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  THESIS QUESTION 
When viewed through the lens of the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, does contemporary defence 
diplomacy legitimize the role of warrior diplomats, generate a net gain in global diplomatic engagement, 
and yield strategic and tactical advantages in COIN?  
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Abstract This thesis investigates the theory and practice of defence diplomacy, a term synonymous with traditional, state-centric diplomacy. Defence diplomacy commonly invokes images of a member of the armed services (man or woman) is full dress uniform among a sea of civilians within an embassy in a foreign country. These people are called Defense Attaché’s (DATT). Despite being a regular feature of diplomatic relations between countries, little is known. The DATT is attached by the sending state he or she represents to an embassy or consulate and charged with the primary responsibility of advising the ambassador on relevant military issues within the host nation (HN). They also serve as a staff contact and liaison within the embassy for military issues, as well as observing and reporting on military developments (Intelligence) in the host country. A distinguishing feature of the DATT, an invaluable ‘link’ in the information chain for the relevant state, is the aiguillette: braided gilded cords worn to distinguish special and senior appointees from senior officers.  This exegesis, Defence Diplomacy: Beyond the Aiguillette provides a comprehensive theoretical and practical review of this understudied yet important and evolving role. It argues that contemporary defence diplomacy is much broader and deeper than this common perception. The misconception is due in part, to a lack of theoretical grounding in analyses to date, which are predominately focused on practice; the ‘who’ and ‘what’ as opposed to the ‘how’ and ‘why’. A revised theory of defence diplomacy based on a strong theoretical foundation not only addresses the ‘why’ question, it also enables a comprehensive assessment of contemporary defence diplomacy, the ‘how’. In practice, defence diplomacy is conducted across the civilian and military (civ/mil) spectrum, well beyond the simple secondment of military personnel to an embassy. This research project is pursuant to confirming whether: empowered by the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, does contemporary 
defence diplomacy legitimize the role of warrior diplomats, generate a net gain in global diplomatic 
engagement, and yield strategic and tactical advantages in counterinsurgency (COIN)?  This document is an adjunct to the Defence Diplomacy in the Long War (Blannin, 2017) research monograph. The monograph evaluates whether long-term operational, institutional, and national security benefits occur when the military, the most kinetic institution of the state, integrates and operationalises its diplomatic capacity in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. It’s a bi-modal document, and its alloyed components are firstly pursuant to the doctorate’s three-part research question. Secondly, it introduces and discusses its research framework: the key questions, the theories, and the multi-disciplinary scope of the project, whilst also ‘telling the story of the research: its motivations, objectives, methods, its findings, as well as further reinforcing its original 
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contribution to the field. Structurally, this paper consists of: a) an introduction which identifies the genesis of its argument as well as the scale and scope of the research; b) a section which situates the thesis within the theoretical concepts which underpin the research; c) a section which tests the hypotheses in a practical context; d) and finally a concluding section which identifies and explains a suite of metrics which support its hypotheses. This document complements Defence Diplomacy in the Long War and represents an integral component of the doctoral research project. However, the numerous practical examples which accompany the theoretical appraisal, notably the detailed assessment of the political advisor and special operations forces personnel, means Defence Diplomacy in the Long War: Beyond the Aiguillette can be read as an independent, comprehensive audit of defence diplomacy. 
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Preface Since the advent of modern civilisation, governments have been the prime and unitary guarantor of its survival and security. While diplomacy and conflict are two axiomatic and visceral options deployed by the state in pursuit of this objective, the thesis examines the role of diplomacy 
in conflict. The thesis asserts that defence diplomacy involves the construction and reproduction of relationships and practices between inter-state military’s and security-oriented departments, which widen and deepen the interdependence and interoperability necessary to establish security in the 21st century. The research investigated how states build relationships via defence diplomacy, establish trust, sustain military coalitions and deter future threats by forming strategically unified and operationally synchronized fronts. The thesis investigates the theory and practice of defence diplomacy, a term synonymous with traditional, state-centric diplomacy; and one which usually invokes images of a member of the armed services (man or woman) in full dress uniform among a sea of civilians within an embassy in a foreign country. These people are Defense Attaché’s (DATT). A distinguishing feature of this invaluable ‘link’ in the information chain for the relevant state is the aiguillette; braided “gilded cords ending in gold metal tagged points, which are worn by officers to distinguish special and senior appointments.”1 Attaché is a French term meaning attached; therefore, the DATT is attached by the state he or she represents to an embassy or consulate with the primary responsibility of advising the ambassador on relevant military issues within the host nation (HN). The DATT also serves as a staff contact and liaison within the embassy for military issues, as well as observing and reporting on military developments (Intelligence) in the host country.  As an expert coordinator of defense-oriented strategy, the DATT may advise senior representatives of government including its head of state. For example, if a state’s military wants to defend a particular city of strategic importance (friendly, allied, or occupied), they may send an attaché to the regional governor’s or mayor's office to facilitate coordination between the military and civil government, thus limiting actions which run counter to both the state and the HN. DATT positions tend to reflect the dominant military service in the host country. For the United States (U.S.), Army and Navy personnel hold most DATT positions as these two branches of the armed 
                                                     
1 DATTs wear the aiguillette on the left-hand side as opposed to the senior officers who wear their aiguillette on 
the right. There are several points of origin for the ornament, such as the rope used to tether knights to their horses, 
or pins used to secure shoulder protector on the armour of a knight or cuirassier’s plate armour or needles used 
for clearing the touch hole of very old muskets. See Australian Army, ‘Our History: Aiguillettes’, Army, (2017).   
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forces are foundational institutions since Independence in 1776.2 For other states, for example, the DATT position in Britain and Japan is a naval officer, while the DATT position in Germany and South Korea is an army officer. DATTs represent their state’s defence department to the HN government and military, assists and advises their ambassador on military matters, and coordinates other political-military actions within their area of accreditation.  This brief introduction to the role of the military attaché provides a grounding for the core theme and title of this document: Defence Diplomacy, Beyond the Aiguillette. The document illustrates that contemporary defence diplomacy is much broader and deeper than the above role description. The misconception is due in part, to a lack of theoretical grounding in analyses to date, which are predominately focused on practice; the who and what as opposed to the how and why. A strong theoretical foundation not only addresses the why question, it also enables a comprehensive assessment of contemporary defence diplomacy; the how. In practice, defence diplomacy is conducted between individual’s across the civilian and military (civ/mil) spectrum, well beyond the simple secondment of military personnel to an embassy overseas. Defence diplomacy facilitates the forging of new security-oriented relationships as well as strengthening existing partnerships. It generates trust and transparency, it can improve a state’s reputation, credibility and status internationally as well as emboldening a government domestically. Defence diplomacy endures, as does its parent concept, diplomacy, because of its ability to illuminate and calm, thus helping states navigate, the turbulent waters of international relations. The thesis is written from a Realist-constructivism perspective (Campbell, 1998; Barkin, 2003; Jackson & Nexon, 2004; Barkin, 2009; Jaafar, 2018). This combination of Realism and Constructivism epitomises the continuity and change aphorism interwoven through this document; being grounded in the traditional yet offering the flexibility and progression which defence diplomacy exudes. It also allows the researcher to explain how traditional tools of statecraft such as diplomacy and the military are used in new and unconventional ways. Additionally, this qualitative study examines the fundamentals of COIN, IR mainstays such as alliance creation in parallel with Traditional Diplomacy theory to gain greater clarity regarding the process of defence diplomacy. Moreover, the thesis supports a ‘militarization of foreign policy’ narrative; arguing that the increase in defence and 
                                                     
2 Four of the five branches of the U.S. Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force & Marine) nominate personnel for 
attaché secondment through the Defense Attaché System (DAS), with successful military staff assigned to the 
Defense Attaché Office (DAO) within the relevant country Embassy or Consulate. The DAO represents the 
Department of Defense (DoD) to the HN while oversight for defense attachés is provided by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and neither the combatant commands or State, the two bodies which defense attachés 
work with on a daily basis. 
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military personnel in a space once the exclusive realm of the professional diplomat, has been paralleled by an increase in Foreign Service Office (FSO) personnel serving alongside their military counterparts.3 In addition, the thesis demonstrates that this new breed of ‘warrior diplomats’ fulfil 
most of the primary objectives of the civilian diplomatic corps, which generates a net gain in global diplomatic engagement.4 The thesis defines U.S. defence diplomacy the construction and reproduction of relationships and practices between inter-state military’s and security-oriented departments, which widen and deepen the interdependence and interoperability necessary to protect its national security interests. 
Defence Diplomacy in the Long War also details how diplomats have been deployed as part of civ/mil stabilization efforts in Afghanistan (and Iraq) at a tactical and operational level to provide unbiased regional insight to field commanders, to interact with local tribal/civic leaders and to assist HN representatives. This type of ‘active’ engagement was mandated at the strategic level, by National 
Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44), introduced by President George W. Bush in 2005. Although legislation previously dictated the HN ambassador as head of mission and the Secretary of State as primary strategic coordinator, NSPD 44 reinforced the vital role of Foreign Service officers (FSO’s) in U.S. global stabilization efforts.5 NSPD 44 articulates how enhanced coordination between the Department of States (State) and the Department of Defense (DoD) in Washington would complement coordination in theatre. This alignment of departmental and operational activities would enhance U.S. efforts to ensure governments abroad could “exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for those who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests” (2005: 2). The Bush administration’s whole-of-government (WoG) model was replicated by many of its Coalition partners. 6 However, the thesis posits that NSPD 44 was a belated response to the combined 
                                                     
3 A by-product of this process has been referred to as “civilianizing military policy” (Jones, 2010), however civilian 
personnel commonly exercise control of military policy decision-making. 
4 This statement is made using Hedley Bull’s five ‘Functions of Diplomacy’ as a frame of reference. Bull identifies 
diplomacy’s principal functions as: Representation, Communication, Negotiation, Information (gathering & 
dissemination), Minimisation of friction, Symbolic function (process & institution) (1977: 164-177). 
5 McCannell notes that the Office of Secretary Defence issued DoD Instruction 3000.05, just prior to NSPD 44, which 
gave stability operations a “priority comparable to combat operations” as well as transferring US$100 million of 
DoD funding to State (2016: 4). The DoD Instruction directed the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to lead and support 
the development of military-civilian teams … as a critical USG stability operations tool” (2005: 3) 
6 NSPD-44 superseded a 1997 presidential decision directive issued by the Clinton White House to formalize 
interagency relationships on what it called “complex contingency operations”; However, Dobbins, Et al., (2003) 
demonstrate U.S. stability operations date back at least as far back at the end of World War II.  
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inter/intra-agency coordination occurring throughout Coalition controlled provinces (Green, 2007; Amend, 2008; Moelker, 2014).7  Applying the lessons learned through a WOG approach, the Coalition shifted from its enemy-centric CT strategy and adopted a population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, transitioning from direct action counterterrorism (CT), to a strategy which incorporated “development initiatives, tribal outreach, and a less kinetic strategy” (Green, 2017: 9). This broad-spectrum, population-centric, WoG COIN/stabilization approach remains in place and the research and analysis of defence diplomacy prioritize this model. Purposefully, neither this document nor 
Defence Diplomacy in the Long War, focused on a particular enemy, in an effort demonstrate the efficacy and universality of defence diplomacy. The document draws upon Sir Robert Thompson’s five principles of COIN for justification for this approach; one of which emphasizes that counter-insurgent (HN and its partners) must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerillas” (Crenshaw, 2012: 15). The thesis recognizes the ubiquity of highly kinetic COIN/CT operations within this framework and evaluates that its findings and recommendations are compatible with all the lines of effort within the current U.S. approach to COIN.8 
                                                     
7 One example of this approach was the combined Australian/Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan (nation building activities) which leveraged the experience gain in previous stability 
operations in Eastern Europe and SE Asia.; Uruzgan was ‘ground zero’ of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 
has remained a pivotal battle-ground for Coalition and Afghan Forces ever since.  
8 The tempo of kinetic operations cannot be ignored. For example, from June 1-Nov. 24 2017, troops assigned to 
Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan enabled or advised 2,175 ground operations and 261 kinetic strikes 
in support of the Afghan Special Security Forces according to figures in the Enhancing Security and Stability in 
Afghanistan report handed to Congress in December 2017 (2017: 6); While its outside the remit of its research, the 
thesis endeavoured to determine whether U.S. efforts to build HN capacity during an active COIN mission while 
conducting highly kinetic CT operations supported or undermined the Coalition’s Afghan strategy.  
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Situating the Thesis Since emerging as a territorial construct after the destruction of the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century, sovereign states have pursued their national interests by any and all of the means available to them. National interests vary between independent sovereign states, representing a state’s political ambition or objectives (raison d’état), and are thus the foundation for the development of policy and strategy. To achieve these political objectives or “to defend or extend what it assesses to be its vital national interests”, the state aspires “to harmonise the instruments of national power” (Dorman & Uttley, 2016: 197, 199). If national interests, or to assign a more familiar and appreciable epithet - ‘desirable goals’, could not be achieved through peaceful or non-violent coercive means, then a state deploys its military apparatus in support of, and to progress their objective.1 This describes the concept of conventional warfare among states; conflicts which in the main have resulted in victory for one state or group of states over a peer opponent(s); an accepted denouement of war. However, as President Abraham Lincoln (March 1861) declared during his inauguration address, “[T]he dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present …;” this description of conventional warfare appears inadequate to explain conflicts which have occurred since the cessation of hostilities on the Korean peninsula in 1953. Over the past several decades, three elements, separate yet equal in their strategic and operational ramifications, have contributed to a complex security environment which continues to challenge our understanding of security, and the military doctrine to achieve it.   First, non-traditional threats such as climate change, global pandemics, and resource scarcity have merged with transnational criminal activity such as piracy and the trafficking of humans, narcotics and weaponry, further complicating the already challenging roles of military planners and policymakers. Secondly, the effects of globalization have amplified the role of the individual collaborator, which “allows localized crises and conflicts to immediately spill beyond their porous regional boundaries and flow directly into the global commons” (Vorndick, July 12, 2017).2 Thirdly, , 
                                                     
1 Stolberg evaluates, that “in a very generic sense, national interests are-that which is deemed by a particular state 
(actor) to be a . . . desirable goal. The attainment of this goal is something that the identifying actor believes will 
have a positive impact on itself” (2008: 4). The author also identifies a 4 tier framework for national interest 
intensity (Survival, Vital, Important & Peripheral) which can serve as a risk assessment tool to assist the decision-
making process, (Ibid: 6-8).  
2 Broadly speaking, globalization aims to create a true global community. Goods, services and people traverse the 
globe, communication is instantaneous and far-reaching and the pace of life in general has increased dramatically. 
It’s an ongoing process by which regional economies, societies and cultures have become integrated through a 
globe network of communication and trade; David Kilcullen defines globalization as “a technology-enabled process 
of improved communications and transportation that enables the freer movement of goods, people, money, 
technology, ideas, and cultures across and within international borders” (2009: 2); General Stanley McChrystal, 
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following the successes of the Gulf War in 1991, an IT-centred, technology-enabled revolution in military affairs (RMA) commenced and continues a relatively unhindered upward trajectory, taking ‘us’ further from a post-WWII, seemingly black and white yet ultimately interim, understanding of warfare and national security.3 Technology is a highly transferable capability itself, with digital and cyber capabilities and the Internet of Things competing equally with traditional military platforms such as a fighter jet, a tank or an aircraft carrier.4 Furthermore, defence companies who manufactured essential elements of U.S. military advantage such as global positioning, precision sensors, advanced computing, even AI and ‘big data’, have been commercialised; transforming military technology into a dual-use commodity (Osoba & Wesler, 2017; Weinbaum, Et al., 2017). As a result, violent non-state actors such as al Qa’ida (AQ) have been able to offset limited conventional capabilities and carry out attacks of strategic consequence, such as the attacks on September 11, 2001, which have destabilised the political status-quo globally. In the 21st century, unconventional, asymmetric warfare and a preponderance of inexpensive baseline capabilities (shoot, move, and communicate), creates a threat environment in which disparate groups of lightly armed militias can undermine the ability of established powers to safeguard global stability.5  
                                                     
former ISAF Commander in Afghanistan, asserts that militants engaged in the global insurgency have been “the 
lucky beneficiaries” of the effects of globalisation; with “their strengths and capabilities being multiplied by a 
convergence of twenty-first century factors” (2015: 4). 
3 Ironically, given the focus of this research, the rapid formation of the “international coalition to expel Saddam 
Hussein’s forces from Kuwait in 1990–91 stands as the high-water mark of marshalling collective will to forcefully 
counter aggression” (Cantwell, 2017); In this regard, US military historian Brian Linn offered particularly persuasive 
commentary, stressing that “before [the global war on terror], the defense community was in the midst of a vibrant 
debate over whether the nature of war itself had changed. Advocates offered the prospect of a glittering future 
through a “Revolution in Military Affairs,” “Military Transformation,” and a “New American Way of War.” But their 
voices were only some, if perhaps the most strident, in a much larger discussion. Others defended the relevance of 
military philosophers such as Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, while still others advocated what General 
Wesley K. Clark termed “modern war— limited, carefully constrained in geography, scope, weaponry and effects.” 
The debate, like the defense community, overflowed with buzzwords—asymmetric conflict, fourth-generation 
warfare, shock and awe, full spectrum dominance—many of which quickly became passé. And with some significant 
exceptions, much of this debate confined itself to hypothetical threats, to the relative merits of weapons systems, 
and to new tactical organizations” (2007: 1-2). 
4 While the highly transferable nature of technology imbues potential opponents with the tools to engage in 
combat, the essential ‘enablers’ of a states military such as leadership, discipline and training are much more 
difficult to aggregate and disseminate. 
5 David Kilcullen’s analysis in Accidental Guerrilla (2009), illustrates the true ‘global’ impact of globalisation in terms 
of its ability to act as a force multiplier for non-state actors and a barrier for Western states is compelling. Kilcullen 
unpacks the dichotomy of globalisation serving to simultaneously draw in and repel individuals with a certain space 
(geographic or virtual) as well as the concept of ‘counter’ versus ‘anti’ globalisation; Thomas Barnett explains the 
‘problem’ of globalisation emerging during the 90’s was a result of competing rule-sets. Barnett claims that similar 
to the 1920’s, in the 1990's the sets were “out of whack, that in the process of expanding the global economy, 
economic rule sets raced ahead of political rule sets. and technological rule sets raced ahead of security rule sets. 
in effect, we wired out much faster than we had the ability to keep pace with in terms of the political and rule sets” 
(June 2004). 
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The accumulated effects of the threats outlined above are not existential for the U.S., a unipolar superpower surrounded by oceans and friendly neighbours. However, its national interests are jeopardised, and the “threats are real enough that few American officials will simply ignore them” (Biddle, Et al., 2017: 1). For example, while campaigning in the last months of the twentieth century, the future President of the U.S, then governor of Texas George W. Bush, somewhat presciently articulated that he was increasingly concerned about “all the unconventional and invisible threats” which emerge from an amalgam of “new technologies and old hatreds” (Bush, September 23, 1999). Two years later President Bush, addressing a traumatized nation post-9/11 declared “[W]e cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather … the United States of America will make that stand” (Bush, September 12, 2002).6 Thus identifying the risk and the need to offset it was clear; developing national security strategies to achieve this objective has proven more difficult. U.S. policy-makers in particular, are in a position in which they must act, but they do so acknowledging that the decisive military (therefore political) competitive advantage the U.S. once held over its conventional adversaries at the end of the 20th century has been eroded.7 Funding constraints over the past two decades have hampered attempts to reverse a deficit to US technological and materiel capabilities. Moreover, achieving military superiority is an ambiguous and fluid objective in multi-domain conflicts with state and non-state opponents.8 Responding to this new reality, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS), Gen. Joseph Dunford, declared that the ‘transregional’ and ‘multifunctional’ nature of contemporary conflicts, requires ‘global integration’ of state’s resources; bringing together capabilities in a unified effort.9 Testifying before Congress in 2017, the CJCS called for a re-evaluation of its significant competitive advantage to enable the U.S. to 
                                                     
6 What is the heritage Bush is pointing too? How are these types of comments perceived by its allies? Does it help 
or hinder combined operations/cooperation? These questions helped guide the research direction for this doctoral 
project. 
7 The erosion of its competitive advantage has thus eroded its capacity to deter. Traditionally, strong nations are 
seldom challenged. 
8 For example, the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command emphasizes that “[W]hile the US has been engaged 
in counter-insurgency operations for the last 15 years, potential adversaries have modernized and studied how we 
fight, and will seek to threaten our critical capabilities” (Multi-Domain Battle, 2016).; While Jeff Danovich claims 
that even if the US does possess “a superior technological advantage over our adversaries in our current conflicts, 
it is the human, not defensive, element that we have come up short on” (May 2017); See also: Haelig, C. ‘Realistically 
Confronting Near-Peer Land Power’, American Security Project, (August 2, 2017).  
9 Gen. Dunford quoted in Dews, F. ‘Joint Chiefs Chairman Dunford on the “4+1 framework” and meeting 
transnational threats’, Brookings, (February 24, 2017); Gen. Dunford quoted in Garamone, ‘J. Dunford: Global 
Security Environment Has Implications for Joint Force’, DoD News, Defense Media Activity, Washington D.C.: US 
Department of Defence, December 1, 2016); This reality is reflected in the increasing prominence of the acronym 
‘TMM’ which stands for” trans-regional, multi-functional, and multi-domain,” see: CJCSN 3500.01, 2015-2018 
Chairman's Joint Training Guidance, (January 12, 2017), p. 4. 
8 
 
project power globally, one which centres on a global network of allies and partners (September 2017). This thesis argues that defence diplomacy enhances the capacity of the U.S. to achieve the former, by generating the latter through a dependable, lower cost and tested process.  Since Herodotus’ chronicling of the Persian Wars, intellectuals have written on the principals, dynamics and transformation of warfare.10 Similarly, the thesis demonstrates that regardless of geographic location or the enemy faced, traditional theories of IR and the entrenched mechanisms available to the sovereign state are not only relevant but indispensable, in achieving its political objectives. Despite the increasingly complex global security environment, diplomacy and war remain two of the most tried and tested me serving a state’s foreign policy. Although more often perceived as mechanisms at opposing ends of the statecraft spectrum, the two are intrinsically connected and serve as mutually supportive means of achieving a state’s foreign policy objectives. Defence diplomacy is the union of these two invaluable means to a state’s policy ends.11 While clearly acknowledged, the concept is inadequately delineated which is somewhat anomalous. Defence 
Diplomacy in the Long War provided examples of generalized and descriptive scholarship. As a result of this approach, as detailed in Defence Diplomacy in the Long War, defence diplomacy is presented erroneously as the use of hard power mechanisms to achieve soft power outcomes. This simplistic description is inadequate to illustrate the utility, scope and ubiquity of the concept. The absence of detailed theoretical analysis of the concept in practice was identified as a gap in research, therefore filling the gap became the researcher’s objective. While being extremely relevant and topical, is also intellectually substantive and presents several perspectives by way of elucidation. To this end, 
Defence Diplomacy in the Long War delivered a case study analysis of the multi-dimensional Coalition COIN effort in Afghanistan, while this document presents an additional layer of nuance and context for the doctoral thesis.   
Rationale, Aims & Structure The thesis presents defence diplomacy as a theory-based construct which helps to explain the rapid commitment of Western states (what Wesley labelled “a broad buy-in”) to offensive operations 
                                                     
10 Yet at the end of the Cold War some scholars argued that “major armed conflict between major powers is on its 
way out” (Van Creveld, 2002: 5). See also: Van Creveld, M. The Transformation of War, (New York: The Free Press, 
1991); Russell, J. Innovation, transformation, and war: Counterinsurgency operations in Anbar and Ninewa, Iraq, 
2005-2007, (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011; Griffin, S. Iraq, Afghanistan and the Future of British 
Military Doctrine: from counterinsurgency to stabilization’, International Affairs, Vol. 87, Iss. 2, (2011), pp. 317-333. 
11 While serving as CJCS, Adm. Mike Mullen spoke of this union, declaring “[M]ilitary forces are some of the most 
flexible and adaptable tools available to policymakers. We can, merely, by our presence, help alter certain 
behaviour … Before a shot is even fired, we can bolster a diplomatic argument, support a friend or deter an enemy” 
(March 3, 2010).  
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in “a country in which no Asian or European ally had any strategic stake” – Afghanistan (2017: 12). The thesis extrapolates and tests the concept by examining the importance of relationships (Keohane, 1971), the efficacy of capacity building (capability aggregation) (Morrow, 1991; Katagiri, 2016), the dependability of allies (Leeds, 2003; Foley, Et al., 2011), the ability of alliances/coalitions to shape the environment, and whether these formations generate improvements in interoperability in COIN/CT (Larsen, 2008). Admiral Mullen concluded that “whatever drawbacks of alliance management there may be, they are more than outweighed by the benefits of operating in unison …  we have become the best COIN force in the world, and we didn’t do it alone.  We had a lot of help” (March 3, 2010). This research project critically examined Admiral Mullen’s statement in its totality. Additionally, it investigated the concept from both the civ/mil personnel involved, as well as the process of defence diplomacy. This approach was chosen to demonstrate that the process of diplomacy has been enhanced by both the relationships it created as well as the engagement undertaken by partners of the Coalition. The thesis presents defence diplomacy as a predictable yet adaptable, efficient and effective, reliable and resilient structure from which states pursue their foreign policy and national security objectives in a complex international system.12 It also concludes that the act of defence diplomacy oriented engagement, as well as the actors (agency-civilian or military), is what makes defence diplomacy an integral component of U.S. foreign policy throughout the Long War. This conclusion is illustrated in detail through a discussion of the POLAD and SOF operator in Appendix 4. The thesis maintains that defence diplomacy exists almost exclusively within the ambit of a state-centric system, therefore Traditional state-centric diplomacy constitutes the theoretical foundation for this research.13 The Traditional approach views diplomacy as a part of the “dialogue between sovereign states over the ‘haute politique’ - mainstays such as war, military alliances, territory, geopolitics, and traditional political-military concerns” (Watson, 1982: 1). Despite a concerted, if at times forced, effort to move beyond the vertical and horizontal stratification and time-honoured cultures developed over centuries, this research unpacks the apparent contradiction between the use of a traditional, state-centric mechanism in a dynamic and increasingly complex security environment. The thesis asserts that defence diplomacy enhances a state’s adaptability against complex security challenges because it incorporates the embedded instruments of strategic 
                                                     
12 For example: Drucker differentiates between efficient and effective actions, emphasizing that “Efficiency is doing 
things right; effectiveness is doing the right things” (2002: 2); Moreover, defence diplomacy’s reliability comes from 
its flexibility and ability to absorb the dynamism of complex environments.  
13 The thesis uses the term ‘almost’ because there are opportunities for non-state actors to engage in either Track 
1.5 (State to NSA) or Track 2 (NSA TO NSA) security oriented engagement. Appendix 5 explores these opportunities. 
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power and statecraft: diplomacy, information, military, and economics (DIME) (Burkhart & Wooly, 2017; McChrystal, 2015).  Ideally, identifying a stable construct to anchor the thesis would counter the dynamism of the Long War, yet the two instruments at the center of this research project, diplomacy and the military, continue to evolve. For example, diplomacy was faced with a crisis of relevance and identity, often criticized for lacking flexibility both in practice and in personnel. Over five decades, Vansittart (1950), Korbel (1962), Porter (1981), and Ramsay (2006) posed the question “Is Diplomacy Dead”? Diplomacy was deemed incapable of responding to the “shifting political and social dynamics, diplomats “exemplified the helplessness of men of the status quo, when change was the call of the day. Prudence was miscast as appeasement and juxtaposed against the posture of gladiators” (Sofer, 2001: 111). However, the ‘gladiators’ weren’t without criticism. It may be true that “[W]e know everything there is to know about war, unsurprisingly, since we have variable access to at least 2500 years of bloody history. But we know nothing, literally zero, for certain about the wars of the future, even in the near-term” (Gray, 2010: 5). Despite the pessimism, this study identifies the oft-cited ‘continuity and change’ aphorism is applicable, and indeed is deeply ingrained, in rationalizing the role of defence diplomacy in the Long War. Early on in the research process, the thesis determined that, just as ‘our’ enemies endure and adapt. so do ‘our’ established mechanisms to counter them 
Defence Diplomacy in the Long War demonstrates that the process of defence diplomacy emerges stronger from the Afghan experience.  However, prominent academics have argued that “[I]f everything is diplomacy, then diplomacy no longer means anything useful, and we can give up using the term, was a constant consideration” (Riordan, 2017: para. 4). Therefore, re-conceptualising defence diplomacy could be construed as counterproductive to improving IR scholarship in general and Diplomatic Studies in particular by introducing another ‘new’ diplomacy. Given this dilemma, this study sought to illuminate rather than obscure defence diplomacy, seeking to define an existing term and update the theory and practice of the term. The thesis achieves this objective, yet it emphasizes the debate over the ‘diluting’ of diplomacy through the introduction of ‘new diplomacies’ has been an impediment to research as scholars are compelled to justify broadening the concept to the detriment of a thorough discussion on theory and contemporary practice. This is not unique to diplomacy with similar discussions occurring within defence regarding entrenched concepts across the policy, strategic and tactical realms. The comparison, and some may say resistance to revaluation, is evident in both diplomacy and defence spheres.  
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Moving from the process to the personnel, the thesis illustrates that although the role of the soldier has evolved over centuries as political systems change and technology advances, there has been a clearly identifiable change in the role of personnel across the civ/mil spectrum over the past several decades. The thesis argues that the often complementary evolution of the soldier and the statesperson is as much inherent as it is reactionary. For example, Hedley Bull and Sasson Sofer recognised that both the diplomat and the soldier worked towards a state’s foreign policy objectives Bull noted that “war also exemplifies the conduct of international relations by official agents”, while emphasising the parallel path each actor took declaring, “diplomatists differ from soldiers in that they confine themselves to peaceful means” (1977: 157). Similarly, Sofer highlighted that diplomats and military men “are actors on two fronts … the diplomat’s sword is never drawn from its sheath … the diplomat’s creed is that of obedience, he seeks not to conquer” (2001: 108). Reveron evokes the sword analogy from the soldier’s perspective when identifying the parallel/convergence of roles dichotomy, emphasising that “offensive military capabilities have been utilised for cooperative purposes however this does not mean that ‘swords have been beaten into ploughshares’” (2016: 7). We can juxtapose the assessment of Bull, Sofer and Reveron with a speech to U.S. forces by President Clinton early in the post-Cold War period where he stated, “You will be called upon in many ways in this new era to keep the peace, to relieve suffering, to help teach officers from new democracies in the ways of a democratic army, and still ... to win our wars” (May 29, 1993). This is quite a remit!  
Defence Diplomacy in the Long War argues that victory in war is achieved because of diplomacy while diplomacy in many cases is at its most effective because it’s supported by a strong military. While most academics hold this statement as self-evident, recent scholarship reflects perhaps a broader acknowledgement of the complementary nature of diplomacy and defence.14 However, the need to collate and present the evolution and convergence of civ/mil roles in 21st-century diplomacy validates the objective of this doctoral research project to reconceptualise defence diplomacy in theory, as well as re-evaluating the concept in practice, especially given the strategic direction of the nascent Trump administration. Senior administration officials have been open in their chagrin of multilateral fora and have prioritised its pursuit of “constructive, results-oriented bilateral relations” (Tillerson, June 21, 2017). Therefore, the reflection, examination and review of the formation and 
                                                     
14 For example, Riordan reinforcing that diplomacy does not necessarily equate with the “pursuit of peace and 
international understanding. It can be, if that is what their political masters instruct the diplomats to pursue. But 
equally diplomacy can be used to provoke war, or secure better conditions for fighting one (think Bismarck in 1869 
or Blair in 2003)” (2017: para. 3). While practitioner turned scholar, Wanda Nesbitt, emphasizes that “our (U.S.) 
best statesmen and diplomats did not shy away from the military but were well versed in the use of force - and 
could persuasively articulate when its use was appropriate and when it was not” (2017: 28). 
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management of U.S./Coalition multilateral engagement within this thesis represents not only a unique, but purposeful academic exercise. This comprehensive assessment complements recent studies which have identified changes in diplomacy such as differences in “the nature of treaty commitments” globally, as well as the way different states leverage “multilateralism versus bilateralism, strategic geography and levels of development” (Wesley, 2017: 13). There are similarities, as well as increasing areas of convergence, in 21st-century warfare as “grey zone/hybrid threats” increasingly “challenge interoperability,” and are the primary cause of “tension between regional and global focus for alliance action (as well as) … alliance structures” (Ibid).15 Additionally, defence diplomacy encompasses tasks related to military-technical issues, as well as military operations other than war (MOOTW) including those related to humanitarian aid and development. 
Defence Diplomacy in the Long War and this document examined these elements and the theoretical foundations which underpin the role of defence diplomacy in mitigating these challenges today, presenting it as a reliable, yet adaptable mechanism for partners across the globe in the future. One of the central motivations for the research project is determining how defence diplomacy abets like-minded states to build relationships with each other conducive to the formation of alliances, coalitions or strategic partnerships which generate the ‘unity of effort’ required to progress foreign policy objectives and deliver national security. Therefore, defining unity of effort and alliances, and identifying a replicable model of it in practice was a primary step. U.S. Army Field 
Manual 100-5 ‘Operations’, declares that ‘unity of effort’ achieved through synchronicity “means more than coordinated action” as it delivers all-pervading unity of effort” whereby every action from every element is a result of a comprehensive understanding of intent which complement and reinforce each other, greatly magnifying their individual effects” (1982: 2-3).16 Despite being an older field manual, this thesis suggests this description more accurately reflects the use of synchronicity in a WOG approach to national security. The thesis demonstrates that the efficacy of an alliance/coalition is contingent on synchronicity; that is to align as closely as possible, the capabilities and strategy of partner states to generate unity of effort.  
                                                     
15 Two of the most influential actors in contemporary COIN, David Kilcullen and Gen. Stanley McChrystal provide 
their assessment of hybrid and grey-zone warfare. Kilcullen argues that ‘hybrid warfare’ is the most accurate 
descriptor for modern conflicts: incorporating “irregular warfare, civil war, insurgency, and terrorism that, coupled 
with local conditions, blends into a hybrid threat” (2009: 346). While McChrystal articulates his experience of the 
challenges of grey-zone warfare on coalition efforts in Iraq, declaring it was not a war of planning and discipline: it 
was one of agility and innovation” (2015: 14). 
16 The US DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, US Joint Publication 1-02 defines synchronisation as the 
arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a 
decisive place and time (2016: 1-02). While LWD 3-03, Formation Tactics, presents he arrangement of related and 
mutually supporting actions in time, space and purpose to maximise their combined intended effects (2016: 169).  
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Unity of effort through sustainable alliances delivers tactical and strategic objectives. Kenneth Waltz specified alliances as treaty bound, threat-specific arrangements, where “[T]he common interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states” (1979:166). While O’Neil defines an alliance as “a formal bilateral and multilateral commitment by states to support other states in defending their security” (2017: 2). Crescenzi, Et al. also focus the formality of the engagement, defining an alliance as a “formal agreement between two or more states to coordinate their actions” (2012: 262). While the thesis broadly agrees with these definitions of traditional alliances, it highlights that as the threat changes, so too does the nature of the arrangement.  The thesis accepts that it is the formal, treaty-bound aspect of alliances which “differentiate them from coalitions or alignments of common security interest among states” (O’Neil, 2017: 2). However, it examines formal and informal security oriented engagement, and demonstrates that coalitions and strategic partnerships replicate significant features of ‘traditional’ alliance operation, such as combined/joint policy-making, active burden-sharing, projecting shared values and intra-alliance bargaining.17 Moreover, accepting that coalitions and strategic partnerships do not revolve around mutual defence clauses such as NATO’s Article 5, the thesis argues that a genuine and robust normative commitment is manifest in defence diplomacy even in relation to coalitions (Schmidt, 2010; Zhongping & Jing; Envall & Hall)    The thesis posits that contemporary alliances have evolved from the some-what rigid guidelines espoused in 20th century scholarship and adopts the definition of Walt who saw “[A]n alliance (or alignment) is a formal (or informal) commitment for security cooperation between two or more states, intended to augment each member's power, security and /or influence” (2009: 86). Consequently, alliance and coalition are interspersed throughout the document. While the term alliance will be most evident in direct quotations, coalition will be used more generally. An alliance is a pact or treaty between two or more parties, made in order to advance common goals and to secure common interests. A coalition is also an alliance, but usually temporary or a matter of convenience. It is a joining of forces usually with overlapping interests rather than opposing. This elementary delineation identifies the similarities between the two concepts as well as revealing that further scrutiny of the differences is redundant for the purposes of this thesis. Additionally, the term Coalition (upper-case C) denotes the combined U.S.-led CT campaign and U.S./NATO COIN effort in the Long War. Ultimately, the alliance or coalition is not the focus of the thesis and discussing the 
                                                     
17Strategic partnerships tend to be bilateral in structure and orient around economics rather than traditional 
security, although economic security is of parallel importance in terms of non-traditional threats to national 
security. However, when strategic partnership in studied in IR, often involving EU or ASEAN member states, it 
generally indicates any formal security oriented agreement “within a broader, generic concept of alignment” 
(Chidley, 2014: 141).   
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differences or convergence in a theoretical sense is beyond the remit of this study, yet it’s important to clarify the terminology given its prominence as a vehicle to demonstrate defence diplomacy. The thesis examines the continuity and change in both the characteristics and nature of diplomacy and war because identifying changes without historical and situational context generates poor scholarship. Gray emphasises that “[A]lthough all wars have the essentials in common … the details are always changing (2012: 7). Moreover, “those changes are often confused, inflated by hubris or ahistorical ignorance into a resounding claim that the nature of war has changed too” (Maurer, 2017: 10). The thesis maintains that past is present, with history providing evidence to 
inform and guide its research and subsequent discussion. For example, over two thousand years ago Thucydides wrote of a triptych of war and the thesis asserts that his prescient hypothesis is applicable to this study. The three elements, ‘fear, honour/culture, interest,’ are manifest in contemporary conflict and diplomacy, and are equally important to theoretical discussions as they are in policy-making.18 Unquestionably influenced by Thucydides, Clausewitz articulated two applicable triptychs of his own with the ‘passion, chance and reason’ trinity as well as the ‘government, 
the army and the people’ triad (Smith, 1993; Villarcres & Bassford, 1995; Stone, 2007; Freidman, 2014). Like the Thucydidean triptych, the thesis proposes that the innate human characteristics and immutable nature of warfare discussed by the Prussian Major General, are both relevant, and advantageous for this research Simpson, 2012). To complete a triplet of influential triptych’s, Kenneth Waltz proposed that understanding when and why states deployed military force involves three factors: “bellicose human nature fired by long-held customs and traditions … the structure of the belligerent states (how domestic policies constrain or fuel foreign affairs), and the international system of those states competing with or against each other” (1959: 12-17).  Evoking these triptych’s, simply referencing ‘Clausewitzian’ terminology and his elucidation of war, or incorporating latent military theories can, however, cause ire among some scholars (Van Creveld, 2002; Osinga, 2006; Baker, 2015; Thomas, 2017) Griffin for example, identifies “major shortfalls with Clausewitz’ language and definition of victory as it relates to COIN” (2014: 2). While Cassidy and Tame insist that “at no time have we more superficially or detrimentally applied Clausewitz than in the Global War on Terror, or the Long War” (2017). However, the thesis 
                                                     
18 The triptych was an enduring presence throughout this research, demonstrating its significance in the civ/mil 
decision-making process and the formation of security relationships. Thucydides intended his work to be “a 
possession for all time” (Strassler, 1998: 15), and … “we come to realise the complexities of modern life have not 
rendered everything experienced by past generations irrelevant to the problems of today … (providing) a sound 
basis from which to discover how best to approach the complex problems facing contemporary strategists, allowing 
us to better understand war’s continuities and discontinuities” (Gilchrist 2016). 
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continuously justifies this historical approach and insists that while COIN is a particular form of warfare, “it is still warfare and thus subject to the same immutable and timeless forces as any other war” (Freidman, 2014: 89).19 Richard Betts articulates the need to look into the past to understand the present, noting: 
Reminders of the limits of theory ring true to practical people. But if causes and effects are 
hopelessly random, then there is no hope for informed policy. Terminal uncertainty, however, is 
not an option for statesmen. They cannot just take shots in the dark, so they cannot do without 
some assumptions about how the world works … Policymakers need intellectual anchors if they are 
to make informed decisions that are any more likely to move the world in the right direction than 
the wrong one (2013: 79).  The thesis identified commonalities, especially in the strategic realm, and these enduring elements serve as the anchor for this research project. This approach is supported by scholars and practitioners alike (McMaster, 2008; Gray, 2010; Harrison, 2017; Rehman, 2017). Therefore, this paper will reference significant strategy and strategists (military and diplomacy) where necessary to support its hypotheses and to add context to the discussion. Finally, the thesis acknowledges its biases, Western in general and U.S. in particular, regarding the terms and concepts used, as well as its diplomatic and military theoretical and practical foundations. For example, Bonadonna declares that: “the civilization of the West could not have flourished had it not created a uniquely effective style of war fighting ... (and while) the defense of Western civilization has been an important and traceable achievement of Western military professionals, the contribution of these professionals has gone beyond war fighting. It has also been cognitive, cultural, ethical, and even ontological” (2017: 1); While Wiseman claims that if the U.S. “is an exceptional country that conducts itself internationally in an exceptional manner, does it not follow that U.S. diplomacy will be similarly exceptional?” (2012: 236).. Definitions are also embedded in the use of language, and, as language is an aspect of the bounded nature of cultures, any attempt to offer a global perspective on war or diplomacy, automatically faces a major conceptual hurdle. Some suggest that such “Eurocentricism: the long-standing use of Western analytical concepts to describe global military history” is in part due to “a general failure to probe the wider resonances of analytical concepts” (Black, 2005: 61). However, the thesis intentionally views defence diplomacy and its attributed components through a Western tinted lens.  
                                                     
19 Similarly, Gray argues that “COIN cannot be debated intelligently as a general and generic project any more than 
can war and its warfare. COIN effort is a subset of effort in war, and—save in moral context—it makes no sense to 
attempt to argue about either, save with specific reference to particular cases” (2012: 17). 
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Despite this, objects viewed through this lens may appear different depending on where one stands, and the thesis is conscious of perception variations within the West’s ‘Long War’ Coalition. For example, the military trajectory, strategic culture, force doctrine and public norms of Australia are different to those of Germany or The Netherlands, just as the military history of Afghanistan is scarcely comparable to that of the U.S. Relatedly, the acknowledged biases do not extend into assumptions or judgements as to the ideal, best or even better system or systems of governance, government and/or social structures; it merely presents the situation as it has been since 2001.20 Similarly, where recommendations are made in the final section, they are oriented toward how to improve accuracy when measuring existing structures, strategies and operations rather than redesigning Afghan COIN. Structurally, Defence Diplomacy: Beyond the Aiguillette follows a logical and progressive formula. Following this brief preface which frames the overall doctoral research project, each subsequent section explains and justifies its referent(s) before transitioning to the next section. The first section incorporates the who, what and why of defence diplomacy. Building on the comprehensive literature review presented in Defence Diplomacy in the Long War which defined Traditional diplomacy and defence diplomacy and examined the fundamental tenets and principles at a granular level, this document discusses the theoretical foundation which supports the thesis and its inter-related hypotheses. The first section illustrates that defence diplomacy revolves around the construction and reproduction of security-oriented relationships and practices between states, and in so doing, demonstrates how it widens and deepens the interdependence necessary to support diplomacy’s role in establishing security in the 21st century.  The second section builds upon the detailed conceptual analysis within the research monograph.  Whereas Defence Diplomacy in the Long War demonstrated the utility, role and scope of defence diplomacy through a case study analysis of the Afghan theatre 2001-2014, the exegesis focuses on the tools (security force assistance, foreign internal defence, and train, advice & assist) and those who work with them (the political advisor (POLAD) and Special Operations Forces personnel (SOF)). The appendices which accompany the second section project the POLAD and SOF 
                                                     
20 This approach aims to inoculate the research from those who claim “there is a tendency to see the Western state, 
a defined body with unlimited sovereignty (albeit within the norms of the international order), as the model for 
governmental development, and to claim that Western expansion, especially at the expense of governmental 
systems that were not suited to the maintenance of substantial standing forces, demonstrated the validity of this 
analysis. However, this model does not adequately explain the varied nature of governmental structures and 
political developments in the present day at the global scale, nor, indeed, the complex relationship between these 
developments and military capability (Black, 2005: 62). 
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as agents of contemporary defence diplomacy to reinforce defence diplomacy’s ability to translate its theoretical potential into positive, practical outcomes.  Finally, the third section examines the issue of metrics, identifying measures used, and determining their efficacy and accuracy, and offers recommendations to improve how progress towards U.S. foreign policy objectives is measured. Success is a disputed and objective concept between organizations, states and Coalitions. However, regardless of the individual parameters for ‘achieving success,’ one commonality is results. Results are outcomes of an action and these outcomes are measurable. However, it’s easier to acknowledge than to practice. For example, it’s acknowledged that an insurgent or militia ‘wins by not losing,’ but obviously, states cannot use the same metric for success (Record, 2005; Stoker, 2009; Paul, Et al, 2010; Clarke, Gill & Dunigan, 2013; Kilcullen, 2016). Those seeking to measure diplomacy-oriented success face similar challenges. A 2010 USG report found that although State had twenty-one public diplomacy performance measures, the majority measured outputs (how much) not outcomes (to what effect) (U.S. ACPD, 2010: 13). While these type of metrics determine whether ‘talk is cheap’ they would not pass the suitable metric test in peacetime let alone an active conflict zone. The thesis determined there is a need to identify appropriate metrics to evaluate, in an accurate and replicable manner, progress in defence diplomacy-oriented engagement. Section three of the paper concludes the doctoral research project by detailing how it tested its hypotheses. 
Methodology The methodology adopted for the thesis is a qualitative case study analysis. However, owing to the growing acceptance of qualitative case study research in IR, the thesis emphasises that:  
[G]iven the contextual nature of the case study and its strength in addressing contemporary 
phenomena in real-life contexts … there is a need for articles that provide a comprehensive 
overview of the case study process from the researcher’s perspective, emphasizing methodological 
considerations … addressing the whole range of choices concerning specific design requirements, 
data collection procedures, data analysis, and validity and reliability (Bendichte Meyer 2001: 330)21   Consequently, what follows is an explanation and justification for not only selecting qualitative methods but also a validation for the particular case study research design as well as the adoption of an exegesis-style format.  
                                                     
21 Bendichte Meyers highlights when case studies are used “the scope of methodology sections in articles published 
in journals is far too limited to give the readers a detailed and comprehensive view of the decisions taken in the 
particular studies” (2001: 330). 
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Although quantitative methodology has proven effective for previous studies of U.S. COIN/CT such as Lum, Et al. (2006), Connable & Libicki, (2010), Adams, Et al. (2011), Gaibulloev & Sandler (2014), Carter (2015) and the U.S. Government Committee on Foreign Affairs reports in 2007 and 2014, the context and diverse data of quantitative methods would not support the directive for this study. The thesis acknowledges that qualitative research methods often face resistance within academia for being unscientific, exploratory, and subjective. While others deride qualitative research for “an emphasis on the qualities of entities and on processes and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured (if measured at all) in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000: 8). However, the ‘apparent’ weaknesses identified by Denzin & Lincoln are the elements which justify the selection qualitative method. A quantitative study which analyzed defence diplomacy inputs; i.e., amount of mil/mil engagement, joint-combined exercises, personnel exchanges, budget allocations, etc. (the who and what), would fail to accurately capture outcomes. More importantly, a quantitative study would not reveal the how and why states pursue defence diplomacy oriented engagement. Through a process of inductive reasoning, hypotheses were generated and an argument mounted to support the thesis. The thesis was strengthened through a process of deductive reasoning as ongoing research delivered greater knowledge of the referent and further supportive evidence was collated. This study identifies the positive attributes of a qualitative approach and demonstrates the quality scholarship it generates. Relatedly, applying the qualitative methods of content analysis and grounded theory (Crowther & Lancaster, 2012) permits an examination of the vast diplomacy and military canon, primary source government documents, peer-reviewed journals, first person reflective literature, and a variety of open source intelligence (OSINT), which are prioritized for their recency, accuracy, objectivity and relevance.  Additionally, in terms of metrics, data sets drawn from existing Long War research are cross-referenced with official primary source documentation. This process establishes strategic, tactical and operational intent, which when combined with the corresponding strategic and/or tactical outcome, can be triangulated with analyses from multiple private and public sector sources (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 2005; Crowther & Lancaster, 2012; Ridder, 2017). This process is replicated throughout the case study sections to demonstrate a correlation or divergence between intended and actual outcomes of defence diplomacy oriented engagement.  The breadth and depth of the resources examined during this study was in part due to the multidisciplinary nature of the subject matter, and in part due to a conscious effort to examine peripheral texts to identify ‘abstract’ thoughts and theories. Bain and Nardin recently wrote that 
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“International Relations scholars often read their own ideas into texts instead of getting ideas from them – ideas that if properly understood have the potential to undermine theirs. By ignoring non-canonical texts, we overlook resources that are necessary to establish the historical contexts of canonical writing” (2017: 213).     Qualitative data was also derived from semi-structured interviews with academics and practitioners associated with the disciplines of diplomacy and strategic studies. Semi-structured interviews were chosen for two reasons, firstly, because questions can be prepared ahead of time both parties can work with an allocated timeframe and secondly, interviewees are able to articulate their views in their own terms. Secondly, semi-structured interviews can provide reliable, comparable qualitative data used in the triangulation process. The interviews were conducted in person where applicable, in a setting selected by the participant for accessibility and comfort. Where meetings cannot be conducted in person, various forms of electronic communication such as Skype, telephone and email were utilised. An additional benefit of conducting semi-structured interviews permitted the author to test the thesis in the real world which provided feedback and critique of the concept. This information allowed adjustments to be made as research progressed. For example, private discussions with current and former ADF personnel identified the existence of a cultural aspect of the Australian soldier which is compatible with leading combined-interagency operations as well as identifying the reason that Australia’s are sought after, and excel, in train-and-assist roles. Personal biases of interviewees were also taken into consideration and requests for anonymity were respected. There are sound justifications for the selection of a case study method evidenced in many respectable general reviews detailing the benefits of this methodology (George, 1979; Ragin & Becker, 1992; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006; Bennett & Elman, 2006, 2007; Gerring, 2007). Case studies allows the researcher to understand and interpret a spatially and temporally bounded set of events while contributing to the construction and validation of theoretical propositions (George & Bennett, 2005; Levy 2008). Yet some posit that a case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, while other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building. The thesis disagrees and adopts a combined Theory-guided/theory building/theory elaboration (Levy, 2001; Kohlbacher, 2006; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2011; Fisher, 2017), Hypothesis-generating (George & Smoke, 1974; Bates et al., 1998; Levy 2008) and Hypothesis-Testing (Eckstein & Lijphart, 1975; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2015) case study design. The integrated case study design enables the researcher to describe, interpret, and explain an individual historical episode, make generalized determinations and identify causal mechanisms (such as the concepts explored in this document), as well as test, re-evaluate and 
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re-test its assumptions. The thesis stresses that it emphasizes theory elaboration and theory guided, with theory-building a value-adding second-order outcome of the research. The integrated case study design may differ somewhat from the conventionally accepted practices of case study research, however, the thesis maintains this does not detract from the strength of the methodology and case design and may in fact overcome some gaps in single case study design (Eisenhardt 1991; Yin, 1994; Stake 2005). Moreover, the integrated design has been examined by Welch, Et al. (2011) who evaluated the correlation and divergence/strengths and weaknesses between theory building (Eisenhardt), interpretive sense making (Stake) and contextualized explanation (Regin, Baskar). The integrated design has been labeled “homegrown” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 534), but the thesis adopts the term ‘issue appropriate integrated case study design.’ This design remains true to traditional methodological steps: the role of the case; the collection of date; and, the analysis of data (Ridder, 2016). The thesis adopted an integrated case study design because it a case study to be the best method to produce replicable and actionable research outputs. Case studies are effective wherever “when ‘how or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Kohlbacher, 2006: 4). They allow one “to study many different aspects, examine them in relation to each other, view the process within its total environment and also use the researchers’ … empathic understanding of human behaviour (Gummerson, 1988: 76). A finally, “case study research has its strength in creating theory by expanding constructs and relationships within a distinct setting” (Ridder, 2017: 282). These three descriptions are highlighted because they accurately describe the format, process and objective for this research project.   The Long War in Afghanistan case study was selected for two reasons. First, the case itself is of interest; the Long War been one of the most prominent, and ongoing international security issues of the 21st-century. And second, it is theoretically significant as the most appropriate case to offer insights into the referent object and thus deliver the most robust and substantive research outcomes; the evolving nature of the conflict and the strategy adaptation revealed multiple cases within the Long War case study. The Afghan case study’s evolution from 2001-2014 could otherwise be labelled a classic longitudinal case study (Eisenhardt, 1989) which is acknowledged as allowing the researcher to investigate a single case at several points in time (Ridder, 2017) rather than a multi-case design (Yin 2014) which the thesis concluded introduced unmanageable variables. As a result, the Afghan case study represents more than a singular spatially and temporally bound set of events. 
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This offsets the criticism that the single case study cannot contribute to scientific development because researchers cannot generalize from a single case. Additionally, the Afghan Long War case study represents both an extreme case and a critical case. An extreme case offers the possibility of more nuanced analysis and detailed findings of a particular or unusual case because it activates more actors and mechanisms in the situation studied. Whereas a critical case has broader strategic importance in relation to a general problem (Flyvbjerg, 2017). More detailed justifications for choosing the Long War in Afghanistan were made in Defence 
Diplomacy in the Long War, where it emphasises the importance of:  
a case study of U.S. defence diplomacy during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and as part of 
NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. The U.S. 
is a valuable referent object for inquiry because its diplomacy is heavily militarised, it has a history 
of over two centuries of defence diplomacy, and it has been both a target and offensive sovereign 
entity in the Long War. Besides further validating theory into practice the aim of this case study is 
to provide an alternate lens through which to view U.S. engagement in Afghanistan post 9/11. The 
Afghan case study enables an examination of both external and host nation (HN) partners, 
providing multiple levels of analysis” (2017: 6) George & Bennett (2005) and Gerring (2007) describe a case study as a comprehensive examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events. This succinct description encapsulates the justification for using a case study of the Long War in Afghanistan to analyse U.S. defence diplomacy which allows the findings of this analysis to understand other contemporary conflicts as well as inform future research. Finally, the format of the paper is consistent with two accepted models of exegeses - the Context Model and the Commentary Model. These models are chosen because of their complementary nature, allowing the scholar to generate a comprehensive ‘Part B’ to the research monograph’s ‘Part A.’ This bi-modal document, with its alloyed components pursuant of the doctorate’s three-part research question, presents the research framework: the key questions, the theories, and the multi-disciplinary scope of the project; as well as ‘telling the story of the research’: it’s motivations, objectives, methods, its findings, as well as further reinforcing its original contribution to the field (Milech & Schilo, 2004; Krauth, 2002; Perry 1998).22 As such, this paper communicates and clarifies the researcher’s intent by discussing the abductive process and other influential factors. Approaching the document in this manner ensures that, while the research monograph and this document are written in different styles, the latter serves as an integral component of the doctoral research project, 
                                                     
22 Perry emphasises that the exegesis is often presented “as raw when in fact it is sophisticated. It presents itself as 
a kind of diary when really it is an oration.” 
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and not a token offering or a disassociated afterthought. However, given the numerous practical examples which accompany the theoretical appraisal, the document can be detached from the monograph and read as an independent, comprehensive audit of defence diplomacy.  
Defence Diplomacy in the Long War evaluates whether long-term operational, institutional, and national security benefits occur when the military, the most kinetic institution of the state, integrates diplomacy to achieve a state’s foreign policy objectives. Whereas this document focuses on the theoretical principles which underpin the research as well as introducing multiple examples which tests the theories validity. The Defence Diplomacy in the Long War identifies and fills a gap in existing analyses of the military campaign in Afghanistan triggered by terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001; thereafter dubbed and expanded into the Long War. It also revives and updates the theoretical foundations of defence diplomacy as well as demonstrating how defence diplomacy enhances the management of unconventional warfare in the 21st-century. Once more, Defence 
Diplomacy: Beyond the Aiguillette augments the published research monograph by presenting a critical interpretation, of the multiple theoretical elements investigated, influenced and incorporated into the research project.  
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Section 1: Defence Diplomacy Theory: Why it works 
Introduction This thesis maintains that diplomats, in their traditional, albeit evolving guise, remain a conduit by which information is conveyed to relevant parties (states) and diplomacy remains of fundamental importance to the international system. Diplomacy and those who engage in it represent “a stable construct in an unstable world,” (Sofer, 1988, 2017) as it’s “first and last, a set of assumptions, institutions and practices for handling certain kinds of relations between human beings” (Sharp, 2009: 13). Sofer and Sharp’s description presents a particularly universal notion, which is useful when reconceptualising the broader diplomatic corps. However, the thesis recognises that this universality can hinder an in-depth assessment of what constitutes diplomacy.23 Despite the potential to undermine the strength of diplomacy by making ‘everything’ diplomacy, the thesis was able to connect the traditional civilian diplomat to the opposite end of the civ/mil spectrum: the soldier. Scholars had previously identified the links between the diplomat and soldier which anchored this research project as it sought to test its hypotheses. The statement below from Ambassador Chas Freeman below is one such example, and its premise is henceforth woven throughout this document. Freeman declared that military personnel and diplomats: 
constitute a learned profession. They possess a high degree of generalised and systematic 
knowledge, a characteristic doctrine of problem analysis and resolution, an orientation to the 
service of community rather than individual interests, a sense of fraternity and shared experience 
and a (largely unwritten) code of ethics to guide their interaction with the government and publics 
they serve (1997: ix)  The thesis argues that the involvement of military personnel in diplomacy generates a net gain in global diplomatic engagement. It evaluates that, for a number of reasons, FSOs were not operating from a position of strength, therefore broadening the diplomatic corps was a matter of necessity rather than a positive proactive exercise. The perception of diplomacy’s demise is partly explained by a limited understanding by some scholars, journalists and other commentators regarding what diplomacy is and is not, and how it relates to the contemporary international system. Some view the professional diplomat as redundant because their role in foreign policy has diminished (Wiseman, 1999; Constantinou, 2010). Sir Harold Nicolson espoused the essential qualities for a diplomat were 
“Truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good temper, modesty and loyalty … intelligence, knowledge, 
                                                     
23 Even Sharp points out that “other people negotiate, represent, report, build coalitions, and seek to reconcile … 
without obviously being diplomats or engaging in diplomacy,” (2009: 63). 
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discernment, prudence, hospitality, charm, industry, courage and even tact” (1942: 136). However, Ramsay (2006) argued that Nicholson’s values are as idealist as the international conventions in which they operate. Yet this thesis contends that the diplomat and diplomacy remain front and center in the management of relations between disparate sovereign entities, therefore it’s a case of evolution rather than irrelevance.24 Throughout the canon of diplomacy, a phrase is consistently conjured to describe the essence of diplomacy’s durability and adaptability: continuity and change. For some academics, continuity and change involve an ongoing, incremental, accumulative process (Der Derian, 1987; Sofer 1988; Wiseman, 1999; Jόnsson & Hall, 2003). While other suggest it’s the diplomat itself which represents continuity in a changing world (Hocking, 1998, Berridge, 2010; Hamilton & Langhorne, 2010).  While many recognise diplomacy’s “inherently adaptive and elastic” nature, Melissen warns that a “preoccupation with the present and too great an emphasis on the notion of change may impede a deeper understanding of diplomacy.” (1999: xix). Diplomatic mechanisms may have changed somewhat in recent history, such as social media, virtual embassies, enhanced civil society representation, yet the changes are mostly by name rather than function (Kelly 2010). Moreover, the ubiquity of continuity and change in Diplomacy Studies reveals a universal diplomacy ontology. During preliminary research for this project, it was determined that because change in diplomacy occurs slowly, similar to the imperceptible movements of a great ocean liner as it tracks towards the horizon, it is possible for diplomacy to change direction whilst it remains on course to reach its destination. Although Kelley insists that the rate of change in world’s “second-oldest profession” could only be characterised as “reptilian” (2014: 16), the evolving demographic of diplomatic actors compels the thesis to adhere to the notion of continuity and change. Subsequently, while others such as Murray (2006) have developed alternate frameworks to effectively ‘retell’ the story of contemporary diplomacy, the thesis would simply use existing structures to support its research platform.  Having determined its theoretic framework, Defence Diplomacy in the Long War examined and defined Traditional diplomacy, followed a timeline of its recent history and unpacked the theories and practices of contemporary diplomacy which allowed it to survive the ambush of the end of the 
                                                     
24 The term ‘devolution’ could also be used to describe the changing nature of post-Cold War diplomacy. For 
example, Baily presented devolution as the “transference from one agency to another of the conduct of 
international affairs and should be distinguished from ‘delegation’" (1930: 259); In relation to diplomacy, delegation 
is described as a “flexible” and “adaptable mechanism” of communication “through officials who operate relatively 
independently and with limited oversight … a process (which) provides a way for states to credibly communicate” 
(Lindsey, 2017: 544). 
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Cold War and the effects of globalization, to remain a potent tool of foreign policy. The thesis was mindful of Cohen’s recommendation that to have a full understanding of diplomacy, one must reach “beyond too-familiar categories and examples” and approach that which one wants to observe “from an unusual angle” (1987: 2). Despite accepting Cohen’s advice and widening the aperture, the thesis revolves around the core theories and practices associated with the civ/mil and mil/mil relationships of the state; thus state-centric Traditional diplomacy remains its focus. Moreover, in spite of the diverse range of non-state actors engaged in 21st-century conflicts, “the key to conflicts lies with the state” (van Veen, 2017: 2). The thesis identified the central diplomatic tenets of representation and communication, and the importance of these two key features became increasingly apparent as research progressed. Also evident was the need to evaluate the methods used in parallel to the policies that dictated the use of those methods. Defence Diplomacy in the Long War presented a situation in which multiple representatives of the state are often imbued with diplomatic credentials and employ diplomacy in contemporary asymmetric conflict situations. The monograph and this paper demonstrates that the inclusion of these multiple representatives enhances the overall effectiveness and impact of diplomacy in the international system. The thesis also sought to reiterate that diplomacy is a method of enacting foreign policy, not a policy in and of itself, so that ‘failures’ of diplomacy may invariably be failures in policy.  Additionally, as noted in Defence Diplomacy in the Long War, the history of U.S. diplomacy has been explored in detail previously, with two prominent and noteworthy features emerging; features which influence the direction of the research and helped shape the hypotheses. First, is the limited time that U.S. diplomacy has existed in comparison to many of its Coalition partners. Second, and relatedly, there is an inherent mistrust and misunderstanding in the U.S. of the diplomatic process and those who engage in it (Wiseman referred to it as Anti-Diplomacy, 2012). Despite this, U.S. diplomacy is supported by a broad range of personnel who are intimately involved in both the formulating and implementing foreign policy. Ambassadors, military commanders and associated staff disseminate their situational analyses along a network of horizontal and vertical channels to inform policy-makers. Once a specific foreign policy goal has been decided and the strategy(s) to achieve the objective begin to take shape, articulating and implementing the policy once again relies on diplomacy, the diplomatist, and his/her network. Announcements from the Secretary of State (Foreign Minister) and other senior Foreign Service staff precede activities from those tasked with 
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implementing the strategy. In recent times this manifests in a WoG effort which incorporates multiple agencies and partners.25 
Defence Diplomacy: The Basics A common, and to the vast majority justified, perception of the military’s core responsibility consists of preparing for and prevailing in major conflicts. Given the recent history of U.S. military intervention since 9/11, it’s easy to overlook the fact that the military does much more than engage in combat. Yet even when engaged in combat, the military apparatus does much more than shoot, move, and communicate (McFall, 2016). The U.S. Marines Warfighting Doctrinal Manual, which serves as a roadmap for 21st-century combat, declares that “[A]t the highest level, war involves the use of all the elements of power that one political group can bring to bear against another … economic, diplomatic, military, and psychological forces” (1997: 25). While these fundamental elements of warfare remain constant over time, the apparatus at its core, the military, has undergone tremendous organisational, structural and operational changes.  This transformation is ongoing, and the accumulated changes have delivered what some have labelled the post-modern military. The thesis argues that the acceleration and expansion (and by extension, acceptance) of defence diplomacy is a by-product of, and a key mechanism for, the post-modern military (Moskos, Williams & Segal, 2000). One element of the post-modern military is deepening civ/mil relationship on an operational as well as a strategic and policy-making level. The civilian aspect of U.S. foreign policy is disparate in its nature, range and scope, including all the civilian personnel in federal agencies who play critical roles advancing national interests abroad. For example, civilian staff of DoD engage with foreign counterparts to advance U.S. interests and provide critical advice in tandem with members of the Foreign Service. The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) identified the evolving nature of civilian activity over the past half-century, describing the role as “more and more operational: civilian agencies and private groups of all kinds are increasingly able to deploy resources on the ground in countries around the world” (2010: 3). However, the evolution described by the QDDR means that the ambassadors ‘country report’ is challenged as the primary source of information for policy-makers. Somewhat presciently, Robert Jervis wrote of a situation where “diplomatic statements which bore no relation to actions would serve no useful purpose for the 
                                                     
25 While the concept of a WOG approach to national security is logical in theory, some question its existence in 
reality. Albert Palazzo asserts that a true WoG effort hasn’t materialised since “the U.S. and its allies mobilized their 
entire societies and co-ordinated their efforts and resources within their domestic economies and across the 
alliance during WWII,” however in the 70 years since, WoG has become “Pentagon jargon everyone wants to 
believe in but in reality, few nations ever achieve” (December 2017).  
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recipient … (or) for the sender …” (1968: 59). To mitigate this problem, Jervis identified the importance of the deeds of civilian representatives as well as their words. For this thesis, such scholarly observations were a constant motivation to elevate the concept and practice of defence diplomacy. Although defence diplomacy was extensively defined in Defence Diplomacy in the Long War, a brief summary refreshes the readers understanding of the concept before engaging in the following theoretical discussion. Du Plessis explains that defence diplomacy mobilises the “trained expertise and discipline” of the military to achieve national and foreign objectives abroad” (2008: 92). Whereas, Bisley contends that “while it may be technical in its means, it is inherently political in its end … using defence personnel and assets to communicate, negotiate and more generally manage relations between states” (2014: 14). Willard presents defence diplomacy as “the conduct by military diplomats of negotiations and other relations between nations, nation’s militaries, and nations’ citizens aimed at influencing the environment in which the military operates (2006: 9). While K. A. Muthanna supports this statement declaring “defence diplomacy can further country specific foreign policy objectives by managing defence foreign relations and supporting the other diplomatic initiatives of government” (2011: 3).  Furthermore, scholars also base their definitions on its role in managing a complex global security environment, solidifying the concept as an effective mechanism for achieving national interests short of military conflict (Edmonds & Mills, 1998; Sending, Pouliot & Neumann, 2011; Taylor, Et al, 2014). Defence Diplomacy in the Long War identified that although it’s active in times of peace, defence diplomacy is a: 
compliant mechanism to integrate and manage the overall military response “in states at risk of 
failure, in failed states … in states emerging from long periods of conflict such as Afghanistan, and 
in states in peaceful post-conflict rebuilding periods” (Reinert & Hussey, 2015: 121). The ability to 
manage a military response assists states in producing “a coordinated set of military actions whose 
direct and indirect, physical and psychological effects might achieve the ends set by the national 
political leadership at the national level,” enabling a state “to coordinate the military actions of the 
operational commanders with any allied actions and to ensure that all military actions would be 
perceived in the right way by other military actors, neutrals, friends, coalition partners, and allies” 
(Smith, 2002: 470).  Using the principle of Realist-constructivism the thesis distils these various interpretations and defines U.S. defence diplomacy as involving the construction and reproduction of relationships and 
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practices between inter-state military’s and security-oriented departments, which widen and deepen the interdependence and interoperability necessary to protect its national security interests.26 This study is theoretically underpinned by Realism and Constructivism, two seemingly divergent political rationales which appear to actually correct each other’s faults (Halliday, 1996; Biersteker, 1999) and represent both stasis and change in IR (Hopf, 1998; Jervis 1999; Sterling-Folker, 2002). Realist-constructivism advocates that the international system is open to and can change but that there are limits or restrictions (Campbell, 1998; Barkin, 2003; Jackson & Nexon, 2004; Barkin, 2009; Jaafar, 2018). While a more detailed explanation follows, the two theories are brought together simply by common ways and means: Realism is based on single interests pursued through multiple mechanisms while Constructivism has fluctuating interests pursued through multiple mechanisms.27 Moreover, Realist-constructivism can be understood as an intellectual evolution of Realism resulting from its adherents’ preference for elaboration and revision rather than the challenge of reconstruction which fundamentally altered established theoretical tradition (Lapid & Kratochwil, 1996; Statesmen, philosophers, scholars and historians have attempted to account for the behaviour of states in both peace and in war, and although Constructivism is commonly understood to be a social theory rather than a substantive theory of international politics, the thesis determined that Constructivism is an effective means to explain defence diplomacy in both. The thesis notes that Constructivism mirrors Realism in that several sub-branches exist such as neoclassical, naturalistic, Narrative, Modernist and Post-modern, however, the focus on systemic impacts of social-level engagement are consistent throughout. For many, Realism has consistently provided the most reliable guidance for how states should engage in statecraft, as well as offering the most compelling explanation for inter-state relations. Neo-realist Waltz (1979), Offensive-realist Frankel (1996), and Defensive-realist Taliaferro (2000) examine the causal and explanatory factors of war between states through three categories: a) human behaviour; b) the internal structure of states; and c) international anarchy. While human nature undoubtedly plays a role in causing war as a means of survival, strong research should include a critical analysis of the parts to the whole (intra-group to inter-group). Are the shortcomings of individual states the cause of conflict among them? Neo-realists would say no, arguing that the good 
states=peace, bad states=war generalization is simplistic and not supported by reality. Waltz insists 
                                                     
26 The definition can be expanded to universally define defence diplomacy as the construction and reproduction of 
relationships and practices between inter-state military’s and security-oriented departments, which widen and 
deepen the interdependence and interoperability necessary to establish security in the 21st century. 
27 Jaafar notes that both theories align by when states apply mechanisms “which are intentionally designed to 
advance the state’s national interests in diverse ways” (2018: 10). 
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that “the international political environment has much to do with the way states behave” (1979: 123). However, Constructivist Wendt explains that the international system is susceptible to socialization driven by the individual members of the states within the system and uses Hobbesian (State of Nature-enemy’s), Lockean (Law of Nature-rivalry) or Kantian (Cosmopolitanism-friendship) political philosophy to demonstrate how elements of human nature can influence, dictate and generate international systemic change. Neo-realism states that the anarchic international system, states is made up of unitary actors who act upon their immediate interests (relative gains) often to the detriment of the overall system interest absolute advantages). Anarchy in IR does not necessarily refer to chaos and the unrestricted use of violence; it’s first and foremost describes a system which lacks a higher or supra-state authority which limits the use of force by sovereign states. Neo-realists contend that anarchy in international relations cannot be modified the building of alliances or international organisations and so foreign policy is based on rationality rather that morality” (Waltz, 1979: 238).  The thesis finds that security-oriented coalition arrangements in an anarchic international system are driven by necessity and convenience to ensure state survival in an anarchic international system; key tenets of Neo/Structural Realism (Waltz, 1979, Gilpin, 1984; Mearsheimer, 2001). However, anarchy in international relations can be mitigated by building alliances by aligning similar self-interests through multilateral engagement which in anchored on the relationship precept of Constructivism (Wendt, 1992, 1999; Ruggie, 1998; Sterling-Folker, 2002; Barnett, 2008; Hurd, 2008; Onuf, 2012; Jackson & Jones, 2012). Similarly, although trust and cooperation are critical components of defence diplomacy which supports an alignment with Constructivism, the thesis also examines intra-group trust which aligns with the state survival tenet of Realism. Moreover, the primary driver for U.S. engagement is its national interest/national security which further supports an alignment with Realism. Realist-constructivism epitomises the continuity and change aphorism interwoven through this document; being grounded in the traditional yet offering the flexibility and progression which defence diplomacy exudes. It also allows the researcher to explain how traditional tools of statecraft such as diplomacy and the military are used in new and unconventional ways. This combination of realism and constructivism manifests in the foreign policy approach of President Trump. The current administration’s foreign policy has been labelled ‘principled realism’ which forgoes the rigidity of zero-sum to generate and flexible doctrine “rooted in values, shared interests, and common sense” (Trump, May 2018). Once again highlighting continuity and change, while much has been written about the foreign policy approach of the Trump Administration parallels are drawn to president’s 
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past such as Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson (Joffe, Et al., 2017; Bosco, 2017; Landler 2017).  The thesis presents defence diplomacy as a parallel, and complementary form of traditional diplomacy. The two adjectives are used, and in that particular order because complementary would infer a subordinate role. However, the thesis positions it on the same level as the vital work conducted by Foreign Service personnel on a daily basis. Defence diplomacy’s origins lie in the classic military diplomacy extant since ancient times, yet in terms of evolution (or change), the concept remained static until the end of the Cold War; exclusively in the domain of classic military to military (mil/mil) relations. The 1990s however, witnessed a new and distinct era in international affairs with the steady rise of interdependence (complex, yet sought after), the growing rise of new actors on the global scene (violent and non-violent), as well as a reinvigorated and radiated form of public diplomacy. These, and other outcomes of the post-Cold War period allowed the practice of defence diplomacy to develop; one which prioritised multilateral interconnectivity. To visualise interconnectivity, imagine a state’s foreign policy infrastructure as a network, diplomacy links the implementation of foreign policy objectives to the capabilities of the Defence and Foreign Service sector.  When managed effectively in this interconnected environment, defence diplomacy is an invaluable instrument of statecraft, bringing to bear the manifold dimensions of both soft and hard power on any security oriented issue. Given that soft power is the ability of a state to attract, rather than coerce, others “by the legitimacy of its policies and the values that underlie them,” this thesis hypothesises that stabilization mission’s, peace operations (peacekeeping, peace enforcement or peacebuilding), and COIN (which have increased in parallel with soft power in the post-Cold War era) are a germane expression of this. The thesis accepts that some may rebuke this statement by claiming that it’s impossible to “militarize elements of a state’s soft power without destroying the very thing which makes soft power so powerful” (Allenby, New America Forum 2017). However, it argues that, not only is it possible, but that it’s indispensable in the context of the Long War. Mirroring traditional diplomacy, non-verbal acts of defence diplomacy oriented engagement, such as humanitarian assistance & disaster relief (HADR), capacity building, combined exercises, shore visits, personnel exchanges and professional military education (PME) signal to partners and adversaries that the relationship is strong. The Joint Chiefs of Staff National Military Strategic Plan for 
the War on Terrorism concludes that U.S. HADR is “often key to demonstrating benevolence and goodwill abroad … countering ideological support for terrorism …” (2006). Similarly, naval bases are key non-verbal defence diplomacy mechanism. The U.S. (like many other countries with a robust 
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navy) negotiates the establishment of naval bases around the world (what is termed forward basing) to act as a deterrence to adversaries, demonstrate an economic and military commitment to partners and allies, and provides strategic and tactical options in times of crisis (U.S. Navy, 2007). The U.S. Navy leverages its robust multi-mission capability and transportation capacity to engage, along with interagency/civilian personnel, in support of a whole range of non-kinetic development, defence and diplomacy activities, as well as participating in COIN/CT and stabilization operations (Greenheart, 2013). It should be noted that naval bases also serve as a venue for people-to-people engagement. Continuing to mirror traditional diplomacy, alongside non-verbal signals, a comprehensive defence diplomacy strategy incorporates equivalent verbal signalling such as public statements, visits from senior political stakeholders, bilateral consultations as well as overt support in multilateral fora. For the U.S., these and other forms of “active engagement by both the executive branch and by Congress, signal a U.S. presence, participation in, and commitment … can have a real positive impact” for U.S. national security (Greitens, 2017). Much like mobilising an aircraft carrier into an area of tension sends a clear signal, removing an ambassador or sending a lower level representative to bilateral or multilateral meeting, communicates a message to multiple audiences, as do a diverse range of activities under the auspices of defence diplomacy. Importantly, and under-appreciated, defence diplomacy encourages partner states to establish cooperative relationships in non-military related areas.  Two further examples of looking beyond the immediate engagement to envision long-term national security-oriented outcomes are HN capacity building efforts and intra-departmental and inter-departmental engagement. Firstly, when it’s successful, enhancing HN capacity can transform the HN into a regional security exporter. By assisting HN with domestic security issues, the HN is encouraged and equipped to provide security in a regional context; providing a regional stabilizing presence as well as an improved capacity to be the sole provider of security domestically. Additionally, regional outreach efforts positively contribute to the legitimacy of the HN.28 Secondly, while testing its hypotheses, the research evaluated how defence diplomacy-oriented engagement facilitates change across the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 
                                                     
28 Madden, Et al. detail shortfalls in partner capability as including “doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. An example of a specific shortfall could be the inability to 
develop ideologically committed partner forces that will fight when placed in combat” (2014: 5). 
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education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). This is an area directly applicable to the type of complex, multifaceted conflict investigated by this study.29 Mitchell concludes that: 
 close and enduring coalition partnerships, coordinating elements of national power into a 
comprehensive approach to joint operations increases the collaborative means to gain and maintain 
a shared understanding of the historical and enduring problem, and the complexity involved in 
developing comprehensive solutions (2017: para. 5).  These directives are vitally important to improving intra-agency and/or inter-agency engagement. However, Major General James P. Hunt argues that while the military go into great detail as to how the U.S. military should operate … (it) doesn’t give much advice on how a military organisation adjusts to the culture chasm that stands between those in uniform and those in civilian clothes” (2008: para. 8). Defence diplomacy facilitates cooperation and coordination, and one way the cultural chasm can be bridged is to increase the breadth and depth of civ/mil engagement through embeds: personnel from State and/or non DoD agencies who work in the DoD as well as combatant commands (PACCOM, AFRICOM etc.) in leadership, support, management or general staff positions. Embeds bring knowledge of their home agencies, new ideas, as well as an expanded expertise and intelligence network. Embeds also provide a conduit for, and a source of, information to effectively explain domestic issues which may undermine or affect certain member state’s engagement in Coalition operations. One particular type of embed, the political advisor (POLAD), is discussed in detail in Appendix 4. Whether looking at conventional or unconventional warfare, U.S. initiated security cooperation under the auspices of defence diplomacy ensures partners are interoperable with U.S. forces in multi-party military coalitions.30 Historically, militaries have cooperated against a common adversary, however, a reduced incidence of interstate war and the rise of transnational non-state threats makes the prospect of exporting security more compelling. In this environment, “diplomacy across the spectrum of national power acts as a vital enabler to the achievement of the long-term strategic aims 
                                                     
29 Cohen, Et al. emphasise “there is a renewed attention in the U.S. joint force on addressing the DOTMLPF-P gaps 
between US forces and those of near-peer and hybrid adversaries as “they demonstrate the types of capabilities 
the United States will confront in future conflicts” (2017: 7). 
30 DoD Directive 5132.03 defines security cooperation as “The full continuum of activities undertaken by the 
Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve 
strategic objectives. It encompasses all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, 
including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that build defense and security relationships 
promoting specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security 
assistance activities; that develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defence and multinational 
operations; and that provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations” (DoD, October 
2015). 
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and operational objectives” (Willard, 2006: 4).  According to Sharp (2013) and Gompert, Et al. (2014), a contributing factor to U.S. outreach are its strategic missteps since 2001 which have reinvigorated the remaining superpower’s need to engage in diplomacy as events exposed the contrast between the U.S.’ military might and its Long War goals. The outcomes of robust U.S. defence diplomacy on its Long War strategy delivers a ‘laundry list’ of benefits to the U.S. and its partners.,  These mutually beneficial outcomes reinforce the process itself and help to establish defence diplomacy as a reliable mechanism in a complex security environment. Former Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command General (and current SECDEF) James Mattis declared coalitions are the only way forward in warfare; insisting that “a spirit of cooperation can overcome capability deficiencies” (2009). The thesis found that one of the many ways defence diplomacy creates this ‘spirit’ and between the U.S. and its partners is through military training and education programs, hosting regional conferences, joint/combined simulations and exercises, as well as dialogue between counterparts from the ministerial level through to deployed civ/mil personnel.  Given that an exegesis-style paper replicates the research process, several questions which were identified during the opening phase of investigation manifest in the above discussion. The questions were: what is the risk, if any, of increased connections between the military apparatus and the domestic and foreign political class? Do we lose the benefits of the information capacity building qualities of the network if the intentional influence and shaping of worldviews dilutes the information pool, devalues free thought and broader coalition input? Can alliance participation negatively impact national interests; and if so how do decision makers align coalition interests and national interests? Does capacity building deliver on expected outcomes?31 While these questions didn’t constitute ‘red flags’ for the project, they were revisited until satisfactorily addressed as the research continued. 
Theoretical Foundations of Defence Diplomacy: Why it Works Scholars and policy-makers have debated the merits of alliance formation for centuries, evaluating why alliances continue to be forged, when they are often perceived “as nothing more than ‘marriages of convenience’” (Leeds, Et al., 2000: 687). Instead of adding to the reams of analyses which address ‘if and when’ alliances work, this section discusses ‘why’ they work. This section 
                                                     
31 Consider, for example, U.S. investment in NATO from the Dayton Accords in 1995 and its eventual intervention 
in Kosovo in 1999. The U.S. spent billions to improve the capability of its European NATO partners in the 1990’s yet 
the U.S. was still required to act against its national interest and intervene with direct action. Moreover, the 
decision-making process to actively engage included a very public debate between State and senior NSA and 
Pentagon officials with SACEUR Gen. Wesley Clark and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright countering the 
strategic advice of National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and SECDEF William Cohen which undermined U.S., 
making it appear politically unstable to a global audience. 
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identifies and discusses the key factors in the ongoing utility of security oriented engagement; from common terms such as trust, reputation and emotion, through to conflict specific concepts such as COIN, unconventional (gray-zone) warfare and battlespace complexity. Lord Palmerston famously told British Parliament that “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual" (Gartzke & Weisiger, 2007: 5). Likewise, Henry Kissinger asserted the U.S. had “no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests.” The thesis tested the validity of these claims and chose to begin with an extensively cultivated human endeavour deemed to be the beating heart of defence diplomacy: cooperation.32 Cooperation generated through defence diplomacy oriented engagement delivers enhanced intelligence capabilities which help partner nations decide, validate and, enforce in a unified manner. Burkhart and Wooly declare that “[M]utually beneficial relationships between actors with similar or compatible high-priority interests are the basis for the condition of cooperation” (2017: 23). Cooperation is central to strong relationships, but states need to know how, as well as the will to work together (Mitzen, 2005; Bjola, 2016). Cooperation underpins the current international order and is the basis for tried and tested theory’s such as collective security (Burkhart & Wooly, 2017).). Despite its prevalence, global cooperation is only possible if the various agencies tasked with supporting a state’s foreign policy objectives are able to effectively synchronize their operations.   Yet there are barriers to inter-agency cohesion. In an analysis of synchronization at the U.S. domestic level, Alexander and Thibodeau identify, two issues that inhibit interagency collaboration which are directly related to this study as impediments which defence diplomacy seeks to mitigate. Firstly, the authors found “a lack of personal and institutional trust among the interagency. Second, there are few networks among the various agencies, both at individual and departmental levels” (Ibid). Moreover, these two issues are mutually destructive as a “lack of institutional trust among agencies such as the DoD, State, and USAID stymies the networks that provide for the dialogue, synchronization, and collaboration required to meet national security objectives …” (Ibid: 87). Over-coming these challenges is a preliminary requirement as any disruption at the domestic level will be magnified when states pursue a strategy of multi-partner engagement.   From the military’s perspective, a state’s armed force personnel support and enable joint-force cooperation (Army, Airforce, Navy) at an individual level from the Chief of Staff down to lower ranked personnel. Additionally, the multi-directional exchange (horizontal, vertical and oblique) of ‘ideas’ mitigate two common impediments to decision-making. The first is what Klein and Kahneman term 
                                                     
32 The thesis recognises that cooperation is evident throughout nature, however it’s existence is uniquely 
fundamental to development of the human race.  
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“fractionated expertise” where experts are challenged when working outside their comfort zone (2009: 522). For example, “the city firefighter facing his first forest fire or the special operator with extensive urban close combat experience sitting on a mountaintop in Afghanistan for the first time” (Walker and Bonnot 2017: 8). The second, and this thesis suggests is a more common impediment to Coalition cooperation in the Long War, occurs when “excessive confidence in one’s experience can jeopardize the effectiveness of skilled intuition” (Ibid).33 If a state is over-confident in its belief that its chosen the correct strategy, it may choose unilateral action (which supplants cooperation). Alternatively, a state, which is deemed to be at best arrogant or at worst unrealistic (or confused), may have difficulty in finding partners to cooperate with In both cases, over-confidence resulting in inaction or unilateral action contributes to instability. At this stage of the research, it was evident that regardless of the causes of current and future conflict, or the adversary faced, cooperative efforts multiply opportunities for success, and that alliances and coalitions are the primary cooperative mechanism to confront one’s opponent(s). 
Alliances: the role of Trust, Reputation, Credibility & Emotion This thesis identifies many variables which influence the decision-making process (the security–political trade-offs) as states’ enhance their security-oriented relationships. Security-oriented relationships include: enduring friendships, ideological/geographical alliances, or opportunistic strategic partnerships and even engagement based on convenience (Moghadam, 2015, 2017; Scremin, 2017).34 While accepting the Hobbesian declaration that “conflict was endemic to the human condition precisely because social recognition was desired by all men” (Dafoe, Et al., 2014: 372), the thesis posits that the formation of alliances and coalitions delivers sought-after recognition while also reducing points of friction which can lead to conflict. Making the connection between 
                                                     
33 Interestingly, the authors also note that “we use confidence as an evaluation criterion - higher is better - when 
there is little correlation between confidence and accuracy” in the decision making process however this author 
would argue that, while Walker & Bonnot’s statement is factually correct, under-confidence or timidity in 
international relations creates uncertainty and instability. Subsequently, Madden, Et al. assert that the “observed 
and forecasted instability around the world will continue to create situations in which policymakers are forced to act 
to protect U.S. interests” (2014: 1).  
34 Each type of relationship has its own set of norms and expectations, as well as political cost for revoking one’s 
commitments. The Syrian theatre demonstrates the different types of relationships in a contemporary irregular 
warfare setting; each of the stakeholders involved are there for different reasons, fighting a different war. Briefly; 
the Turkish Russian relationship is strategic yet it was able to survive the downing of a Russian aircraft by the Turkish 
military in 2015. The US Turkish relationship is based on alliance commitments yet their strategic objectives do not 
align and us support for Kurdish forces in northern Syria interferes with Turkey’s regional foreign policy objectives. It 
could be said that the foundations for Syrian Government relationship with Iran is ideological/geographical yet Iran’s 
ongoing engagement causes the regions Sunni ruled states to deepen their investment in the conflict.  
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reputation and/or status and war is not a particularly bold move academically (Dafoe, Et al, 2015; O’Neil, 2017). However, it provides both a grounding and a point of departure for discussing multiple individual, yet ultimately amalgamated elements which engender the enduring status of the alliance.   From a process oriented perspective, this thesis identifies that trust exists on two equally important parallel planes. First, trust in the institution of diplomacy (defence diplomacy) itself is required for stakeholders to ‘buy into’ the process. In this respect, trust in the institution has a self-sustaining effect on the process of defence diplomacy. Second, a level of trust is necessary before a state commits to an alliance or coalition. Once a framework for cooperation has been operationalised, trust among coalition partners is generated through their ongoing engagement with each other. This hypothesis is supported by many of the sources examined for, and presented in, Defence Diplomacy 
in the Long War and Beyond the Aiguillette. For example, Bjola (2013) stresses that trust is key to building and sustaining inter-state relationships, while Metlay (1999, 2016) and Glenn (2017) highlight the association between institutional and personal trust. From the perspective of the process, issues of trust can be addressed through defence diplomacy-oriented engagement. Trust is key to the efficacy of traditional diplomatic engagement, yet it’s presence or lack thereof is magnified in civ/mil cooperation in active combat. Whereas a traditional diplomat can engage in the business of diplomacy with foreign a representative even where trust is lacking however a lack of trust between deployed civ/mil personnel in theater creates a toxic environment which can exacerbate the lethality of an already dangerous situation. For example, Australian Air Commodore Chris Westwood emphasized that “the word trust is critical when you get into theater and the voice on the other end of the radio is familiar” (2017). Joint/combined military engagement “builds trust and enables information-sharing with partners” and this creates an assurance, which is “vital for enabling nations to maintain military forces at levels unlikely to trigger arms races” (Burkhart & Wooly, 2017: 23). With no external means of building or enforcing security agreements, trust is essential to, and an outcome of, defence diplomacy. It may sound trite, but trust is the glue which binds coalitions together. Piotr Sztompka asserts “[I]n order to face the future actively and constructively, we need to deploy trust” (1999: 12). Alexander and Thibodeau echo this sentiment, declaring “[M]ost successful interagency collaborations are personality based, and both success and failure hinge on the trust built among the individuals within each organization” (2016: 88). For example, part of Rumsfeld’s derision of NATO Coalitions was grounded in his belief that “you can’t delegate, and have confidence in delegating unless you have developed a sense of the individuals to whom you are delegating” (Rumsfeld quoted in Cohen, 2002: 230). Therefore, trust is essential within the alliance to generate the unity of effort required to counter common security threats.  
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Discussions of trust transition neatly into the role of values, for while states and those who represent them may develop the requisite level of trust, a divergence of values can undermine progress. A current and ongoing process exemplifies the role of values in a state’s foreign policy decision-making process. In theory, and supported by declarations from Presidents since WW II, values have been the linchpin for U.S. foreign policy, yet the current Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has been a vocal advocate for removing the ‘promotion of democracy’ from State’s mission statement as well as the separation of values and policy. This line of thinking is a direct reflection of President Trump’s inauguration speech in which he declared that the U.S. would not impose its values on others (Blake, 2017). Moreover, driven by populism, President Trump has tapped into public sentiment by “openly questioning long-standing U.S. stances on key foreign and national security issues such as alliance relationships, nuclear non-proliferation and global free trade” (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017: 480). The Secretary told a meeting of departmental staff in May 2017, that the “fundamental values of freedom, human dignity, the way people are treated” guide U.S. policy, but they “are not our policies,” and that “sometimes values have to take a back seat to economic interests or national security” (Statement May 3, 2017). Secretary Tillerson concluded that interests come first, and then if we can advocate and advance our values, we should” (Finnegan, 2017).35 This approach raises several questions, the answers for which will only become evident over time. Questions such as: will the allies and partners of the U.S. follow suit; can liberal institutionalism, the core of Western-led global stabilization efforts, survive the ‘new’ norm; what will be the long-term outcome of the ‘overt’ separation of interests and values? Does it really matter, is this bifurcation a figment of Liberal imagination in relation to foreign policy decision-making?36  Realist-constructivism helps to answer these questions. From a purely Realist perspective, the thesis accepts that in an anarchic world, interests always ‘trump’ values when the two conflict.37 Therefore, it’s anathema for a state to defend its values whilst undermining the advancement of interests, primarily ensuring its security. Expanding the view from the anarchic world of Hobbes to examine 19th and 20th-century security pacts; the concepts of Cooperative Security, Collective Security and even Comprehensive Security are founded on interests, not values. While the two terms are often 
                                                     
35 These statements parallel the apparent de-construction of State. For example, see: Jeffrey, J. F. ‘To Save the State 
Department, Rex Tillerson May Have to Break It’, Foreign Policy, (March 3, 2017). 
36 Moreover, if President Trump’s embrace of ‘his general’s’ continues to discount senior civilian personnel in DoD 
and State, will this undermine US security? For example, see: Wang, C. ‘Do Diplomatic and Defense Vacancies Risk 
U.S. Security?’, The Cypher Brief, (September 19, 2017). 
37 William Bain recently wrote that the “concept of anarchy is rooted in a juridical conception of statehood that 
privileges attributes of independence and separateness … State stand to see each other as isolated persons; they 
are alone in a treacherous world, compelled to make their way on their own account of wisdom and power” (2017: 
3).  
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consolidated into one uniform concept, this thesis maintains that interests ‘must’ be the primary consideration in the decision-making process if coalitions are to remain sustainable and enduring. However, applying a Constructivist lens allows one to align national interests, values and alliance/coalition creation. Thomas Wright contends that value-based multilateral engagement, which serves as the foundation for a WoG security coalition, “has deep roots in both American and European foreign policy traditions” (2013: 182). While Michael Mazarr emphasises “that the thick network of post-war institutions,” the U.N., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (or GATT, later the World Trade Organization), NATO and the non-proliferation treaty, “were largely American creations, designed to avoid a replay of the twin disasters of the 1930s …” (September 2017). Although this may be correct, with NATO being the most prominent values-based multilateral institution, the trans-Atlantic security institution has evolved whereby the value of democracy is a requirement for NATO members, in the late 90’s (prior to 9/11) NATO was formally re-mandated to operate in the interests of its members, even out of area operations. The thesis proposes that while prioritising values rather than interests creates a more ‘palatable’ intra-coalition narrative for domestic consumption, the narrative ‘sours’ when exported outside the in-group. Peter Varghese recently echoed this sentiment, asserting that so-called ‘universal’ values are “largely the lived experience of western democracies and as such hold little meaning for those … outside that cultural and historical tradition” (September 2017).38  Despite prioritising national interests, the thesis does not disregard the role of values in the decision-making process as it cannot be underestimated, particularly the role of emotion in relation to values. Gilchrist ponders the collective impact (government and the citizenry) “of compromising on their beliefs purely to succeed in war,” questioning whether “the cost of what a state can lose in terms of honour worth what it seeks to gain from pursuing its perceived interest?” (November 2016). Some view values and emotion as inseparable; with the emotional element identified as what distinguishes values from more abstract notions. Therefore, when debating alliance formation or multiparty military proactive engagement, policy-makers must take this into consideration. A domestic constituency is more likely to comprehend, and therefore support, committing forces to protect ‘our’ values. However, the thesis argues there are inherent volatility and fragility in pursuing a security coalition under the influence of emotion. 
                                                     
38 Varghese noted that “It has been easy for Australia to assert our core values as universal values because from 
the time of British settlement, Australia has been closely aligned, culturally and intellectually, with the dominant 
global powers.  We were part of the system which wrote the rules; which authored the international conventions 
on human rights and which gave universal reach to our founding principles.” 
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Cox and Wood remind us that one must remember “an act that was ‘emotionally driven’ does not preclude that act from also having instrumental political motives, and rational planning. Indeed, the binary oppositions between emotion and rationality …  emotion/feeling and cognition/ rationality are inextricably fused, and that trying to separate them is like ‘trying to slice a cake into the flour and sugar that went into it’” (2016: 113-114). The thesis posits that motivation and resolve are also clearly associated with an emotion-based experience (Mercer, 2010, 2013).. Wesley notes that some partner states perceive or portray “the alliance as the objective, rather than the means, of foreign and strategic policy” (2017: 11). However, research for this project revealed that this approach can be politically untenable in terms of domestic support and international reputation, as well as undermining the military benefits of alliance membership. For example, some states in the U.S.-led effort to counter transnational terrorism are wedded to the idea of joining the coalition rather than supporting the strategic objectives or Western values which underpin the strategy.  Similarly, Agnew notes the ‘digital age of interconnectivity means that “[P]ublic criticism or critical comment placed in the public domain by a military member or public servant undermines the trust and confidence the government has in the organisation and the individual (2015: 10). In terms of defence diplomacy, this situation leads to underinvestment, unstable partnerships, undelivered objectives, and perhaps most importantly, the concept of alliance formation and maintenance is undermined. Patrick Porter also explores the role of the public asserting that states should “approach national security as a public conversion over the orientation of the country, grounded in dialogue between expert and general will, to guide preparation and response” (2016: 242). However, the thesis is critical of the influential role of uninformed, emotionally driven publics in the national security decision-making process of Western governments. Ultimately, regardless how the debate takes place, and whether an interest is judged to be either a high or low priority, a state must also assess its capability for acting on that interest. One incentive for states to engage in honest strategic communication is to avoid undermining its legitimacy and good reputations, which would impact its ability to use ‘traditional’ diplomacy in the near future (Satori, 2005; Josten, 2006; Paul, 2008; Anders, 2009).  Experience is an integral component of reputation. Reputation is based on the past experience of others, the state itself is limited in its options to enhance its reputation and its efforts can be quickly undermined by external yet influential variables. Research by Crescenzi, Et al. reveals that alliances which fail to engage regularly eventually wither. While those with a lot of alliance opportunities (both positive and negative) generate histories that are more permanent” (2012: 264). Walt (2009) and Wesley (2017) are among those how have examined alliances for their ability to deliver transactional 
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benefits based on a cost/benefit basis. If one subscribes to the notion that “risk is calculated in dyadic wars by decision-makers on the basis of their relative capability” (Vasquez and Rundlett, 2016: 1398), then by extension, do coalitions create the same situation artificially? This question indicates that the complexity of conflict may be reduced to a simple win/loss equation. Therefore, an increase or decrease of an actor’s capability will, ceteris paribus, increase or decrease one’s chances of success.  Additionally, Crescenzi, Et al. (2012), Johnson and Leeds (2011), Morgan and Palmer (2003) and Smith (1995) have questioned whether the formation of alliances promote peace, reducing or increasing the probability of conflicts occurring. Their research parallel’s and informs debates exploring the decision-making of emboldened actors in alliances and coalitions discussed in this document. Interestingly, Vasquez and Rundlett hypothesise that if an alliance already exists, uncertainty is less of a concern, presumably because unity of action is generally understood, and, “depending on the aggregation of power, decision-makers can become less risk averse” (2016: 1399). This ‘emboldening’ can occur across the coalition to both increase the size of the coalition, as well as the scope of its activities. For example, U.S. led coalitions are attractive for a myriad of reasons discussed within this chapter, such as reputation by association, though the U.S. may use its leadership of a broader coalition to test potentially unpalatable strategies and tactics. The U.S. has the political weight to test, try and even fail, and still emerge relatively unscathed: creating a win/win for its coalition partners if it works, while being capable of absorbing blowback when it doesn’t.  The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 definitely tests this hypothesis, and the Bush administration’s political and military adventurism in general serves as an example of the difficulties associated with alliance formation. Reveron (2015) and Wesley (2017) claims that “the manner in which President Bush articulated the formation of a coalition to target the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks as “a test of how much allies were committed to American security and American global-order preferences” (2017: 12). However, this ‘us or them’ approach proved to be contentious and successive 
Pew Global Attitudes and Trends polls illustrate that the U.S. suffered a relative decline of favourable views during the 2000’s. The USG sought to redress negative perceptions in part through improvements in mil/mil engagement. The ‘us or them’ approach also reflected negatively on some states which joined the Coalition. States can often be accused of loyalty undermining self-interest as a state can be “driven by, moral, legal, or reputational concerns to uphold an alliance commitment without regard to, and often at the expense of, its national interests” (Beckley, 2015: 12). For some states, there’s are delicate balance of morality, reputational issues, and both long and short-term interests (Hartle, 1985; Bjola, 2013; Beckley, 2015; Dubik, 2016). Dafoe, Et al. evaluate this balancing of priorities and conclude that although reputational or social aspirations are more often evoked as 
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justification for committing to war, “the need to protect national honour, status, reputation for resolve, credibility, and respect” are central to such decisions (2014: 371).  Acknowledging reputation’s importance in the national security decision-making process requires one to examine what constitutes reputation as well as the identifying the variables which may affect it. For example, Dafoe, Et al. claim it’s an umbrella term that refers to any belief about a trait or behavioural tendency of an actor, based on that agent’s past behaviour” (2014: 375). Whereas McMahon (1991), Mercer (1996), and Wolford (2007), and Gibler (2008) framed reputation as concept influenced by specific leadership. Schelling wrote of a “reputation for action” (1966), Metlay examined a “reputation of trustworthiness” (1999), Leeds, Et al. explored how an alliance thrives on a “reputation for reliability” (2000), while Sartori scrutinized the benefits of a “reputation for honesty” (2005).  A state’s reputation can be established, reinforced and ruined through a range of activities, including its military-oriented engagement. However, reputation is an external interpretation, and depending on where you stand, the inference may not be universal. Dafoe, Et al. note that how one state views the same event or characteristic may be different from another, even having “multiple reputations in reference to the same trait; however, to say that a state has a particular reputation implies that most observers hold the relevant belief about the state” (2014: 372).39 Reputation also has an important domestic component which can be articulated as national pride or “national honour” (Levy, 1981: 582-583). National pride plays a central role in a discussion about the diplomatic role of U.S. defence personnel in particular. Andrew Exum recently wrote that “[D]espite uneven performances in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. public never stopped hailing its heroes in uniform” (July 24, 2017). Could the same be said of the Foreign Service, which pursues the same foreign policy objective, re-emphasizing that many FSO’s have deployed to the front-lines in the Long War along-side their uniformed colleagues? Alliances can also shape states military policies “through processes of socialization” whereby allies begin “to redefine their selves so that they embrace at least some of the partner’s interest as their own” (Beckley, 2015: 15). For example, states which have previously engaged in alliance arrangements are more willing to be amenable to future alliance engagement and be recognised as reliable security and defence partners (Johnson & Leeds, 2011; Crescenzi, ET al, 2012; Vasquez & Rundlett, 2013).  The downside of this sense of self-confidence (in some cases overconfidence) is that smaller allies may be emboldened to act more aggressively than they would otherwise. Whether positive or negative, reputation (to improve or consolidate) is an 
                                                     
39 Dafoe, Et al. categorize these individual perceptions as first-order beliefs, whereas a consensus, group view can be 
labelled second-order and require a level of shared past experience and/or belief (2016: 374). 
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important element in the decision-making process, justifying the examination of its role in defence diplomacy-oriented engagement.  While states enter into formal security oriented agreements for a variety of reasons, the “assumption of reliability” is a key determining factor in the decision-making process (Crescenzi, Et al., 2012: 260). For example, the 2010 UK MOD’s Future Character of Conflict openly acknowledged success in Afghanistan is vital for the UK’s deterrence reputation (2010: 16). While Porter suggests that perhaps as a legacy on its former greatness, there’s an inherent “belief that British credibility rises and falls with ‘past performance,’ “that is that failure somewhere threatens core interests everywhere” (2016: 247). It’s clear that state’s reputation influences the likelihood of alliance formation as well as the selection of alliance partners (Miller, 2003; Crescenzi, Et al, 2012).). While business-oriented literature highlights the importance of reputation in the corporate world, no such consensus exists within scholarship on interstate conflict. Some quantitative studies report a significant effect of reputation on deterrence outcomes (Huth and Russett 1984; Huth 1990), while other case-study based analyses question the logic of reputations in deterrence and interstate bargaining (Mercer 1996; Press 2005). Recent research also suggests that reputation affects alliance dynamics (Miller 2003; Gibler, 2008). Credibility also impacts a state’s reputation, for example, Robert McMahon wrote “that demonstrating the credibility of American power and American commitments ranked among the most critical of all U.S. foreign policy objectives” (1991; 455). However, similar to reputation, credibility takes on a different meaning depending on which side of the transaction one sits. In terms of scholarship, credibility is most often studied in relation to deterrence, that is, does one’s opponent view the threat of force as a credible one? Credibility has typically been expresses as a subjective blend of resolve, reliability, believability, and decisiveness (McMahon, 1991; Mercer, 2012; O’Neil, 2017). Mercer simplifies the role of credibility and references emotion in terms of alliance effectiveness, asserting that a commitment made by a state (a threat or a promise) “is credible when an observer believes it will be kept … (whereas) credibility without emotion becomes knowledge for one ‘knows’ if a commitment will be kept” (2013: 225). Interestingly, Slantchev states that an actor achieves credibility when it “engages in an activity that he would not have taken if he were unresolved” (2010: 359). This evaluation links directly to the previous discussion of states acting in an emboldened (unwarranted) or overconfidence manner.  Based on its research, this thesis identifies the importance of reputation, reliability and credibility (perceived or observed) across three viewpoints. Firstly, from within the state, which has a domestic political component. Secondly, from those within the orbit of the particular state, that is 
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current or potential alliance partners. And thirdly, among adversaries and those states which necessitate the formation of the alliance/coalition. If a state’s reputation for reliability is damaged through previous alliance behaviour, it “can leave them vulnerable to aggression from adversaries or can result in declining political influence (2012: 261).40 Wesley finds “[T]he combination of falling U.S. relative power and rising systemic threats to that power creates a paradox of rising indispensability and falling credibility for the United States among its allies” (2017: 7). In spite of this perception, the fact remains that “since 1945, the U.S. has, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world” (Beckley, 2015: 1). The thesis argues that regardless of U.S. capabilities, the most effective way to limit action (internal) or impose restraint (external) is through defence diplomacy oriented engagement. Whether observed through the lens of a partner or an opponent, and whether one’s credibility is ‘high’ or low’, a state’s credibility signals the likelihood of future actions and/or intentions (Jervis, 1968; Mercer, 2013; Pregent, 2016).   Finally, in terms of reputation, the thesis contends that terms such as status, prestige, honour, standing and identity are often substitutes for reputation; they are simultaneously inter-related yet important concepts in isolation.  Moreover, while noting research such as Dafoe and Caughey (2016) and Katz & Skylar (2017) which investigates the influence of reputation, emotion, and motivation of 
individual leadership (Executive, DoD and/or State), this thesis evaluates reputation in relation to the state. The thesis justifies its focus on the prevalence of the state in its research through works by Kahneman, 2003; Hutchinson and Bleiker, 2014; Cox & Wood, 2016), and by highlighting Crescenzi, et.al who assert that “while foreign policies may be influenced by the opinions of individuals, the realm of possibilities is constrained by state-related factors, including the nation’s capability, geopolitical stature, existing relationships with other states, and the similarity of its national interests with others in the system” (2012: 263). The thesis suggests that at no time in recent history has the ability of the state to be able to communicate its commitment and demonstrate its capability to respond to a casus foederis (cause for an alliance) been so important. Given the diffuse nature of threats in unconventional warfare, states must be able to effectively articulate their individual objectives as well as their ‘red-lines.’ The thesis argues for defence diplomacy’s peerless role in this aspect of alliance formation. 
                                                     
40 Although the influence of reputation in the decision-making process is difficult to measure, even sceptics identify 
its role in the formation and maintenance of an alliance. For example, Copeland resisted attributing too much 
significance to reputation and reliability in the formation and maintenance of alliances, declaring the US should not 
“fight for its reputation without due consideration of costs, benefits, and feasibility,” he acknowledged that 
“sometimes the only way to forestall changes in the status quo is to show a willingness at least to risk such an 
outcome ... a reputation for this kind of resolve still seems to be a necessary element of an effective foreign policy” 
(1997: 68)  
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Scholars have invested heavily in determining whether such arrangements add to the security dilemma instead of reducing conflicts and tension, finding there are two sides to the collective security coin. Walt (1987) Smith (1995) and Crescenzi, Et al. (2012) are among those who weigh the costs and benefits of alliance formation in relation to changes in behaviour and attitude. From the U.S. perspective, its military superiority in delivering the capabilities to overwhelm any other nation-state on the face of the earth makes it an attractive partner. However, the risk assessments of other states examine capability and intent. Therefore, while U.S. capability is clear, its ability to disseminate intent to friends and foes alike highlights the need for it to maximise the type of defence diplomacy-oriented engagement covered by this thesis (Gholz, Press & Sapolsky, 1997; Posen, 2013; Benson, Bentley & Ray, 2013). Through defence diplomacy, states use persuasion to form alliances, coalitions and partnerships, explaining to states how useful cooperation in the field of defence is and how much regional and international security can be preserved if various states pool their military capabilities (Kilcullen, 2009). In theory, defence diplomacy mitigates threats by developing inter-state dialogue, promoting the creation of alliances, agreements and counter-partnerships designed to interconnect the defence systems of states. Practically, research has identified defence-oriented alliances “significantly attenuate” the onset of interstate disputes while those states without a formal alliance structure are more likely to revert to kinetic military options in inter-state disputes (Levy, 1981; Oren, 1990; Leeds, Long & Mitchell, 2000 Leeds, 2003; Vasquez and Rundlett, 2016). Of course, these conclusions are subject to states acting rationally. A truism of IR regards states as rational actors, making decisions on the basis of self-interest following a comprehensive assessment of appropriate courses of action.41 The inclusion and assessment of rational actors and rational actions is influenced by the Realist-constructivism grounding of the thesis. Rational Choice Theory aligns itself with Constructivism as both are framed as social theory’s which facilitate an understanding how actors engage within a flexible, yet constrained system (Barnett, 2008).42 The thesis uses Huth and Russett’s definition for ‘rational’ as the capacity “to order one's preferences, and to choose according to that ordering and perceptions of the likelihood of various outcomes” (1984: 499). A rational decision-maker may be risk-averse, or 
                                                     
41 It has been suggested to the author that this ‘truism’ could be perceived as a dangerous assumption as political 
elites do not always act rationally. However, the research focused on states, and dismissed the actions of individual 
leaders as to much of a variable to be useful. This approach discounts the use of alternate IR political theories such 
as cognitive approaches (Rosati, 1994), Word-System Theory (Wallerstein, 1976) and Institutionalism (Cox, 1984). 
42In his analysis of the theory, practice and applicability of Rational Choice Theory through the lens of military 
decision-making, Alan Hastings presents the five phases of the Rational Choice Strategy Process as 1) Identify the 
set of options, 2) Identify the ways of evaluating these options, 3) Weigh each evaluation dimension, 4) Rate the 
options, 5) Pick the option with the highest score.   
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risk-acceptant. Another applicable risk assessment related concept, and one which influenced the research for Defence Diplomacy in the Long War to help explain (and in-part justify) why the Coalition has persisted with particular strategy’s in Afghanistan, is prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory “challenges traditional paradigms of decision-making (expected utility theory) and predictive behaviour” by proposing that decision-makers tend to value the cost of losses as greater than the cost of abandoning an action in pursuit of an alternate strategy-the proverbial ‘doubling-down’ (White 2017). Prospect theory aligns itself with rationality because “the assumption of rationality does not require that perceptions be accurate, or that a given decision-maker’s preferences will be the same as other people's” (Huth & Russett 1984: 499). The thesis asserts that while this is a relatively simple assessment to make in a bilateral setting, the situation becomes increasingly complicated with each addition to the alliance because each party’s experience, is-à-vis the opponent may be, and probably will be, different.  Leeds, Et al. highlight that ‘rational’ states are “forward-looking actors” and “are expected to consider the anticipated results of their actions in choosing paths to take” (2000: 696). However, anticipation is heightened by learned experience, and according to rational-choice theory, a state will view previous action (reputation) as a strong indicator of the credibility of the message being delivered. Therefore, even the most risk-acceptant, forward-looking state will base its decision, in part, on experience, and reputation of the adversary as well as its potential partners. Additionally, even though prospect theory suggests that decision-makers will be reluctant to change course as costs increase, it must be acknowledged that the most rigid of mission plans will have contingencies.43  While theories, structures and formulae are central to consistency and accountability, there is an inexorable human element to war and multi-dimensional innate human characteristics such as emotion can, and do, interrupt the two-dimensional realm of whiteboards and field manuals.  Emotion is an intrinsic and powerful aspect of the human psyche which can influence state actions across the political spectrum. Given the relative predictability of emotional responses (based on experience), they can be used by leadership to manoeuvre wavering allies. For example, it’s widely acknowledged that post-9/11emotion was leveraged by U.S. policymakers and advocates of military 
                                                     
43 Contingencies are aligned to the other dominant concept in this space, expected-utility theory. Expected-utility 
principle predicts that a decision-maker will assess the probability of “each possible outcome of a given course of 
action … summing over all possible outcomes for each strategy, and selecting that strategy with the highest 
expected utility” (Levy, 1997: 88).; ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process transfers and operationalizes these theories, 
and the associated concept of comparative evaluation, into military planning through a seven stage process in 
which upon receipt of specific mission objective(s) a commander will nominate and evaluate suitable courses of 
action to achieve the mission objective. Part of the commander’s evaluation will also include the “certainty, 
probability and possibility” of external factors to affect (positively and/or negatively) mission objective (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979: 266).   
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action to “cajole reluctant allies to join the fight” (Beckley, 2015: 10).  Beckley also recognizes that as OEF became the Long War, the U.S. has restrained allies, and on occasion, was itself retrained by its Coalition partners. Other scholars have explored the role of emotion as an identifiable variable in strategic decision-making including the previously mentioned interpretation of political signals (diplomatic or military) (Slantchev, 2010; Mercer, 2013; Cox & Wood, 2017). Accepting that emotion is a key factor in accepting cooperative action, once a coalition is formed, acting in unison increases the costs to the target whilst reducing the cost to the coalition.   Linking emotion back to the discussion of reputation, coalitions also increase the credibility of group action by reinforcing redlines and limiting domestic blowback (Robinson, 2012). Yet the thesis identified that domestic considerations are not always a final and are subject to manipulation. As such, domestic opinion should not be a primary determinant factor in the decision making process. For example, research by Krebs (2010) explored the role of emotionally-driven public influence on policy-makers. Krebs found that public opposition to the involvement of prominent U.S. allies, France, Germany and Canada, did not stop leadership from committing to Afghanistan during the initial combat phase of the Long War, yet wide-spread public protests around the world prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in in March 2003 saw the Canadians refuse to meet their ‘obligation’ and commit forces. 44 Jervis proposed an alternative view wherebythe state seeks to protect its external reputation from domestic factors. Jervis found that “decision makers may be deterred from giving firm commitments because of their belief that the public cannot be counted on to redeem the pledge if it comes due” (1968: 66).  Incorporating these concepts into the research and identifying their connection to each other was an important process. Beliefs such as trust and credibility are dependent on emotion, and emotion influences how people/states interpret evidence. From a rational perspective, people/states use evidence to revise their beliefs. However rational actors can also compile evidence which conforms to their beliefs, biases and/or agenda. Similarly, because reputation is subjective and somewhat reliant on credibility, even the most rational of actors can base its decisions on a flawed interpretation of reality (Alexander & Thibodeau, 2017; Walker & Bonnot, 2017). Examining how this impacted the relationship building process reinforced the role of defence diplomacy as a mechanism 
                                                     
44 The Iraq invasion is an interesting case whereby Canada had access to the same intelligence curtesy of their 5 Eyes 
Intelligence Network membership (US, UK, Canada, Australia, & New Zealand) yet declined to use this intel as 
justification for their involvement in military operations (as did fellow 5 Eyes partner NZ.). The CIA’s declassified 
Report on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for WMD as well as other investigations that over 90% of the Intel into Iraq’s 
WMD program came from the US and the UK which may have influenced the decision of the two ‘junior’ Network 
partners. 
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to generate trust, confidence, consistency (a combination of predictability and reliability), and most importantly unity of effort; thus satisfying one of the thesis hypotheses. 
Deterrence & Coercion The thesis recognized Clausewitz’s assertion that “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (1989: 75) as justification for examining coercion and deterrence through the lens of defence diplomacy. Researching these concepts revealed several relevant elements of ‘Traditional’ diplomacy which ground the thesis. Through a diverse range of bilateral relations, multilateral processes including summits, a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy (see Appendix 
6), the Coalition has used defence diplomacy to coerce and deter its opponents during the Long War with varying degrees of success. The U.S. Army explains that “[C]oercion generates effects through the application of force (to include the threat of force) to compel an adversary or prevent our being compelled” (JP 1-0, 2013, I-13). Whereas coercive diplomacy is a psychological mechanism which is more adaptable and flexible when contrasted against the decisive and rigid instrument of direct kinetic military force. Therefore, the strategy relies on the threat of force rather than the use of force (Schelling, 1965; Dornoch, 1988; Bildt, 2000; Kaplan, 2006; Motwani, 2012).  The relationship between diplomacy and force is openly debated and it forms part of the many post-conflict analyses. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and the process through which Libya dismantled its WMD program are two recent examples of coercive diplomacy in practice. This success of these actions were a direct result of coalition-building efforts of Western partners. Coercion in population-centric COIN has an additional component beyond kinetic operations which presents opportunities for defence diplomacy to assist strategic planners and those tasked with its implementation. Continuous direct engagement between a coalition, the HN, as well as the in situ population in vital to determining the level of coercion and/or deterrence. Siegel and Hackel concluded, “the only territory you want to hold, is the six inches between the ears” of the locals (1988: 119), therefore disproportionate and/or misaligned coercion can undermine tactical and strategic objectives.45  There are different levels of coercion, from discriminate through too indiscriminate and while the level can be viewed subjectively, an objective assessment would situate levels of coercion on a continuum between direct violations of the Geneva Convention, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), or 
                                                     
45For example, The Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis report identified one of the failures of the U.S 
intervention in Iraq was the limited understanding of “ethnic and tribal identities, religion, culture, politics and 
economics” (2012: 4-5). ‘Decade of War Study’, Joint & Coalition Operational Analysis, (Parkway VI: Joint Staff J7, 
2012), pp. 1-50 
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International Human Rights Law, through to sanctions, economic inducements and generating pressure through multilateral fora (Kilcullen, 2006a; Lyall, Zhou & Imai, 2017). The thesis asserts that 
everything other than the legal violations of the outliers of the continuum are necessary to progress strategic objectives in contemporary COIN. The challenge for planners and practitioners is deciding what is the appropriate level of coercion along the continuum. Too far toward the right of the continuum, and the population may gravitate toward the insurgency; while, too far to the left, and the counterinsurgent (the Coalition) may appear ill-equipped to deliver promised security, the intelligence gathered will be benign, while important relationship building mechanisms will be ineffective. It is indeed a delicate balance as too far in either direction risks the local population at worst supporting and a best accepting the insurgency. In an acknowledgement that counterinsurgents (civ/mil) will require both kinetic and non-kinetic coercive tools to operate in highly dynamic areas of responsibility (AOR), Morris concludes that “[W]ithout some degree of coercive power to control the population, it is unlikely that a future counterinsurgent can succeed against a modern insurgency” (August 2017). This thesis argues that defence diplomacy generates what the U.S. Army terms comprehensive 
deterrence which is an outcome of a WoG approach which protects U.S. interests by “preventing an adversary’s action through the existence of credible physical, cognitive and moral threats by raising the perceived benefit of action to an unacceptable risk level” (U.S. Army, 2015, 10). Sabrosky (1980), whose empirical research is often cited in alliance oriented research, argues that leaders pursue alliances to accomplish two objectives: to deter war or to win the war if deterrence should fail. This is a generally acknowledged, observed and logical progression, yet ‘we’ only know it’s working when it doesn’t; and when it doesn’t ‘we’ must move to the next best means of achieving the objective.46 of the thesis posits that defence diplomacy, establishes balance of security-oriented capabilities between likeminded or interest aligned states to generate the transparency and predictability necessary to deter an adversary (Kahn, 1965; George & Smoke, 1975; Huth & Russett, 1984).  Additionally, and in relation to the previous discussion on reputation, deterrence can also be built upon a “retroactive illusion … a social construct emanating from strategic players” (Samaan, 
                                                     
46 Huth and Russett state that “the absence of an attack does not necessarily attest to the success of deterrence: 
perhaps the potential "attacker" never really had any intention of attacking. If so, the "attacker" was never 
deterred … the reason has little to do with the threat of retaliation, and that the failure to attack is due to a change 
of priorities by decision-makers (1984: 497); Khan articulates the progression between strategic options: “In most 
deterrent situations, once deterrence has failed it is irrational to carry out the previously made warnings or threats 
of retaliation since that action will produce an absolute or net loss to the retaliator. Thus the threat of retaliation, 
in order to be believed to be believable, must depend upon the potential irrationality of the retaliator” (1965: 57-
58). 
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2014: 40). Yet just as basing decisions on reputation and credibility alone is problematic, reputation-based deterrence is “unnatural” and unreliable; requiring “constant adaptations to mitigate the risks of miscalculations” (Ibid). However, reputation and/or credibility can be influential asdeterrence can be established over time by engaging in a series of analogous actions which generates the aptly named ‘cumulative deterrence.’ The concept of cumulative deterrence is operationalised in the Israeli Defence Force’s ‘mowing the grass’ strategy (Almog, 2004; Rid, 2012) Israeli defense doctrine dictates, “the attrition of the enemy that repeatedly “mowing the grass” entailed was part of a longer-term strategy to achieve “cumulative deterrence’ … that would eventually lead to the complete cessation of attacks on Israel” (Cohen, Et al., 2017: 40). The thesis argues a comparable effect can be achieved through actions under the umbrella of defence diplomacy-oriented engagement. Moreover, just as Shamir and Hecht claim that each IDF operation “should not be regarded as an independent event, it is part of a long-term strategy” with short-term, medium-term, and long-term objectives, the aggregate of increased defence diplomacy oriented engagement generates confidence in and of the process and signals intent to opponents (2015: 88). The Israeli strategy alternates between continuous routine low intensity activities and occasional, yet strategic, escalations. Adapting the fundamental of this type of strategy would lead to the erosion of an opponent’s confidence to engage in actions which run counter to coalition state’s national interests/security which is the desired outcome evidenced throughout this research.   This finding aligns with the hypothesis which drove this aspect of the research; that is: defence diplomacy-oriented engagement engenders alternative deterrents. Theoretically, the mechanism of defence diplomacy makes unilateral diplomatic or military intervention redundant by generating “awareness of the other side’s capabilities and intentions” (Henrikson, 2013: 266). The concept manifests into doctrine with the 2011 Military Strategy and the 2015 National Security Strategy identifying a world in which the military’s contribution to U.S. leadership must be about more than power. In practice the mere presence of U.S. personnel signals support to an allies, future partners and adversaries alike (Maurer, 2017; McChrystal, 2017). As a result of the sheer size of its force, from an operational perspective, this unique capability provides the U.S. National Command Authority (The President and SECDEF) with additional options across a “spectrum between large-scale conflict and diplomacy” (Michel, March 17, 2016).  Deterrence and coercion align with the concept of ‘shaping,’ which JP5-0 Joint Operation 
Planning, defines as various activities “performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies” (2011: xxii). Defence Diplomacy in the Long 
War concludes that the relationships built within the Coalition established a unified and credible, 
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front that could simultaneously assail, deter, compel, and shape. The latter occurred when a state’s objectives were progressed through suggestion, influence, persuasion, compellence and deterrence which removed the need to deploy direct kinetic force. 47 Despite the benefits of shaping an environment, aligning interests and generating unified action, progress can still be undermined by the actions, and more importantly inactions, of individual coalition members.  
Caveats and Influence The thesis identifies, reinforces and demonstrates ‘unity of effort’ as the optimal outcome of the accumulation of actions within the spectrum of defence diplomacy. However, there are certain impediments to this desired end-state which emerge from the very mechanism created to achieve it: the coalition. Because effective alliances or coalitions require coordination and cooperation, not subordination and domination, Plutarch’s questioning of how do states retain their “spears and shields” and not end up “bound to the bench and oars” remains relevant. The answer, according to many modern alliance treaties is to include specific language regarding the circumstances under which the alliance comes into effect such as NATO’s Article 5 (Collective Defence).  National reservations or safeguards, most often referred to as caveats (also known as ‘red cards’), are individual guidelines, or a suite of parameters, which determine the actions of a particular state’s civ/mil apparatus within a coalition. Caveats are deployed as a mechanism to balance a state’s alliance commitments. However, they directly impact the central hypothesis of this study as caveats are often cited as “a particular problem for unity of effort in multinational coalition operations” (Frost-Nielsen, 2017: 2). The effects can manifest in a number of short and long-term issues for the existence and therefore efficacy of the coalition as well as for the states within it. For example, caveats can send mixed signals to coalition partners, undermining confidence in the alliance. Additionally, the 
                                                     
47 Related to this discussion is what this thesis labels ‘ideological containment,’ presented here as an alternative to 
traditional geographic containment which is difficult to achieve in 21st century 5th domain warfare (Air, Land, Sea, 
Space & Cyber-virtual). Generating a unified response to a threat through a coalition framework based on defence 
diplomacy oriented cooperation, coordination and communication establishes the ideal condition to implement 
containment strategy based on ideology (as well as geography). The AQ model demonstrates that local conditions 
are no longer local, one’s opponents can manipulate globalisation-enabled connectivity to aggregate the ‘global 
aggrieved’ to form an amalgamated force. Containing such a force is impossible in the traditional sense as this force 
is dispersed around the world, therefore an alternate strategy is one that can identify and isolate extremist 
elements of the unifying ideology. David Kilcullen (2009) discusses the difficulty of traditional containment in 
relation to Sunni extremism in the global Umma (Muslim Community, calling for a balanced approach “along a 
spectrum of engagement” from direct territorial intervention through to separation. The thesis assesses that 
defence diplomacy facilitates Kilcullen’s request through its multifaceted kinetic and non-kinetic toolkit. Kilcullen 
discusses ways of engaging with disaffected Muslims without intervening in what he labels “a civil war within Islam” 
(2009: 16). 
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reputation of the caveat generating state, as well as the reaction from partner states, can have a detrimental effect on the caveat generating state’s reputation. Having discussed the importance of reputation in the coalition formation, it’s easy to see how inserting and enforcing commitment parameters can destabilize the coalition before it becomes operational; or more critically, after it becomes operational.48  Some caveats are created to impose restrictions on the policy-makers themselves; delivering a self-inflicted limitation to mitigate potential over-reach. This may be done for several reasons but the primary factor appears to be the need to insulate policy-makers from difficult decisions; for example: We could not make ‘X’ decision because of parliamentary/congressional constraints.49 Saideman (2016) points to the 2011 NATO campaign in Libya with the U.S. ‘no-boots on the ground’ caveat as a recent example of intra-alliance caveats dictating operations which ran counter to individual member-states strategic objective(s). One can interpret the caveat as a natural outcome of inter-state bargaining, a process to assuage (Frost-Nielsen, 2017), while others view them as a control mechanism, which purposely limit the military leaderships ability to dictate decision-making (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014). Some conclude that caveats are the product of the compromises necessary to reach an agreement among domestic political actors with contending views on military intervention (Feaver, 1998). The thesis argues that caveats have the potential to undermine the trust, transparency and unity of effort, which is the primary reason for forming the coalition, leaving one to question their utility.   However, as a ‘balancing’ mechanism, some practitioners present caveats as a protective measure for junior partners and a necessary component of responsible statecraft (Kelly, 2002’ Crane, 2017). These appraisals of the caveat support principal-agent theory, or agency dilemma; whereby one entity (the ‘agent’) is able to make decisions on behalf of, or that impact, another entity (the ‘principal’) as a trade-off for the principal delegating its national security to a subordinate (the agent). Principal-agent theory has been used as a lens through which to analyse coalition efficacy as well as 
                                                     
48 In private conversations between this author and ADF personnel involved in Iraq from 2004-2008, military 
personnel explained that the Australian governments rules of engagement and geographical guidelines 
(constraints) created tensions with their Coalition partners (notably the US) who openly criticised the Aussies for 
“not be fully-engaged in the fight.” 
49 Andrew Carr recently presented a cogent argument of the origins, operation and outcomes of bipartisanship and 
the need for non-partisan debate regarding security and defence issues; this thesis suggests that the ‘bipartisan 
condition’ is at least in part to blame for the generation and implementation of prohibitive caveats. Carr highlights 
that bipartisanship can emerge in a democracy as an outcome of political debate, based on agreement as to the 
existence and nature of policy challenges, and the correct policy prescriptions to address them. In contrast, 
bipartisanship can also operate as a process for addressing and resolving political issues, via a norm established as 
a standard of appropriate behaviour against partisan debate which punishes those who are seen to transgress it 
(August 2017). 
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civ/mil relations for over the past two decades (Swain, 2014; Egnell, 2013; Miller, 2005; Cohen, 2002; Bland, 1999; Feaver, 1998; Downs & Rocke, 1994). While it may seem complicated, at its core, principal-agent theory is primarily a cost-benefit analysis (Agnew, 2012; Coletta, 2013; Biddle, Et al, 2017). The thesis recognises the relevance of principal-agent theory research and its contribution to understanding when and how states react to threats to its national security. However, it argues the types of engagement generated through defence diplomacy reduces divergence between principal and agent interests as well as the need, and therefore impediment, of caveats. The role of trust, reputation, credibility, predictability ect., which are discussed in this document in the context of defence diplomacy, are all relevant in diminishing the need for caveats through the alignment of interests. Junior alliance partners are often assessed through the lens of capability aggregation, assuming the primary function of an alliance is to aggregate military capability against threats common to the allies. However, there are instances which counter this assumption whereby weaker states can significantly influence alliance dynamics (Shin, Izatt & Moon, 2016 Rawlins, 2017). Writing on another period of systemic upheaval and unpredictability, the inter-war years, E. H. Carr debated the power of opinion and influence; asserting that “Realism tends to emphasise the irresistible strength of existing forces and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to, these forces and tendencies” (1946: 10). Despite his Realist predilection, Carr identified the ‘power’ of non-peer states to influence outcomes, a position which was embraced by Neo-realist founder Kenneth Waltz (1959, 1979). As a precursor to Realist-constructivism, the theory chosen to anchor this thesis, Waltz’s more pliant neo, or structural-realism helps to explain the ‘how and why’ of defence diplomacy and its role in complex, inter-dependent relationships. Yet Gordon Vella insists that “[P]ersuasion is made easier if it is backed by integrity, respect, experience, and trust” (2013: 11), which represents a contemporary form of latent and perceived power, and are central to a Realist-constructivist approach. Recent research reflects this (Jazbec, 2013; Scott, 2013; Blaxland, 2017, Wallis, 2017; Moyse, 2017) and reinforce the importance of reputation in the relationship building, and decision-making phases of an alliance identified by the thesis.  
Shared Interests or Coalitions of Convenience? While ‘shared interests’ are presented as a positive component of defence diplomacy-oriented engagement, it is clear that state’s do not necessarily enter into an arrangement with perfect strategic alignment and asymmetry of interests. James Morrow, a widely recognised source of alliance theory, emphasised that asymmetry of interests could be viewed as a common indicator in the alliance 
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formation process, writing, “without divergent interests, an alliance would be unnecessary because each party would each party would come to the others aid simply in order to pursue its own (identical) interests” (1991: 906). However, international relations is not ‘black and white’ and actors “will always have multiple interests, which will vary in importance, priority, and feasibility” (Burkhart & Woody, 2017: 22).  Therefore, generating areas of mutually beneficial cooperation can be difficult. For example, inherent suspicion is an openly acknowledged and natural outcome when states outsource their security, at any level, to an external partner.50 Private discussions with a policymaker involved in the Afghanistan and Iraq war decision-making process revealed that “success in early operations led to a greater commitment from the Australian Government” even in areas which undermined national interests.  However, the thesis sought to determine whether this was replicated across the spectrum, whereby operation and tactical gains influence decisions which counter strategic objective and national interest. Moreover, research explored whether military progress influenced how national interests are articulated. In addressing these questions, comments from two individuals with intimate knowledge of the formation of national interests and the articulation of strategic objectives, Senator Robert Hill, former Defence Minister (2001-2006) and Ric Smith, former Secretary of Defence (2002-2006), were extremely helpful. Senator Hill discussed the difficulty in generating consensus during the lead up to both wars, declaring that “participating in the planning stages does not mean commitment,” while Ric Smith noted “political support for the US did not parallel military opinion on the ground” (June 2017). The examination of shared interests revealed a correlation with other elements reflected upon in this section. For example, influence, trust and reputation are intrinsically connected the generating and maintaining shared interests. The thesis asserts that externally driven but locally generated capacity-building consistently leads to an alignment of interests over time, however it could not determine whether this alignment was sustainable or whether such alignment 
                                                     
50 The Hope Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security noted the “Australia’s interests do not, and cannot, 
exactly or entirely coincide with that of any other country, no matter how friendly” (1976: 50); While Biddle, Et al. 
emphasise that “no two states can ever have identical interests … even great allies like the U.S. and Great Britain”; 
citing a divergence in interests and objectives from WWII to Libya in 2011 (2017: 10). 
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would influence the effectiveness of a COIN campaign.51 However, it’s evident that identifying what a state’s ‘interests’ are, should dictate the areas which partner states prioritize.52  While dialogue and transparency engendered through defence diplomacy are one way to generate an accurate picture of areas of commonality, institutional and organizational differences can still limit unity of effort (Shein, 2004; Walker & Bonnot, 2016; Perkins, 2017). There’s an ongoing conflict within security -oriented bureaucracies between the desire to maintain a predictable and stable environment, and the need to improve, solve problems and achieve results in complex environments. Finding this balance between completing day-to-day activities and a sincere commitment organisational change requires adaptability and innovation, especially in an active zone of conflict. Adaptability is not only a reaction to a confronting situation, it’s also about anticipating changes in the environment and being ahead of the curve.53 In a military context, prescience requires critical and creative thinking as well as a comfort with ambiguity, risk-taking, and decentralized 
                                                     
51 The research of Biddle, Et al. identified the connection, revealing "there is a statistically significant negative 
correlation between US-partner interest alignment and U.S. SFA provision: the closer the interest alignment, the 
less likely the US is to provide military aid” (2017: 10). For SFA to be deemed successful, receiver state policy 
(interests) would need to support US foreign policy (the receiver state’s military could not be used against US 
interests); While Hurst, Mandrick & McElligot, claim that “delivering capacity and capability development through 
SFA requires more than training in individual and collective tasks (e.g., fire and maneuver). Security forces must be 
tied into higher-level policies and the rule of law, otherwise we are training potential militias with untethered 
leadership and violent agendas” (November 18, 2017).  
52 The ongoing conflict in Iraq and Syria presents a contemporary example of the difficulty of aligning the various 
tools of State and DoD despite the common interests pursued. The US is juggling its operational and strategic 
objectives with three major powers (Turkey, Iran and Russia) and one quasi-state regional actor with inherent 
mistrust of the West; a legacy of undelivered promises. In Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds have dominated the battle for 
norther Iraq cities such as Mosul since 2014. And while State sought to legitimise the nascent Abadi government in 
Baghdad, SECDEF Carter announced a US$415 million gift for selected Peshmerga units in April 2016, which was 
expected to go towards maintaining a combat active Kurdish military force, raising concerns with the central 
government who subsequently openly chastised the US for its decision. Meanwhile the Syrian Kurds are 
unwearyingly leading the protracted fight against ISIS in across the north of the country, yet again, there are 
divisions between State and US-led forces. Gayle Tzemach Lemmon wrote that senior foreign service officials, 
“particularly U.S. diplomats based in Turkey, share the Turkish government’s concerns about U.S. forces aligning 
with Syrian Kurds and have been worried about U.S. plans to have Syrian Kurds take part in whatever stabilization 
efforts come next. Meanwhile, in the eyes of those in uniform inside Syria with an up-close view of the battle, the 
Syrian Kurds are the best fighting force America has in country. They’re also most able to access and assist with 
Syria’s humanitarian crisis and post-conflict stabilization. The divide is driven by the differing mandates facing State 
and the Pentagon. The State Department is working to keep NATO ally Turkey in dialog and on board. While this 
type of support is strategically justified, sovereign governments may perceive it as external manipulation in 
domestic politics. That risk is mitigated by effective diplomacy, based on personal engagement/relationships.  
53 Short-term obstacles must be overcome to achieve long-term development which requires foresight or vision, “a 
picture of the future framed by a value-based purpose that creates a path to drive behaviour, change, and 
motivation” (Walker & Bonnot, 2016: 2). However, the authors maintain that achieving long-term organizational 
development (improving) whilst accomplishing its missions (operating) “are not mutually exclusive tasks” (Ibid: 2). 
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execution to solve problems and get results (ADRP 6-22, 2012). Across the broader spectrum of civ/mil engagement, these capabilities are a prerequisite for effective innovation to take place. Once again, an understanding of the nuances and intricacies of international relations reveal that although interests can be identified and their structure can be aligned, the road to unity of effort is not cleared of impediments. Although “strong, stable cultures can provide effective performance … they are only as stable as the environment in which they operate. Achieving an environment which fosters shared beliefs and/or a shared commitment to mission objectives requires developing an overt and clearly defined concept of ‘how, what, where and importantly why.’ (Anders, 2009). Walker and Bonnot label this as a “collective consciousness” (2016: 5). The thesis demonstrates the centrality of ‘collective consciousness’ on a macro level; generating effective and sustainable relationships however, it is evident on a micro level as well. The thesis argues that without micro level ‘collective consciousness’, establishing security oriented coalitions through defence diplomacy would be greatly reduced. E. H. Carr (1946) recognised the importance of developing a universal ‘pride of service’ to ensure the transition from conscription to an all-volunteer professional force. It’s an analysis which is as applicable today as it was 70 years ago (Agnew, 2012; Gent, 2014). Collective consciousness materialises in mass opinion in the public sphere which in turn influences policy, whereas mass opinion within the military manifests through the concept of doctrine. (See Appendix 6 for an assessment of how public diplomacy generates mass opinion). It has been suggested that “Doctrine is the box you need to know before you can think out of it,” therefore a brief introduction to the concept is required.54 Doctrine reflects a consensus opinion, shared understanding and institutionalised knowledge, and provides theory-based directions on ‘how’ to carry out operations (Jackson, 2013; Angstrom & Widen, 2015). :6). The thesis assessed whether a joint/combined doctrine would disseminate the lessons learned of 16 years of Coalition engagement to a wider cohort, and whether defence diplomacy-oriented engagement would be the appropriate vehicle? The U.S. military defines joint doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives … in coordinated action toward a common objective …” (ADP 1-01, 2014: 1-2). Using this definition, the thesis concludes that in a perfect world, joint doctrine would be a highly valuable tool to create the unity of effort required to confront threats in a complex environment. In a Coalition context, it would allow stakeholders to generate “the best team without having the best players” (Høibak, 2012: 24). 
                                                     
54 Unknown Soviet source quoted in Carroll, (2004: 5). 
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However, would ‘another’ doctrine, especially one which dictated a course of action for civ/mil practitioners, obscure rather than illuminate? (Mintzberg, 1994; Gray, 2010; Cavanaugh, 2017).55   The thesis posits that nowhere is this more evident than in the debate regarding the theory and practice of COIN. While the fundamentals of ‘classical’ COIN (policy objectives) have remained relatively static over time, the strategic challenges of 2001 are different to those faced by the Coalition in 2011 and will have no doubt shifted again by 2021 (Corum, 2006; Freidman, 2014; Jackson, 2017). The dichotomy facing policymakers is that “yesterday’s doctrinal wisdom most likely will get one killed and will also lead to mission failure” (Rid, 2010: 10), while continuing to fight without a clearly defined objective equates to high cost, high tempo activities in search of a strategy. The thesis concludes that the presence (and perhaps leadership) of the vast U.S. defence infrastructure, the lessons learned over 16 years of conflict as well as the increased cooperation across the policy, strategic and tactical realm derived through defence diplomacy-oriented engagement, equips the Coalition with the ‘tools’ to generate the sought after joint doctrine. 
Mission Command: Operationalising Trust & Reputation Some of the criticism for Defence’s role (civ/mil) in diplomacy appears based on normative interpretation or an embedded premise that diplomatic “engagement is about managing relationships, not command and control; it’s about cooperation, not fighting; and it’s about partnership not dominance” (Reveron, 2014: 68). To address this critique, the thesis examined the fundamentals of ‘command’ to identify whether the criticism is warranted.  Justification for this area of research is clear, because at its core, command is about decision making. Being in the right place to make a decision, knowing the right moment to make it, knowing where to obtain the best possible facts to inform the decision, keeping the plan simple, shaping the environment to receive the decision, thinking it through to the finish, being alert to the second and third order consequences, then ensuring the idea is understood at every level. Once again, the theoretical relevance of reputation and trust, both strategically and tactically, is evident in the concept of mission command because “[M]ission command is the practice of assigning a subordinate commander a mission without specifying how the mission is to be achieved” (Australian Army, LWD 1, 2014: 45). The thesis evaluates that the essence of mission command is ‘why’ as well as the ‘how’; disseminating a clear understanding of the ‘end state’ and accommodating 
                                                     
55 Gray warns that the “international community of defense and security practitioners and commentators is so large 
and industrious that one can feel overwhelmed by the cascade of new-sounding concepts and schools of thought, 
as well as by the sheer volume of theories, analyses, commentaries, and instant histories of still-moving events” 
(2010: 10). 
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alternative plans of attack. Nevertheless, the practice of clearly communicating of a commander’s intent is fundamental to lower ranked personnel understanding what underlies an assigned mission. Intent can be defined as “a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state helps subordinate and supporting commanders to act” (Glenn, 2017: 22). Although the term has been adopted by civilian agencies, successful mission command is contingent upon military-specific culture of decision-making based on vision, delegation, professional competence, and trust. Reputation (credibility and reliability) is essential in terms of disseminating intent, as well as supporting the decisions of subordinates (building subordinate confidence in decision-making). Similar to other examples discussed, progress is made at an internal (individual actor level), as well as a systemic level (the mission command concept) when a commander has a reputation for effectively utilising mission command.  While the paragraph above explains the concept from an intra-force perspective, its relevance increases, and the potential problems are magnified when applied to combined/joint operations. Theoretically, because mission command has been adopted by most Western militaries, partner states are ready to apply the concept to their Long War strategy. However, disseminating intent and supporting subordinate decision-making is heavily reliant on credibility and reliability in previous operations, as well as authority, hierarchy and status of the partner within the coalition (although most of the 51 members of ISAF would be classified as ‘junior’ partners, some states are more ‘junior’ than others). An additional impediment to combined mission command during the Long War was the constant rotation of commanders between 2001 and 2014 whereby 18 ISAF commanders and 6 OEF commanders transition out of theater taking with them cultural, institutional and strategic knowledge (Selber, 2017). Selber identifies effective mission command, continuity and unity of effort as the foundations of success in the Long War. (December 2017).  Perhaps as an unintentional result of a WoG approach, policy-makers increasingly rely upon the concept of mission command to achieve their COIN/CT objectives; yet generating it continues to challenge practitioners. Augmenting existing civ/mil coordination during decision-making will help to align expectations with the realities of mission command at the operational level. Moreover, successful development of mission command produces positive results beyond combined operational success (Anker III, 2013; Bacevich, 2016; Gould, 2017). Once more evidencing continuity and change, the thesis finds that developing effective mission command in COIN-based combined operations requires a combination of revisiting exactly what is to achieved by ‘levelling’ the decision-making process, encouraging fluidity within its parameters, and the confidence to revisit the concept to 
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generate an alternative when it’s not working. These efforts are greatly enhanced by defence diplomacy-oriented engagement. 
Defence Diplomacy in Unconventional warfare & COIN 
Unconventional Warfare David Galula, who wrote what many consider to be ‘the’ seminal book on COIN, argued that the military aspect of COIN is only 20% of the strategy with the remaining 80% being political, economic, and information operations (1964: 64). While General Kitson discards the arithmetic to claim, quite bluntly, that “there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity” (1977: 253). Based on the evaluations of Galula, Kitson, Dey (2007), Kilcullen (2006), Bartholomees (2008) and Griffin, (2014), the thesis sought to determine and then articulate how defence diplomacy integrates all the elements of statecraft (DIME) to generate a 100% response to an insurgency. Defence Diplomacy in the Long War details the practical differences when operating in unconventional conflict. However, this paper provides a brief ‘refresh’ to before testing the relevant hypotheses.  The conventional warfare paradigm “is characterised by the use of direct force against adversaries, with centralised command and control (C2) to support the massing of resources against the enemy centre of gravity-that is, a nations-state’s uniformed military forces” (Young, 2013: 126). A way to differentiate between this ‘understood’ model of conflict and what ‘we’ face today is to focus on the intensity of combat, that is: Conventional or Regular-High tempo, and Unconventional/Irregular-low tempo.56 Another vital element exemplified by irregular conflict, and one which enhanced cooperation and coordination addresses, is the importance of precision v’s 
accuracy (Garard, 2016).57 While precision weaponry in conventional combat delivers immediate 
                                                     
56 The term ‘understood’ in in reference to comments by President Reagan’s SECDEF Caspar Weinberger who 
declared in 1986 that: “Much has been written about low-intensity warfare, but it remains an open question how 
much is understood. Of greater certainty is the fact that little of what is understood has been applied effectively” 
(quoted in Baratto, 1986: 1). One could argue that this statement is applicable in the current context. 
57 While precision weaponry in conventional combat delivers immediate results, in irregular combat, a lack of 
accuracy with precision targeting can produce a legacy of negative outcomes. Collateral damage restricts freedom 
of action as the local population reacts, either in concert with the insurgency or independently, against the 
perceived aggressor. Accuracy, as far as it is possible to be accurate in irregular conflict, comes from comprehensive 
Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR). However, without naming a particular incident, Young found, in 
the first decade of the Long War, that “insurgent groups were strengthened and U.S. freedom of action were 
curtailed when its forces caused civilian casualties” (2013: 126). While accurate targeting with limited to no 
collateral damage is a noteworthy achievement in irregular/unconventional conflict, transferring security to a 
capable HN remains the primary objective.  
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results, in irregular combat, a lack of accuracy with precision targeting can produce a legacy of negative outcomes. Collateral damage restricts freedom of action as the local population reacts, either in concert with the insurgency or independently, against the perceived aggressor. Accuracy, as far as it is possible to be accurate in irregular conflict, comes from comprehensive Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) which is enhanced through the interoperability generated through defence diplomacy.  Interoperability involves the comprehensive exchange of knowledge. Hooker and Collins insist that ‘improving our ability to teach others to defeat an insurgency or terrorists is likely the key to future us participation in irregular conflicts” (2015: 16). Nowhere is ‘teaching’ going to be more significant than in the area of C2. C2 is another major difference between conventional and unconventional combat. Effective C2 transitions down the chain of command and delivers the flexibility required to achieve tactical/strategic objectives in pop-centric COIN (Young, 2013; Hooker & Collins, 2015).58 While other terminology such as “asymmetric warfare,” “hybrid warfare,” “irregular warfare,” “unconventional warfare,” “unrestricted warfare,” “ambiguous warfare,” “gray zones,” are often used, the thesis argues that the term unconventional warfare is best placed to describe the multi-faceted and multi-domain conflicts occurring around the world in the 21st-century especially the Long War case study at the center of this research.  
Joint Publication 3-05 Joint Special Operations and Joint Publication 1-02 Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms define unconventional warfare as “activities to enable a resistance or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power through and with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area” (2014: 249). While US. Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare (2012) doctrine maintains that the U.S. can exert its influence through limited involvement to achieve its policy objectives whilst reducing the potential domestic blowback which results from a commitment a large number of U.S. troops to protracted conflicts. The thesis posits that U.S. defence diplomacy efforts directly supports both definition and doctrine by generating joint and combined interoperability and by establishing relations built upon trust, understanding, equality and reciprocity. Success in any form of warfare requires reaching a desired political end state, however in unconventional conflicts the insurgent does not need to secure 
                                                     
58 General Petraeus noted that “we did not get the strategy and command and control architecture right in 
Afghanistan until 2010” (Quoted in Hooker & Collins: 2015: 10); While Young writes that “conventional warfare and 
operations other than major combat had different means (the use of force versus the broader effects combining 
direct and indirect approach) and ends (capitulation of a military force versus sustainability and capacity building)” 
(2013: 127). Achieving these ‘ends’ appeared allusive, because “capacity building taxed the military and the U.S.G 
overall, as they were often not prepared for these tasks, especially on the scale required in Afghanistan” (Ibid). 
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a military victory, merely surviving long enough to act against a state which is itself undergoing a process of rebuilding/stabilization.59  COIN: Evolving Concept The DoD defines insurgency as “[T]he organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority” (JP 1-02, 2009: 266). It also defines counterinsurgency as “the comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances” (Ibid: 128). At its core, the primary difference between COIN and conventional warfare, is that the contest between insurgents and counterinsurgents is primarily conducted on a political level rather than a physical battlefield. According to the famous Rolling Stone article which contributed to the replacement of Gen McChrystal as Commander of ISAF, COIN theory “essentially rebrands the military, expanding its authority (and its funding) to encompass the diplomatic and political sides of warfare: Think the Green Berets as an armed Peace Corps” (Hastings, 2010). However, just as the theory of warfare has evolved, so too has COIN theory. In their 2010 comprehensive COIN study, Victory has a Thousand Fathers, Paul, Et al. identified and delineated differences in ‘classic’ and ‘contemporary’ COIN (2010: 32).60 The RAND researchers detailed there has been a shift from the COIN ‘in a box’ top-down method, to a more mission specific, bottom-up approach which prioritises area specialists with detailed political, linguistic and cultural knowledge with an ability to develop relationships with in situ stakeholders.  However, there is still the issue of establishing a unified command, and effort. Cohen Et al. maintained that the ‘ideal’ counterinsurgent: 
 would have unity of command over all elements of national power … However, the best that 
military commanders can generally hope for is unity of effort through communication and liaison 
with those responsible for the non-military elements of power. The ambassador and country team 
                                                     
59 The Taliban’s strategic withdrawal in Afghanistan around 2008 and AQIM’s numerous retreats in Yemen are two 
examples of this tactic. During this time of rebuilding, the Coalition also risks undermining its policy objectives by 
propping up or openly supporting an illegitimate HN security force. 
60Classic COIN approaches: Development (classic “hearts and minds”), Pacification, Legitimacy, Democracy, 
Resettlement, Cost-benefit, Border control, “Crush them”, and Amnesty/rewards.  
Contemporary COIN approaches: Strategic communication, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, “Beat 
cop”, “Boots on the ground”, “Put a local face on it”, Cultural awareness, Tangible support reduction, Criticality of 
intelligence, Flexibility and adaptability. See also: Dodge, T. ‘Iraq, US policy and the rebirth of counterinsurgency 
doctrine’, Adelphi Series, Vol. 2, Iss.434-435, (2013), pp.75-114.; Coincidently, Ambassador Paul Bremmer, who led 
the Coalition Provincial Authority in the immediate post-invasion phase in Iraq (2003-2004), had a large wooden 
sign on his desk which read, ‘Success has a Thousand Fathers’ (Quoted from Sky, 2015: 55).   
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must be key players in higher level planning, while similar connections are achieved down the chain 
of command (2006: 50). This ideal scenario reflects the contemporary U.S. approach to COIN, and epitomises a WoG strategy which requires civ/mil synchronicity to build trust, open channels of communication and engage with local populations. This core belief is evidenced in the 2009 ISAF Commanders COIN Guidance which states that “ideology can influence the outcome, but it’s usually subordinate to the more practical considerations of survival and everyday life … mobilising the community to participate actively for their own safety, stability and success is the crux of COIN at local levels-and creates circumstances to end insurgent influence permanently” (Hall & McChrystal, 2009). The thesis determined that the Joint 
Operations FM and the Commander’s Guidance illustrate (and should indoctrinate) how the various measures undertaken under the auspices of defence diplomacy remain front and centre to progressing contemporary COIN objectives. Despite possessing the theory, the tools and the direction (the objectives of COIN, whether enemy or population-centric, have been clearly articulated), COIN strategy does not exist in a vacuum and even the best strategy never ‘survives contact with the enemy’; especially during periods of strategic complexity.  
 
Complexity Clausewitz proclaimed that “Everything is very simple in War, but the simplest thing is difficult” (1997: 66).61 General McChrystal writes that “being complex is different from being complicated” because a complicated environment can contain many different elements, but that all the elements are connected in some, “relatively simple,” way (2015: 57). Confusing though complicated environments may be, individual elements can be catalogued and are, therefore, comparatively predictable. In complex situations, however, “the number of interactions between the components increases dramatically the density of interactions means that even a relatively small number of elements can quickly defy prediction” (Ibid). A preliminary ‘misstep in a complex environment can escalate in a nonlinear manner, increasing exponentially the costs of miscalculation. (Schaeffer & 
                                                     
61 A unique, Long War specific example of the Prussian strategist’s proclamation is provided by Lt. Col. Grau (Ret.) 
who recalls difficulties in regards to ‘time’ in operations during the early stages of OEF because US and Coalition 
forces used ZULU (Greenwich Mean Time), the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) located in the 
Gulf used CHARLIE (Kuwaiti time-3 hrs ahead of GMT), and the militia’s relied on Afghan local time (4.5 hrs ahead 
of GMT) (2009: viii). Timing is essential to battle success, but it would generally be considered to be one of the 
simpler aspects of C2, yet this example illustrates the line between simple and complicated can be easily eroded in 
challenging environments. 
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Lake, 1996).62 However, ongoing exposure to complexity, commonly referred to as experience, generates a level of understanding which is magnified when more actors are exposed to the complex environment. This is an area that defence diplomacy-oriented engaged, notably joint/combined training, personnel exchanges and professional military education (PME) can offset the challenges of complexity. It should be noted that the term offset rather than overcome was used. While acknowledging the potential role of experience, it is not a panacea for complex environments. The presence of complexity however, should not be a barrier to addressing urgent issues.  Alexander Frank (2015) identifies four elements that combine to make something complex: adaptability, interdependence, interconnectedness, and diversity. Using these elements, Frank defined the Coalitions wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as “conflicts of unparalleled complexity” (November 2015). Using these four metrics, the war in Afghanistan consists of a confluence of local political legacy’s, a globally interconnected insurgency, the almost unimpeded influence of regional nation-state enablers, and one of the most challenging terrain to conduct a COIN campaign. The Afghan theater demonstrates that the difference between complicated and complex is more than mere semantics, being firmly embedded in the strategic realm. Given the presence of multiple complexities within a single region or AOR/OE, concepts such as ‘multiplex’ environments focus the attention and provide a useful lens to view the scope of defence diplomacy (Acharya, 2017). States operating, and more importantly coordinating, within a ‘multiplex’ world face new challenges with untested solutions. Along a continuum from simple to chaotic, McChrystal labels the current conflict environment as complex, in which “cause and effect can only be determined (and therefore evaluated) after the event.63 The term complexity, and the definition and explanation presented above cannot accurately reflect the pace of change in national security during the Long War years. Yet Gray reminds us that although “the stage sets, the dress, the civilian and military equipment, and some of the language are always changing, the human, political, and strategic plots, alas, remain all too familiar” (2010: 11). Gray’s simple, broad statement supports a hypothesis tested in this study; one that proposes the theory and practices of traditional, state-centric diplomacy, more specifically defence diplomacy, is a useful unit of analysis from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Furthermore, the thesis argues that complex system dynamics necessitate Coalition contributions to 
                                                     
62 McChrystal recalls Jonathan Schaeffer who calculates that the first two move in a game of chess have 197,742 
possible outcomes which dramatically increases to 121,000,000 by the third move. See table and equation on page 
125 in Schaeffer, J & Lake R. Solving the Game of Checkers’, Games of No Chance, MSRI Publications, Vol. 29, (1996), 
pp. 119-133. 
63 In Team of Teams, McChrystal defines Simple as predictable-replicated-master & apprentice state; Complicated as 
difficulties can be overcome by examining cause and effect in real-time, and Chaotic as no relation between cause 
and effect. 
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enhance capabilities across multiple spheres of engagement because no one individual state has the multi-faceted capacity to combat irregular/unconventional conflicts. Appendix 1 presents a critique of the assumption that a complex environment is therefore one in which states face uncertainty. Complexity can often result in policymakers being placing a premium on action over inaction, especially when threat-specific coalitions have been generated (Madden, Et al, 2014; Hooker & Collins, 2015; Porter, 2016). This type of situation can lead to a complicated or compromising relationship which runs counter to national interest, otherwise known as entanglement (Keohane, 1971; Jervis, 1988; Gibler, 2008; Crescenzi, Et al, 2012). At its core, ‘entanglement’ explains how an “alliance drags a state into a military conflict against its national interests” which places “their reputation at risk, socializing their leaders into adopting allied interests and norms, and provoking adversaries and emboldening allies” (2015: 9, 13).  Of course states must identify what exactly its national interests are before they can distinguish and determine the best course of action to take to secure these interests. Effectively managing action and inaction is central to determining “the degree of effort required to obtain compliance in comparable deterrence and compellence situations” (Schaub, 2004: 389). Despite this cogent description, scholars have noted that “most treaties require states to make only modest departures from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement” (Downs, Et al, 1996: 380).  Once again however, the choice for state’s is not binary. Deterrence requires less effort than compellence, yet the balance shifts as the situation deteriorates. Adaptability is key, with the thesis arguing that this is an area where the military’s exposure to civilian institutional culture and experience should be leveraged to its full potential. This exposure may help overcome a military structure which is resistant to change (Groen, 2003; McChrystal, 2015; King, 2017). Although joint/combined coordination mechanisms will not alter the dynamism of conflict, they ensure civ/mil personnel are ‘singing from the same song sheet.’ These mechanisms make a positive contribution to civ/mil interconnectivity, which enhances the decision-making process at the tactical and strategic level.  Despite the ‘potential’ for improvements, Coalition efforts in the Long War have often been criticised for a lack of tactical and strategic symmetry.64 Appendix 2 defines and discusses the 
                                                     
64 “War and violence decoupled from strategy and policy—or worse yet, mistaken for strategy and policy—have 
contributed to perpetual war, or what has seemed like 15 years of “Groundhog War” (Cassidy & Tame, 2017); For 
more on the concept of ‘Groundhog War’ see: Layne, C. ‘Troops Now, Strategy Later’, The American Conservative, 
(June 20, 2017); Preble, Et al. bluntly opined that “We cannot compare the costs or wisdom of going to war if we 
do not know what our troops will be asked to do. The U.S. military should never be sent into harm’s way without a 
set of clear and obtainable military objectives … that the military’s mission is defined and attainable,” (2016: 101-
102).  
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connection between policy, strategy and tactics, their unique, but complementary role in the Long War and the ability of defence diplomacy to enhance each of them.65 Thus far, this document has articulated how the research sought theoretical justification for alliance formation and coalition building. The concepts discussed in Section 1 are some of the primary challenges and opportunities which defence diplomacy has to navigate to function as an effective mechanism of the modern state. The section aimed to add a layer of nuance to the description of defence diplomacy presented in Defence Diplomacy in the Long War. The next objective was to demonstrate how theory translates into practice to determine whether the promise of success is deliverable. Section 2 illustrates how defence diplomacy delivers on its promise by operationalising the various theoretical elements covered in Section 1. Defence Diplomacy in the Long War explores and explains the unique characteristics of U.S. defence diplomacy, therefore Section 2 avoids duplication by prioritizing individual instruments.   
                                                     
65 Because this study hypothesizes that defence diplomacy has contributed to improvements in policy, strategy and 
tactics (ends, ways & means), it is necessary to define, albeit briefly, the three in theory and practice.65 The 
manipulation of the three concepts, with the addition of ‘risk’, is termed operational art; a term which encapsulates 
the enduring practice of securing political objectives through the use of force whilst acknowledging the subjective, 
and often ephemeral nature of conflict 
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Section 2: Defence Diplomacy Theory into Practice: How it Works 
Operationalizing Defence Diplomacy Any successful partnership requires constant nurturing and evaluation. The partnership between the two most powerful structures of U.S. foreign policy reflects this, having undergone a series comprehensive reviews and restructuring since the Second World War which has led to strengthened, if not perfect, relations. This critical, yet tenuous, relationship between State and the Pentagon has been labelled “an uneasy partnership” (Cohen 2002). Defence Diplomacy in the Long 
War argued that it’s important to analyse the situation as it is and not measure it against some distant ideal. While it’s not perfect, the thesis concludes that what we have will more than likely continue for the foreseeable future. Increasingly so over the last several decades, U.S. military leadership has engage with international FSO’s, senior government representatives and even heads of state which complements the work of the U.S. diplomatic corps. Dana Priest and Ambassador Freeman concur, stating respectively that “American generals and admirals, emissaries for 50 years of the world's strongest military, have long exercised independent influence abroad, and in doing so, they jockeyed with diplomats and intelligence agencies to shape U.S. foreign policy” (2000) which “caps a longstanding trend … (of) Generals and Admirals bestride the highly militarized foreign policy apparatus” (March 2017).  
Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy Since the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon has incrementally prioritised U.S. forces to “solve complex problems, causing civilian agencies to atrophy,” though some view this emphasis on “diplomatic and nation-building missions” as a waste of a highly skilled resource which ultimately reduces the military’s “ability to fight and win wars” (Priest, 2000). Often perceived as a relatively recent phenomenon, the so-called militarization of foreign policy goes back several decades. Throughout this period there have been disparate voices arguing the U.S. military had an unwarranted and unwanted influence on its foreign policy influence (Goodman, 2004; Adams & Murray, 2014, Wright,2017). Although Defence Diplomacy in the Long War describes the phenomenon throughout, to summarise, the militarization of U.S. foreign policy is presented as a united, and concerted effort to supplant State. Civilian and military personnel within the defence establishment have championed the strategic importance of utilizing diplomacy and development and the need for foreign policy solutions that do not require boots on the ground, at least in kinetic operations. However, accepting, adopting and enhancing its diplomatic capacity has received push-
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back from the DoD and some policy-makers. For example, prior to the Long War, high ranking military personnel were adamant that “U.S. relations abroad suffer because the Pentagon's leadership foolishly shuns deep contact with the State Department” (Priest 2000). While a prominent Long War figure, current SECDEF and former CENTCOM and SOCOM commander, General James Mattis has claimed forthrightly that “if you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately” (2013). 66   The central premise of the thesis advocates that states need to take stock of the current toolkit and evaluate what it needs, and how to do the job. The U.S. possesses undeniable material power and while near-peer competition increases, it still remains unrivalled. Yet despite its material capacity as well as its expanded mandate as a global policeman and protector of liberal values, some insist that the U.S. had neglected its non-kinetic security-oriented capabilities (Miller, 2016; Crocker, 2018). Moreover, these capabilities need to be utilised under the guidance of a mature strategy which aligns material capabilities with a clear understanding of the political history, language and culture of the nations it engages. The thesis proposes that through defence diplomacy-oriented engagement, the U.S. military (and its Coalition partners) incorporates the area-specific knowledge which used to be the sole-domain of the resident ambassador and his Country Team.  A recent example which supports this statement is drawn from the increasingly volatile East Asian region. Of note is the primary diplomatic role performed by General Brooks is in his current posting as Chargé to South Korea during a period of heightened tensions with the DPRK. As the ‘literal’ nexus of civ/mil regional engagement, the general fills the FSO void by acting as an Ambassador and Assistant Secretary for East Asia at State. General Brooks is also fulfilling his obligations as United States Forces Korea, United Nations Command and ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. Others support the diplomatic role of the combatant command, with Willard endorsing the Regional Commander as assuming the role of “senior diplomat of the United States government” (2006: 49). While focusing exclusively on USPACOM, Willard declares that although the were “interagency shortcomings … the coordination of USPACOM’s military diplomacy program remains relatively effective as its theatre strategic level activities act as conduits of information and coordination at both strategic and operational levels” (2006: 57). The thesis found this generally to be the case across the six U.S. combatant commands (AFRICOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, 
                                                     
66 The SECDEF emphasizes that “it’s a cost benefit ratio. The more that we put into the State Department’s diplomacy, 
hopefully the less we have to put into a military budget as we deal with the outcome of an apparent American 
withdrawal from the international scene” While testifying before Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2017 
Mattis reiterated this stance, stating “It’s probably a rather simplistic way to point out that we have to engage with 
whole of government, and yes sir, I still stand by the theory” (Kheel, 2017).  
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NORTHCOM & EUCOM), which effectively serve as incubators for the next generation of warrior diplomats. Although other examples of warrior diplomats are detailed in the appendices, they most commonly manifest in the operations of Civil Affairs personnel. Gun-Toting Diplomats Facts on the ground can influence change at the institutional level.  If reality dictates that ‘traditional’ FSO’s cannot perform their nominated duties due to security concerns, or limited access to relevant stakeholders owing to under-developed personal relationships, the thesis argues that military personnel can, and should fill the void. For example, in 2014, the year security of the Afghan state transitioned to the ANDSF and the GIRoA; Karl Kadon, a former U.S. Marine Civil Affairs (CA) team leader in Sangin province, predicted that because of:  
“the failed imposition of a centralized counterinsurgency approach to a decentralized problem in 
Afghanistan … well-trained ‘warrior diplomats’ are key for future deployments in resource-
constrained environments … the tactical situation demanded that the military commander act 
beyond his authority and make political decisions that would produce measurable results” 
(January 2014).  In such a restrictive security environment CA specialists ensure that vital communication and representative channels are maintained. CA operators and the operations they conduct are the commander’s asset to purposefully engage non-military organizations, institutions, and populations. CA personnel are “experts in both advancing U.S. interests and objectives and developing the capabilities of partner nations through regional engagements” (Wagner, 2007). CA units are DoD’s “primary force specifically trained and educated to shape foreign political-military environments by working through and with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations” (FM 3-57, 2014: 13). The thesis finds that CA personnel represent an intrinsic element of the population-centric COIN Long War strategy and thus worthy of further examination.  In 2006, SECDEF Rumsfeld transferred responsibility of CA from the Special Operations Command (SOC) to the U.S. Army. As a result of that decision, hundreds of CA units have to fight for their share of the U.S. Army’s substantial, but not unlimited training and equipment budget. Consequently, intra-DoD competition, as well as the leaders who have prioritised ‘traditional’ forces, has impacted the efficacy of CA units. Similar to the competition within State, the situation has been exacerbated as the range and tempo of Long War operations has increased. CA units are deployed throughout the world, from Latin America to Africa to SE Asia, in U.S. foreign internal defence (FID) and stability operations. CA personnel provide an invaluable diplomatic role in U.S. COIN, therefore maximising CA capabilities should be prioritised. The thesis recommends returning CA to SOC which 
68 
 
would significantly reduce competition, provide CA specialists better access to their share of the Defense budget, and importantly, place conventional CA specialists on par with their special operations forces (SOF) kin which ensures universal capability aggregation across CA units. Making this change will require direct input from the SECDEF and the Assistant SECDEF for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, who are the principal civilian interlocutors in DoD’s decision-making process.   Relatedly, one of the reasons that CA personnel are so valuable is that “the majority of CA specialists are Army Reservists, which gives them a distinct advantage in restoring civil society as they can bring their civilian skill sets to bear in a hostile environment” (Danovich, May 2017).67 However these unique capabilities may be underutilised and the readiness of reserve personnel in relation to their full-time peers (18% - 20% of the total force) has come under scrutiny. Selection and training to become a CA specialist is an 18-month process encompassing foreign language skills, policy and strategic analysis and negotiating techniques as well as tactical manoeuvres including parachuting (CA specialists’ need to be deployable in any theatre). However, reservists CA personnel do not follow the same training regime, resulting in reservists being deployed who are not fully trained to fulfil their vital role (Bryant II, 2008; Walsh, 2010; Harrell, 2017) CA support operations by deploying with SOF teams in isolated, austere, and remote environments, therefore, it’s clear that parallel or ‘intensive’ training for reservists, although currently part of the training structure, need be developed further. Given the pivotal defence diplomacy role of CA personnel in the Coalitions Afghan COIN campaign, ensuring they are deployed with the highest possible level of readiness must be a basal requirement.  Beyond simply ‘winning hearts and minds,’ and its connection to SOF, the thesis identifies CA support within large conventional units at the tactical and operational level. CA personnel are archetypal ‘middlemen’ (and women), linking the commander with local authorities in his AOR as well as assisting a HN government to: meet its peoples’ needs; maintain a stable, viable civil administration; and generate the legitimacy required to achieve the objectives of the COIN strategy. CA specialists identify critical requirements needed by local citizens in combat or crisis situations and are primarily responsible for researching, coordinating, conducting and participating in the planning and production of mission related documents, while facilitating civil-military operations of the supported commander.  
                                                     
67 Current serving CA operator, Captain David Harrell also identifies the benefits of the reservists’ ability to bring a 
specific skillset to CA operations, by emphasising while most active duty civil affairs soldiers have only their previous 
military training to prepare them for the challenges they’ll be tasked with addressing during deployments, reservists 
often specialize in anything from law to economics and education to engineering in civilian life” (2017: 2). 
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CA personnel are also a conduit for civilian input, and their influence in the military operations decision-making process is illustrated in Figure 2. CA personnel are essentially uniformed FSO’s, described by some as “the armed wing of the State Department” (Danovich, May 2017), or perhaps more controversially as “gun-toting diplomats” (Walsh, 2010: 71). Therefore, if the FSO vacuum is indeed filled by CA personnel, one must evaluate whether Kadon’s well-educated warrior diplomat ideal presented in the first paragraph is a reality? The answer is yes, and no. Yes; the military has an incorporated, and developed CA personnel who can actively operate in a conventional warfighting role as well as performing traditional diplomatic activities such as HN community liaison, representing the ambassador and engaging in the political decision-making process. And no; the thesis suggests that CA needs to return to its SOF roots, and generate an improved state of readiness, in order to live up to its potential as a key component of U.S. defence diplomacy and its integrated foreign policy and national security apparatus. This thesis supports the militarization of foreign policy narrative and the examination of CA personnel helps to justify this stance. However, the thesis argues that the increase in defence and military personnel in a space once the exclusive realm of the professional diplomat, has been paralleled by an increase in FSO personnel serving alongside their military counterparts. The by-product of this process has been labelled as a “civilianizing of military policy,” whereby “pinstripe generals … intrude into areas that have traditionally been left to diplomats” (Jones, 2010: para. 2). However, the ‘intrusion’ has not been one-sided. For every former general who becomes an ambassador, there are diplomats serving as deputy combatant commanders. Legal requirements notwithstanding, the prospect of a civilian Head of Mission (Secretary of State), mission chief (ambassador) and combatant commander is not beyond the realm of possibility. Jones drew on his personal experience and intimate knowledge of the inner working culture of State and DoD to suggest that the ongoing melding of civ/mil roles “could be invaluable for civilian foreign-policy experts and military leaders alike” (2010: para. 15). The thesis concludes that this new generation warrior diplomats and soldiers in sandals should be represented in the contemporary definition of a 
diplomat.    
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         CA Support to SOF CA Support to General Purpose Forces 
Unit Size Attached to small special operations task forces Attached to battalion, brigade & higher 
Type of Operation Contribute directly to FID & Unconventional Warfare Contributes primarily to conventional operations and large-scale COIN 
Command & Control Controlled by theater SOC or Ambassador/Country Team Controlled by conventional command structure 
Operational Base Able to operate in isolated, austere environments independently or with other SOF 
Operate in developed theaters with general purpose forces 
Example of Rare Skills Required Navigation of non-tactical vehicles and advanced language skills Significantly greater level of functional expertise 
 
Figure1: How CA contributes to STABOPS & COIN (Source. Walsh, 2010: 74). 
  Figure 2: Warrior Diplomats (Civil Affairs officers) support decision making across the spectrum (Source Civil Affairs Operations FM 41-10, (1962), p. 4-2.  
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To conclude the discussion on the merits of the militarization of U.S foreign policy and the need to view the relationship between DoD and State, as it is rather that as we would like it to be, the paper introduces some relevant financial figures. When re-evaluating the relationship, statistics relating to budgetary allocation or personnel distribution which clearly identify a preference for the military side of the ledger can be interpreted differently. For instance, Rose Jackson recently highlighted that in 2011 the DoD directed only 17 percent of all security assistance (compared to State’s 80 percent), but by 2015 the DoD’s share increased to 57 percent to State’s 42 percent (2017: 11). This may seem alarming as a statistic in isolation or when viewed from State. However, the thesis posits that DoD’s annexation of available resources progresses U.S. national security because its cadre of warrior diplomats increases the amount of engagement beyond what State could deliver. Moreover, DoD has been best placed to coordinate efforts contingent to the USG WoG Long War strategy.  A more detailed examination of how one triangulates stats, strategy and outcomes appears in the final section of the paper. However, even if one looks at the figures with a DoD-oriented bias and accepts that funding is directed to the right department, headline figures can still mask existing cross-departmental challenges. Former British Ambassador to Afghanistan Sherard Cowper-Coles lamented that a major impediment to U.S. strategic progress in Afghanistan is the “vigorous American tradition of inter-agency warfare in Washington and in the field” (2011: 283). Therefore, statistical data can be misinterpreted and/or misrepresent the amount of progress in inter-agency synchronization.  
Breaking Down Barriers in Civ/Mil Cooperation and Coordination The WoG approach, presented by the thesis as the only truly sustainable method achieving U.S. national security policy objectives, has prompted the creation of several offices or bureaus of inter-agency/civilian and military coordination which reported directly to the Secretary of State (the Head of Mission). One pertinent example is the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and its successor, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilisation Operations (CSO). The S/CRS was launched by Secretary of State Powell in August 2004, to improve the U.S. government’s response to events on the ground through complementary civ/mil initiatives such as the Active Response Corps (ARC). Former Director of the S/CRS, Ambassador Carlos Pascual, recalled that the motivation for establishing the S/CRS was the “need to have the capacity to deal with issues relating to conflict: preparing for it ahead of time and responding to it afterward” (2006: 80). Structurally, the S/CRS was an interagency office, centrally tied with U.S. foreign policy objectives, which drew on civilian capabilities (new and existing) to enhance U.S. WoG civ/mil 
72 
 
capacity.68 Another civ/mil initiative broadly supported by the Bush administration, was the much heralded Active (Civilian) Response Corps (ARC) a cohesive civilian unit made up of FSO’s and civil service officers which could be deployed with U.S. military troops as part of U.S. global military interventions. The Active Response Corps was later restructured into the Civilian Response Corps but continued to operate within the parameters of its original mandate.  However, as budgets reduced and the will to intervene withered, so too did the ARC. A similar fate was to befall upon the S/CRS. Despite broad support across the Executive and Legislative branches, as well as relevant departments (State, DoD, USAID, Treasury, Justice ect.), the S/CRS appeared to succumb of ‘failures’ in the Coalition’s ability to achieve stability in Afghanistan, and the growing public astringency towards U.S. post-9/11 nation-building efforts. By the end of the first decade of the Long War, the S/CRS was dismantled and a new, leaner, and perhaps less ambitious entity was created to pursue the US’s WoG Long War Strategy: the CSO. The CSO represents the USG State-led conflict and stabilization apparatus 2.0 (Serafino, 2012; McCannell, 2016). While continuing to promote inter-agency coordination and cooperation, the bureau followed a more moderate mandate and budget than the S/CRS. The new entity was directed to collaborate with “relevant partners,” including State, the DoD and NATO, “to harmonize civilian and military plans and operations pertaining to conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization,” as well as strengthening the government’s “capacity to plan and conduct” such operations (Serafino, 2012: 4).  The thesis identified commonalities between both the Office and the Bureau, such as claims of underfunding in relations to its mandate. Requests for increased funding were countered by offsets and carryover from the previous FY. There’s also evidence of creative accounting by Congress by incorporating funding from other State programs such as the Diplomatic and Consular Program and the opaque Overseas Contingency Operation fund. Importantly, both entities identified improvements in the civ/mil processes, most notably: the retention of knowledge in the areas of conflict and stability; the capacity to inform and influence the decision-making process in relation to national security in general and the Long War in particular; the ability to generate and maintain a rapidly deployable personnel base. The S/CRS and the CSO also illustrate unwelcome continuity in both the Bush and Obama administrations. The thesis identifies the ‘constant’ of time as another commonality between State, and DoD led initiatives (structural and operational). Yet, returning to the papers previous discussion of continuity and change, it suggests that time represents a ‘variable’ as much as a commonality.   
                                                     
68 For example, the 2011 civilian/diplomatic surge in Afghanistan-See: Defence Diplomacy in the Long War, p.107. 
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Throughout the Long War, in contradiction to their WoG approach to national security, when faced with strategic and operational ‘headwinds’, both administrations were quick to shed State-oriented ballast whereas the DoD was able to ‘trim it sails’ or simply adjust its course (to continue the nautical analogy) without suffering the constraints of budget cuts and/or structural realignment (dismantling). It must be acknowledged that this is not unique to the Long War nor the Bush/Obama administrations and has been occurring for decades.  Another related constant is the emergence of military personnel in senior departmental roles across successive U.S. post-WWII administrations, as well as the increasing reliance on the advice from service chiefs and senior military personnel in response to dynamic threat environment. However, some question whether this equates to the ‘politicization of the military,’ and urge the armed forces to remain an apolitical institution by resisting, as an organisation, its elevation as a political actor crossing the line of being respected as a non-political, professional military leader to being just another advocate for the administration’s line (Cohen, 2002; Agnew, 2017; Exum, 2017). Is this a valid critique?  If their communication (advice) and representation is overtly political, one may revisit the civ/mil relationship and subsequently increase divisions and roll-back integration. While still in its infancy, the Trump administration appears set to continue the DoD ‘default’ approach and the continued militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Several of the president’s actions inform this opinion, for example, bypassing US Legal Code Title 10, Section 113 in nominating SECDEF Mattis and General H.R. McMaster (National Security Advisor), delegating responsibility for U.S. global military operations (legacy and future), and declaring that he had given “total authorization” to military leadership. The prominence of ‘Trumps General’s,’ highly respected military personnel in key decision-making positions in the Trump administration has caused some to argue that: 
 “U.S. military leaders must recognize their advice must evolve as political conditions change; must 
focus more on cooperation with civilians than on civilian control; empower mid-level leaders and 
staff officers to participate fully in the interagency process; anticipate problems rather than 
waiting for a political end state; and focus on how military tools can accomplish civilian goals” 
(Golby 2017) Moreover, good military advice flows out of trust relationships, and the candour that good military advice depends on requires mutual trust. Yet trust should be earned, not implicit & continually validated on both sides of the civ/mil relationship. It’s worth reminding an under-experienced administration that “[T]he politician who plans his own commando raid will almost surely regret it” (Cohen, 2002: 263). The S/CRS-CSO example could be perceived as further evidence 
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of the DoD simply steamrolling State, or are there other factors at play?  Though the combined civilian and uniformed elements of the U.S. military apparatus are an influential presence in the national security decision-making process, the thesis argues that State has contributed to its apparent subjugation whereby the “creeping irrelevance” of State is largely self-imposed (Butler, 2017: 37).. Initially, there were positive signals from Washington such as NSPD 44 and DoD 3000.05 (see p. 2-3 of this document), structural changes were implemented such as the Policy Coordination Committees, as well as the incremental infiltration of FSO’s into the strategic and operational decision-making process. However, information and operational siloing and internal power struggles have left State unable to exploit these opportunities and it’s failed to solidify its role in the evolving Long War. This has created a competitive, and some would say “toxic” atmosphere which has entrenched a lack of individual resolve from the embassy personnel through the Secretary (Serafino, 2012: 2). When combined with pressure from D.C., the regional bureau’s through to the individual embassies have railed against any new legislative, structural or personnel reforms which could have limited their access to the Secretary and weakened their place in the bureaucracy. Adams claims this quest to retain status and power is a consequence of “uneven structural changes over decades which have left the department somewhat fractured internally” (2014: 28). Obviously, this impacts efficiency and further diminishes the body in the eyes of the executive branch, the legislature, the American people, as well as external stakeholders. Moreover, while it was preoccupied with internal restructuring and the ongoing debate about ‘what is diplomacy’, State was slow to adapt to the deeper integration of defence and diplomacy.69  Others see positives, claiming “the growing ascendancy of the military in foreign policy decision-making have all contributed to the realization that State and Defense must work together more effectively” (Kashkett, 2017: 22). Despite the realisation, operationalising the ‘new’ WoG approach has been challenging and the result have been far from universal. Operating in a military unit in Afghanistan, Lt. Green recalled that “[W]hile many examples exist of great partnerships with the civilian interagency in just as many instances, miscommunication, uncoordinated planning, a lack of teamwork, and even animosity have been the norm” (2012). Yet progress is being made and interoperability is improving. Defence Diplomacy in the Long War demonstrates some of the myriad of ways this is occurring such as the VSO and PRT programs (pp. 97-110).  
                                                     
69 Author interview with former State staffer (September 2017). The interviewee was adamant that “the hardest 
fight was not trying to convince DoD that they needed help from other parts of the government, it was trying to 
convince other parts of the government that they had a role to play on the battlefield in this type of conflict (COIN).” 
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How can State remain relevant while championing the diplomatic qualities of Defence? Or is this line of thinking irrelevant given the melding of foreign policy instruments in an era of WoG approaches to national security? If one answers yes to the latter, and dismisses the imposed reality of reducing itself to a soft power mechanism, then “the challenge for State is not necessarily to weaken or reduce the role of the DoD, but to strengthen (its) voice and ensure that our expertise is recognized as equally valid” (Nesbitt, 2017: 28). One way to achieve this is for State personnel to embrace opportunities to engage with DoD-oriented institutions. One such institution is the National Defence University (NDU) which brings together the five branches of the U.S. military, various domestic security-oriented agencies, as well as foreign military officers. The institution exposes the next generation of civ/mil leadership to different perspectives on a range of U.S. foreign policy issues as well as the opportunity to build lasting relationships with inter-agency personnel.70   The NDU example highlights that a critical area of inter-agency interoperability and coordination are opportunities to work and learn together, and importantly understand each other. Once institutionalised and perfected at a domestic level, these structures can be transferred or used as a template for multinational engagement. Mechanisms which expose civ/mil personnel to the respective organisational cultures, language and techniques are the keys to operational and strategic success. From the military’s perspective, professional military education (PME) “imparts skills and knowledge to its forces, and socializes them to organisational norms and conventions” (Brooks, 2007: 22). The same is true, to a certain extent, for FSOs, although State’s intra-agency training does not follow the same regimental structure as the military.  The positive outcomes generated through exposure to diverse organizational cultures as well as the personal networks and relationships created through formal institutions such NDU or ad-hoc facilities are multifaceted and extend well beyond the educational benefit to the individual. In the immediate term, education as opposed to combined/joint training, is central to sustained interoperability because training teaches personnel how to do something while PME teaches personnel why (Nesbitt, 2017). One should not overlook the reciprocity of PME and personnel exchanges (civilian and military); as the transfer of knowledge (cultural, technical and/or operational) flows in many directions. Whether through institutions such as the NDU or one of the many analogous PME initiatives incorporated into inter-state defence cooperation, the thesis concludes that education-based engagement (sustained under the auspices of defence diplomacy) 
                                                     
70 Nesbitt recalls “countless stories of FSOs who graduated from NDU … and encountered a classmate 5-10 years 
later in an inter-agency setting” which re-emphasizes the importance of personal relationships, an integral aspect 
of defence diplomacy (2017:31). 
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shapes the worldview of allied and partner states, and enhances one’s ability to influence or predict state behaviour. More broadly, the thesis posits that ‘education’ is one of the most effective non-coercive mechanisms deployed by the state in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives.   Theoretically, there is great value in pursuing integrated civ/mil PME, yet it’s important to test the concept in practice to support defence diplomacy’s central role in progressing U.S.’ Long War objectives across the strategic, operational and tactical spectrum. Cleary’s (2011) detailed examination of Western foreign military assistance (FMA), FID and broader security sector reform efforts in HN such as Afghanistan and Iraq post-9/11 fulfils this role. While critical of some aspects of the Coalition’s Long War strategy, Cleary identifies the benefits of PME, particularly focusing on: personnel exchanges; generating and disseminating joint/combined doctrine; the relationships forged; and the trust generated. Without these programs “these groups simply do not speak to each other, have no understanding of their respective roles and the constraints under which they operate, and thus lack trust. Without trust how can security be achieved?” (Cleary, 2011: 7).  Cleary’s study re-enforces the role of trust: intra-group trust; inter-group trust, trust in the mechanism, and trust in the strategic objective. Trust has the power to persuade, but can it overcome the entrenched institutional cultures of DoD and State?  To address this question, the thesis adopts the “two hands on the sword” analogy from Mackubin T. Owens as the most accurate and succinct explanation of traditional civ/mil relations. Owens elucidates that “the civilian hand determines when the sword is drawn” while the “military hand keeps it sharp and wields it in combat, always guided by the purposes for which the war is being fought” (2013: 2). Owens’ explanation forms part of an ongoing debate addressing objective control of the military; an issue which lied at the heart of the post-WW II restructuring of the U.S. Armed forces, notably the 1947 National Security Act and Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) (Huntington, 1957; Guttmann, 1965; Dunlap 1992; Cohen, 2002; Bonadonna, 2017; Faint, 2017; Golby, 2017). Clausewitz concluded that “[I]f wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and their relationships with one another” (1996: 76). Whereas Huntington declared that a skilful soldier excels in the “management of violence” which would be civilized, rather than the explicit application of violence which would be uncivilised, robotic and without conscious (1957: 61). The Australian Army asserts that “A soldier without either interest in, or knowledge of the intellectual content of the military profession, is a soldier in appearance only” (LWD 1, 2014: 49). While Bonadonna views the military profession as “an interdisciplinary branch of the humanities … especially in the profession of arms, a soul as well as skills is required” (2017: 274). This thesis 
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interprets the statements of Clausewitz, Huntington, the ADF and Bonadonna as a recognition of the warrior diplomat within the modern soldier. What if it was possible to combine all the qualities advocated by Clausewitz, Et al., with those espoused by Nicolson in relation to the ‘ideal diplomatist’? (see Figure 5, Appendix 4, page 4-24) Answering this question was key to establishing a coherent association between theory and practice.  Illustrating once more that this exegesis-style paper is an equal as well as complementary component of the doctoral research, two appendices add another layer of nuance to the contents of Section 2 and further tests the arguments of the thesis. First, while Defence Diplomacy in the Long 
War demonstrates how the mechanism of defence diplomacy progressed U.S. and Coalition foreign policy and national security objectives in the context of the broader effort in Afghanistan, Appendix 
4 presents the policy advisor and special operations forces as the embodiment of the ideal warrior diplomat; physically, intellectually, and certainly in terms of contribution to mission success. Second, in an attempt to assess the alternatives should civ/mil engagement be rolled-back, or reach its zenith short of ‘our’ objective, Appendix 5 explores the privatization of defence diplomacy.  
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Section 3: Metrics, Forecasts & Final Thoughts Representing a formal conclusion to this multi-year research project, the final section examines whether defence diplomacy delivers a return on investment (ROI) in what a RAND corporation has labelled “the most under-resourced reconstruction and stability operation in history”- the Long War (Dobbins, Et al., 2005).71 The section address this and other ROI oriented questions by examining the vexing issue of metrics; the problem of identifying them, why they’re important, then recommends several alternatives and tests their utility in measuring progress in the Long War. Metrics are a fundamental aspect of the concept of lessons learned; a process which seeks to identify a better way of achieving an objective. The discussion of metrics is also a fitting way to conclude the paper as they (metrics) are the final element of this research project. As Clausewitz implored, “in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together” (1997: 5). Clausewitz’ sentiment was echoed in a recent statement by SECDEF Mattis, who spoke of the centrality of measuring effectiveness and more importantly of identifying what effectiveness would be measured against. Amidror recognized that gauging success in COIN includes non-military criteria such as “the degree of security, and indices of economic growth” (2014: 5), while Jones and Munoz (2010) emphasized the “interrelated” nature of all lines of effort (non-military and military) in COIN requires commensurate progress. Measuring the effectiveness of defence diplomacy requires such an approach. 
Metrics Since October 2001, the U.S. government and its Coalition partners have invested time and money to achieve their Long War policy objectives through direct action, stabilization campaigns and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.72 However, the legacy of these efforts is measured against the notion of victory, a notion which some argue can’t be identified regardless of the metric (Bjelajac, 
                                                     
71 The U.S. has spent over US$ 1.463 trillion since 9/11, with the $115 billion allocated for the Afghan reconstruction 
effort more than the inflation-adjusted amount the US spent on the post-WW II Marshall Plan; See: ‘The Afghan 
War Quagmire’, International New York Times, (Sunday Review Editorial, (September, 17, 2016); Defense Finance 
and Accounting Service, Cost of War Monthly Report, US Department of Defence, (June 30, 2017), pp. 1-74; 
Crawford, N. C.; US Budgetary Costs of Wars through 2016: $4.79 Trillion and Counting’, Costs of War, Watson 
Institute of International and Public Affairs, Brown University, (September 2016), pp. 1-22. 
72 While the personal cost of human fatalities are immeasurable, military personnel killed or wounded in combat 
have a compounding impact in the short term tactically, and the long-term in the strategic and even policy realm. 
According to icasualties.org, Coalition fatalities in the Afghan operating environment (OE) total 3545 (November 
24, 2017). Figures on civilian personnel are more difficult to calculate however the Watson Institutes ‘Costs of War’ 
project lists the number of humanitarian related personnel at 382 (August 2016: 8). 
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1966; Gray, 2006; Paul, Et al., 2010; Griffin, 2014).  Yet the victory objective persists and deploying such a definitive (yet ambiguous) measure, the ongoing conflict creates a situation whereby the significant progress made in terms of intra-agency coordination, inter-agency cooperation as well as joint, and combined interoperability are minimised, overlooked or denigrated. While interpretations of effectiveness can differ depending on the framework used, most would agree that U.S. efforts in the war on terror have been largely ineffective. However, how we measure is just as important as what we measure. Gray identified the issue of metrics as “a universal and eternal challenge,” asking, whether in conventional or irregular warfare, combating a state or an insurgency, “what is the exchange rate to convert military performance, measured how, into desired political outcome?” (2010: 9). While Dan Green, who deployed to Afghanistan several times during OEF, insisted that a primary concern of the many flaws of the U.S. Long War strategy is “the absence of metrics in understanding whether we were winning or losing” (2017: x). The thesis recommends that the spectrum of defence diplomacy (breadth, depth and outcomes) should be integrated into current conflict metrics. This would provide alternative, yet complementary measures of progress, and generating more realistic, transparent and comprehensive evaluation of whether the U.S. and its coalition partners are ‘succeeding’ in the Long War.  This study addressed the paucity of universal parameters by identifying appropriate, primarily qualitative, metric’s of efficacy or inadequacy by promoting Measures of Effectiveness (MOE’s).73 The goal of a MOE is to assess changes in system behaviour or capability, and are tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect (Joint Forces Handbook, 2006: 108). More importantly, as it relates to this study, MOE’s are standards used to evaluate and compare the success or progress of a strategy oriented action(s) (Grohoski, Seybert & Romanych 2014). MOE’s are crucial during policy validation and strategy formulation. Lieutenant Colonel Ray A. Combs II emphasises that “they help strategic leaders gain better insight into how to better determine effects-based directives so subordinates can clearly discern policy and intent” (Ibid: 86).  The thesis presents MOE’s as an appropriate metric for defence diplomacy as they not only determine task performance or accomplishment, they also measure behavioural or capability changes, or the effects on systems in relation to the AOR. Critically, in relation to the impact of diplomatic engagement, MOE’s can also identify evidence of human will or intention. Using this model, 
                                                     
73 Another term used, often substituted for MOE’s, are Measure of Performance (MOP’s) which is “a criterion used 
to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment” (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 5-27).  This thesis 
uses MOP’s as a short-term, largely tactical oriented metric, whereas MOE’s are more compatible with strategy and 
measure a sustained period of time (1, 5 10 years ect.). 
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identifying MOE’s requires stakeholders to consider not only its objectives but also those of the other participant(s). Such a dual-perspective enables a more holistic view in determining the effects necessary for success. An effect is the desired or undesired “physical or behavioural” state of a system resulting from actions between “friends, adversaries, and the environment” (Joint Forces Handbook, 2006: 6). Effects must be measurable (i.e., the ability to observe changes in system behaviour) and achievable. While MOE’s may help a government determine the effectiveness of its policies, they also serve to promote transparency, information sharing and accountability which are essential to defence diplomacy (Hoobler, 2003).  It’s vitally important for a state to measure its understanding of a situation both tactically and strategically as “[W]e tend to engage in places where we think a difference needs to be made, not necessarily where we think we can make a difference” (Cleary, 2011: 4). For example, the construction of roads is viewed as a positive stabilization and development outcome and useful metric in the Long War, yet Ambassador Crocker explains the dichotomy between U.S. and Afghan needs. Crocker explains that: 
 Afghanistan has a very traditional, very conservative society ... we think roads are great because 
populations can move, farmers and manufacturers can get goods to market, kids can get to schools, 
and so forth. Well, that is not a universally accepted notion in Afghanistan. An absence of roads also 
keeps people out, and a lot of Afghan villagers prefer it that way (2013: 107). This example once more highlights the centrality of trust, transparent dialogue and cultural awareness in defence diplomacy is confirmed and subsequently supports a framework with defence diplomacy-oriented engagement as a vital unit of measurement. Kugler asserts that in “COIN, more so than in other more conventional operations, the influence of the diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts hastens more effects and progress than military operations alone” (2006: 10). Correspondingly, the thesis prioritizes measuring effects on multiple levels, therefore the proximity and value of Effects-Based Assessments (EBA’s) is clear. EBA’s consider all instruments of national power, essentially unconstrained in ways and means. An EBA emphasises functions rather than forces. For example, in cases of deterrence, the usual focus would be how an adversary was convinced that the course of action pursued was not worth the cost, whereas an EBA would apply what the thesis labels a comprehensive how which incorporates: what was used, when it was used and why it was chosen. An EBA “pinpoints and quantifies events on the ground to produce a centralized and highly accurate report” and such a comprehensive assessment “should be tied directly to national policy objectives, and policymakers should be able to view such assessments with relative confidence” (Connable, 2012: xiv-xv).  
81 
 
Some supporting examples were identified during the research (Martins, 2005; Bate, 2016) including Lt. Col. Thomas Netzel’s2013 report on the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Afghanistan. The report examined how better oversight and fixing past errors (the effects) of CERP could achieve U.S. COIN objectives in parallel with the objectives of the GIRoA.74 Moreover, it’s necessary to measure effects in real-time, within an active conflict environment. Active measurements align with Effects Based Operations (EBO) which have been flagged by some as a way to merge “all national security tools across the spectrum of conflict” (Mattis, August 2017).75 Some have questioned the use of EBAs as an applicable COIN metric, as its unable to capture COIN’s complexity through centralized and quantitative analysis (Challans, 2006; Freidman 2010; Connable, 2012). The thesis agrees in principle because it views EBA’s as a qualitative metric, one which is malleable yet consistent. A qualitative EBA is far more effective as a COIN metric than a standard quantitative method because it collection and analysis of tactical actions to determine operational effects and strategic progress. The thesis suggests EBA’s be propelled to the forefront of active-conflict and post-conflict metrics.  While using EBA’s in relation to defence diplomacy may be novel, it is grounded in the historical study of war and conflict. The essence of the military art is prefaced on our “understanding, or attempting to understand the cause and effect relationships that exist between tactical actions and operational and strategic ends” (Combs, 2006: 5). Therefore, it’s of critical importance to be able to measure second and third order effects to identify progress toward accomplishing a given task, desired or unintentional effect, or achieving an objective. Relatedly, the capacity of defence diplomacy to shape or influence perceptions has a direct link to the measurement of effects. Perl recognises this relationship, claiming “perception of progress has a major impact on establishing priorities and allocating resources … Positive progress is possible using diverse strategies, which may employ very different tactics” (2007: 3).  That being said, it’s necessary to identify which means has been the most effective in achieving the desired end. For example, is it possible or advantageous to compare SECDEF Rumsfeld’s ‘Light footprint’ consolidation and stabilization strategy with the ‘surge’ and McChrystal’s ‘clear, hold, build’, or even the enemy-centric or population-centric COIN models deployed between 2007 and 2014? 
                                                     
74 CERP was hailed as a “mission enabler … a proven effective non-kinetic weapon system” thus the report was 
useful as it demonstrated that EBAs can measure non-military operation within active conflicts as well as military 
operations outside of combat (MOOTW).  
75 The concept of EBO’s, a system generated by the US Air Force, was adapted by the US Joint Forces Command, 
from a ‘closed complex system’ approach to an interactive ‘open complex system’ approach which sought to 
operate in dynamic irregular conflicts” (Mattis, 2009). The shift was inevitable, as the fundamental nature of war is 
inconsistent with a closed complex system approach. 
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(Galula, 1964; USNDS, 2004; McChrystal 2009; Lushenko & Hardy, 2016). Other research employs indicators such as the number of significant acts (SIGACTS) occurring within a particular operating environment (OE). Some dismiss SIGACTS as ambiguous “blunt measures of enemy activity” which “cannot capture nuance or complexity” (Lushenko & Hardy, 2016: 114). However, similar to the alternative approach the thesis takes to EBA’s, the thesis recognises SIGACTS as a vital adjunct for MOE’s when coupled with qualitative analysis to evaluate outcomes of a particular operation as well as the success of mission execution or strategic objective. Comprehensive assessments incorporate and evaluate ‘all’ activity within the OE or AOR. Carlson reminds us that “[M]ilitary strategists from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz have argued that the ultimate military objective may well be something not found on the battlefield” (2014:149)  Improving how to measure progress and inform adaptations are only part of a comprehensive assessment. “Even perfectly designed approaches and frameworks for assessment will continue to fall short” unless they are able to accurately reflect the complexity of COIN (White, 2017: 126). In addition, does the current suite of metrics incorporate pre-existing conditions such as history, socio-political and cultural issues? (Steel, Et al, 2009; Connable, 2012; Goepner, 2016). The thesis recognises its recommendations have limitations, and that focusing on that which is measurable has several possible drawbacks. First, the measures in question may be irrelevant to strategic success. Second, regardless of a particular measure’s significance, the fact that it’s being measured often causes a disproportionate amount of emphasis to be placed upon it. In other words, ‘what gets measured, gets measured.’ Another problem occurs when determining timeframes for measuring short-term behavioural changes. Finally, most endeavours, including defence diplomacy, have some form of tangible output which is usually conducive to measurement, but numbers alone do not always reflect reality. Despite these limitations, incorporating the suggested metrics into Long War assessments would contribute to the type of comprehensive analyses which remain the primary motivation for this research project. Reinforcing the much touted, somewhat glib axiom of ‘applying lessons learned’, measuring the effectiveness of past strategy-aligned actions is fundamental to future progress. Following his experience in a leadership role during the inter-agency non-combatant evacuation (NEO) mission in Lebanon during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Andrew Condon recognised that “a clear set of WoG preparation objectives need to be defined and validated, along with a corresponding set of metrics in order to be able to assess achievement, or progress towards achievement” (Condon, 2007: 73). Operationalising these recommendations would include inter-agency simulations which incorporate all civ/mil agencies. Joint training and preparation should 
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range from full combat exercises through to reception, staging, onwards movement and integration (RSO&I) activities, undertaken to generate unity of effort.  The results of these joint interactions should be used to generate mission metrics, as well as providing decision-makers with important pre-event feedback, such as the state of readiness, thereby facilitating change to the mission at a tactical level. Ultimately, these metrics should not only measure progress towards the ‘objective’ but also measure the efficacy of the process of interagency engagement. For example, Steven Kashkett is forthright in his summary of the Long War, declaring that “for most of us in the Foreign Service, one of the most striking developments in the 16 years since the 9/11 terror attacks has been a dramatic increase in synergy between the Department of State and the U.S. military (2017, 22). However, assessments from non-embedded personnel would find it difficult to accurately, and consistently measure synergy, cooperation, relationship building etc., without the recommended metric or framework. In addition to the metrics discussed above, government departments such as the DoD, State, USAID, as well as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have inbuilt accountability mechanisms to calculate ROI’s and measure or evaluate the operational and tactical implementation, outcomes, impact and cost-benefit/cost-effectiveness of defence diplomacy-oriented engagement. For example, the GOA, the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of Congress, produces a monthly 
Costs of War document, annual reports and mission specific assessments. In a 2017 report into U.S. foreign assistance, the GOA emphasised “the importance of evaluation, and the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 requires the President to establish guidelines for conducting evaluations” (GAO, 2017: 2). Another mechanism for interagency transparency is the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) quarterly report. SIGAR’s mandate is to investigate and report to Congress and the Administration on U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, including making recommendations for improvements. More importantly, the Office of the Inspector General is uniquely independent, not housed in any one agency, but required to report on all aspects of reconstruction in Afghanistan, regardless of federal departmental boundaries.   The DoD implemented its latest mechanism for measuring effectiveness, releasing the Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy (AME) in January 2017. The nascent policy aims to ensure “security cooperation programs will be based on clearly defined of the anticipated outcomes, a set of "specific, measurable, achievable, relevant/results-oriented, and time-bound objectives,” and a theory of change that explains ‘why’ and ‘how’ the outcomes are to be achieved (DoD, 2017: 15). Additionally, DoD will “integrate individual activities into unified, coherent, multiyear efforts to realize broader and more meaningful results” (Ohlbaum, 2017). The five-stage framework of the AME 
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goes beyond instituting greater accountability by also promoting the application of lessons learned to improve programs, meaning changes are made based on accumulated (therefore measured and substantiated) evidence. This oversight framework aims to ensure the U.S. and its Coalition partners won’t be building things people don’t want (such as Crocker’s road building project example earlier in this section).  Other avenues for mission specific oversight include departmental weekly updates and detailed summaries such as the Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations’ OIR Quarterly 
Report to the United States Congress, which delivers a timely and accurate account of actions by the DoD, State and USAID covering all aspects of contingency operations including the costs of programs and projects, accountability of funds, the awarding and execution of major contracts, grants, and agreements. Additionally, since the introduction of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961, the level of Congressional oversight of State controlled SFA programs has increased substantially, facilitating debates, reviews and restructuring.76 Increasing oversight, while important in terms of tracking the ‘who, what and where’ of U.S. SFA, will not generate the necessary metrics in isolation to ‘balance the ledger.’ Ross claims that policy-makers still debate “[W]hat objective should take priority in security assistance initiatives, building relationships or building capacity?” (2017: 4). It’s a case of aligning rationale with objectives; for example, a strong relationship with a partner based on shared security interests encourages, but not necessarily empowers a partner to support or ideally substitute U.S. forces. Both aims (relationships and capacity) contribute to the security of the U.S. However, without a clearly defined objective, measuring, and therefore improving, the efficacy of SFA will continue to undermine the tactical and strategic ‘promise’ of the concept.  One point which needs to be reinforced is that mistakes and/or failure at the tactical or even strategic level are inevitable. Moreover, they need to be acceptable as long as the mistake is identified relatively quickly and that lessons are learned and applied. Progressing U.S. national (or aligned Coalition interests) is only possible if every effort (as much as it’s possible in a complex environment) supports the strategic objective. Perhaps a consequence of 24-hour news cycle and the influence of social media on decision-making, acknowledging mistakes (publicly and in cabinet) is perceived as a sign of weakness both politically and militarily. As a result, policy-makers and upper echelon military personnel are often reluctant to call out mistakes and force change. This scenario is understood using Prospect Theory and viewed through the lens of entrenched power politics. McChrystal notes “there is comfort in ‘doubling down’ on proven processes and regardless of their efficacy,” though “feeling 
                                                     
76 On first glance this appears promising, however, State operates with a smaller budget and therefore delivers a 
smaller proportion of US SFA. 
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comfortable should not be our measure of success” (2015: 8). One feels uncomfortable in part because articulating victory in the Long War has thus far proven to be an elusive endeavour despite determined attempts made across the academic and policymaking spectrum. Although contributions by some prominent decision-makers have obscured rather that clarify intent. For example, former NSA H.R. McMaster offered an esoteric definition, claiming that “Winning in Afghanistan is really aimed at allowing Afghanistan to be Afghanistan” (August 2017). At its most elementary level, the purpose of fighting is to secure a better peace than one enjoyed before. However, defining peace in complex unconventional conflicts such as the Long War requires profound scrutiny beyond the scope of this research.  If victory or defeat in unconventional warfare is too difficult to define, let alone measure, can lessons-learned be used as an accurate metric? Despite the diligent chronicling by field historians, this thesis argues it is not a certainty. Even the most conducive learning environment, which facilitates the rectification of all previous strategic and tactical mistakes, would not necessarily lead to success in current and/or future conflicts. Hooker and Collins remind us that “[T]he defeated will often learn better than the victors” (2015: 4). Surely then, military effectiveness offers a useful tangible metric, being measured through the skill level, or proficiency of the force (all the civ/mil components). Again, this thesis argues it is not necessarily so. For example, a recent study from Biddle, Et al. presented “proficiency: skill in the conduct of war” as their dependent variable (2017: 4). The authors justified the selection of proficiency as a unit of measurement by highlighting that it’s “possible for a skilled military to be defeated by a materially superior foe, and while combat outcomes can shed light on proficiency, skill and combat outcomes are separable” (2017: 4).77  Would these metrics help to more accurately evaluate current complex conflicts in Syria and the Philippines? The multi-nation coalition effort in these conflicts are based on a familiar train, advise, assist, accompany and enable (TA3E) mission, therefore if skill and capacity, or the combined forces ability to carry out its assigned mission (the fore mentioned ‘readiness’) is measured against the original mission objective, then the distinction between mission success and failure can be reliably determined. However, the thesis emphasises that a clear strategic objective is required to evaluate whether a successful TA3E mission progressed this medium to a long-term end state. This document has discussed improving readiness of CA reservists to enhance U.S. defence diplomacy, yet how does the Army measure improvements? Interestingly, although the DoD requires all services to regularly assess and report on the ‘readiness’ of deployable units according to a highly 
                                                     
77 Materiel capacity (combined arms, ISR ect.) is also important to measure in relation to proficiency and can be 
qualified and quantified. 
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specified readiness reporting system (DoDD 7730.65, June 2002), and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review indenting an “emerging readiness crisis” (2014: 36), unit cohesion is not considered an assessable factor of readiness. Moreover, readiness is often measured post-facto as part of an After Action Report (AAR), therefore becoming subsumed in operational metrics; that is: objective versus outcome (Clarke, Et al., 2014Paul, Et al., 2015).78 These assessments are also influenced by the outcome of the particular event, timeframe or set of circumstances. Despite the flawed criterion, an emphasis of skill level is inevitable as it’s embedded in the military’s training culture (Forster, 2009). The thesis stresses that if this culture impacts our soldiers, it’s inevitable that it must also impact the soldiers that we are expecting to provide security on our behalf. Therefore, this reality should be taken into consideration when developing train, assist, advice, accompany and equip (TA3E) missions (see appendix 3). The thesis recommends that ‘readiness,’ as a precondition for success and failure, is an object to be measured in isolation. This can then be used to determine the viability of SFA, FID, and TA3E programs. A separate assessment of these initiatives within the context of the strategic objective can then be generated, yet the two assessments should not be conflated. Moreover, an increase in pre-event joint/combined inter-agency (State & DoD) simulations or rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill’s, through institutions such as the ADF Combat Training Center, can provide decision makers with a more comprehensive understanding of WoG readiness. Lt. Colonel Birch and Major Kirby emphasise that “Combat Team and Battle Group Warfighting Exercises, Mission Rehearsal Exercises” etc., provide stakeholders with unique opportunities to observe, make determinations and disseminate information to improve readiness “for specific operations and contingencies” (September, 2017). These and other similar mechanisms improve WoG readiness and introduce new units of measure. More importantly they build and maintain relationships, and generate unity of effort; two outcomes at the core of defence diplomacy.  
Forecasts 
“… just when we found the answer, they changed the question” (Gray, 2010: 10) B.H. Liddell Hart proposed that victory occurs when “the state of peace of one’s own people is better after the war than before …” (1991: 357). While Defence Diplomacy in the Long War and Defence 
                                                     
78 An AAR has four key questions: “What were our intended results? What were our actual results? What caused 
our results? And what will we sustain or improve?” (U.S. Army, 2014: 207–214); AAR’s can also assess strategic 
progress, identifying areas which should be sustained as well as areas which can be improved in order to achieve 
strategic/policy objectives.  
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Diplomacy: Beyond the Aiguillette have analysed 16 years of complexity during the Long War in Afghanistan, looking back at the event which provoked the U.S. and the Coalition to initiate OEF offers a candid validation for pursuing defence diplomacy oriented engagement. From a U.S. perspective, building enduring relationships based on predictability and a level of trust with partner nation means that U.S. global presence doesn’t actually require the U.S. to be present globally. While U.S. defence diplomacy builds confidence it also builds a network of reciprocity in which information fills the void where U.S. representation is limited or non-existent. Its network of partners generates in situ perspective on culture, social movements, and power dynamics, illuminating threats which would otherwise remain dark. Without this network-enabled global perspective, “the U.S. has no ability to anticipate, much less disrupt, a 9/11-type plot” (Petit, 2017). These vital U.S. partnerships need to be maintained to keep vital communication channels open and the information flowing, because even a thousand eyes in the sky can’t always penetrate the shadows. In an October 2017 congressional hearing with the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Dunford, introduced the Trump administration’s new Afghan strategy dubbed ‘R4+S’ (regionalize, realign, reinforce, reconcile and sustain). When asked by ranking member, Senator Angus King (I-ME) to offer his interpretation of victory in the Long War, Gen. Dunford was adamant: 
If you define winning as making sure we don’t have another attack on the homeland from the 
terrorist organizations that operate in South Asia … we can do that,” Dunford said. “If winning 
includes getting the Afghan forces to the point where they can provide security for their country 
with a minimal amount of international support, we can do that. If winning includes meeting 
[Afghan] President [Ashraf] Ghani’s goals for security of the population in key economic areas, we 
can do that (October 3, 2017). On August 21, 2017, President Donald Trump announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia, declaring “[F]rom now on, victory will have a clear definition: attacking our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing al Qa’ida, preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan, and stopping mass terror attacks against America before they emerge” (2017). The new strategy includes a surge of 4000 troops and a transition from a time, to conditions based framework (Kelly, 2017).Days later, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Hugo Llorens held a joint press conference with the commander of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan General Nicholson, to highlight two key, Afghan-specific components, of the nascent strategy: “building diplomatic consensus for a stable, peaceful Afghanistan among regional actors and outside powers, and ensuring they play a constructive role toward this goal” (August 2017). While the statement is new, the content is familiar and once again 
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illustrates that “the U.S. does not have 16 years of experience in Afghanistan; it has one year of experience 16 times” (Cancian, August 2017). Nicholas Burns, former Under Secretary of State and ambassador to NATO, and the aforementioned Ambassador Crocker opined recently that “[O]ur strongest and smartest presidents have known that integrating our diplomatic and military strategies is the most effective way to succeed in the world today” (November 2017). Whether the current president meets their criteria will be illustrated in the months to come. However the short-to-medium-term direction of U.S. national security was articulated in two key documents released in late 2017/early 2018 when the DoD presented the ‘new’ U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS), while the White House released its National Security Strategy (NSS).79 The NSS has historically been part strategic guidance, part public relations tool, while the NDS remains, as its creators intended, a classified document with a public summary; they both are an expression of the current political/military worldview of the U.S. The NSS and the NDS should prioritise clear and unambiguous objectives, painting a broader picture of U.S. national security. The NDS and NSS added substance to the Trump Administrations Long War strategic skeleton, yet a clear definition for victory predictably lacking. Final Thoughts The research project began with the aim of presenting defence diplomacy as a mechanism which facilitates relationship building and cooperation between like-minded states. During the Long War in Afghanistan this occurred between the U.S. and Coalition states, between the Coalition and the HN on a macro level, between intra-Coalition civ/mil personnel, between deployed Coalition personnel and HN security forces, as well as between deployed Coalition personnel and the HN population. Following a comprehensive analysis, the thesis concludes defence diplomacy delivers positive outcomes in all these interactions, and enhances Coalition effectiveness across the policy, strategy, and tactical spectrum. It also concludes that defence diplomacy provides a traditional diplomatic foundation to generate the unity of effort required to confront contemporary threats, whether conventional or unconventional, to national security. The Long War endures, and while preventing the next one is of paramount importance, winning the one we are in will demonstrate to those watching (both friend and foe) that it can be done. The research drew motivation from the need to explore and thus expand the manner in which diplomacy is perceived in relation to COIN and CT. The majority of scholarship presents diplomacy as 
                                                     
79 Other important documents released this year which will shape U.S. national security, are the U.S. CT Strategy. 
the Nuclear Posture Review, the National Biodefense Strategy and the Missile Defense Review. 
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a soft-power mechanism and examine it from a non-combat, preventative (counter narrative, public diplomacy, combating violent extremism-CVE) perspective (See Appendix 6). However, the focus of this study is on active combat and stabilization. Although prevention and deterrence are discussed, it’s in relation to the ability of defence diplomacy-oriented engagement to generate the unity of effort (united front) to deter opponents from escalating active conflicts and/or preventing localized issues from impacting regional partners. Another factor which influenced the thesis is the proclivity to associate or amalgamate tactics with strategy. While the connections are evident, the thesis demonstrates that in 21st -century unconventional warfare, a highly capable force employing the best tactics will be limited in its effectiveness unless it’s operating under the guidance of a multilateral strategic framework. The thesis determines that complex system dynamics dictates coalition contributions enhance capabilities because no individual state has the necessary capacity across all domains to counter 21st-century threats to national security. Specifically, the thesis explains how U.S. defence diplomacy involves the construction and reproduction of relationships and practices between inter-state military’s and security-oriented departments, which widen and deepen the interdependence and interoperability necessary to protect its national security interests. More broadly, it has also established that the activities under the auspices of defence diplomacy, facilitate the combined civ/mil skillset capable of progressing national security objectives in unconventional warfare as well as achieving military victory in contemporary conflicts. The thesis also argues that strategic victory requires the creation of a favourable political order through the use of direct, kinetic-combat operations and indirect, non-kinetic governance operations, and presents evidence that both direct and indirect activities fall within the scope of defence diplomacy. Through Defence Diplomacy in the 
Long War and this document, the thesis outlines and validates the usefulness of defence diplomacy as a mechanism to achieve these objectives.  From both the individual state (the U.S.) and multinational (Coalition) perspective, the thesis finds that defence diplomacy generates a strategically unified and operationally synchronized WoG approach to national security. It helps to establish new security-oriented relationships as well as strengthening existing ones (Civ/Civ, Civ/Mil, Mil/Mil). It generates requisite trust and transparency, it can improve a state’s reputation, credibility and status internationally as well as empowering a government domestically. It also impacts the decision-making process across the policy, strategy and tactical realm; influencing policy direction of like-minded states, facilitating unity of effort, and unity of action in the strategic level, and enhancing interoperability in joint/combined missions on a tactical level by formulating universal doctrine, interagency and intra-coalition/alliance training and 
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exercises. The thesis also establishes that the cross-spectrum ubiquity defence diplomacy’s the cross-spectrum ubiquity is self-sustaining in relation to the process for two reasons. First, strategic and tactical success presents options for prospective policy and vice versa, and second, success for those engaged in the process maintains commitment and encourages new partners to buy-in. The thesis looks favourably upon the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and enthusiastically advocates for the warrior diplomat. It concludes that their contributions generate a net gain to global diplomatic engagement. Finally, the thesis determines that defence diplomacy endures, as does its parent concept, diplomacy, as a result of its ability to, illuminate, navigate and calm the turbulent waters of international relations. 
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Appendix 1 
Does Complexity lead to Uncertainty? A critique  Freidman reiterates that insurgencies are dynamic, nonlinear entities whose parts interact in unpredictable and complex ways” (2014: 84). So, while Defence diplomacy builds trust, generates transparency, facilitates the flow of information among partner states and importantly, disseminates strategic intent to a broad audience on multiple levels, to what extent does a strategically unified and operationally synchronized coalition enhance a state’s national security in a complex and/or uncertain multiplex threat environment? Answering this question is pertinent as the 2017 Australian Foreign Policy White Paper identifies uncertainty in the opening paragraph and returns to the issue 11 times in the opening 30 pages. The following critique addresses two important questions within the context of complexity and uncertainty as it related to the thesis. Firstly, “If we can’t predict the future, how can we be wise when preparing for it?” (Porter, 2017: 239); and secondly, “How can we best apply creative thinking and the art of war in a 21st-century environment characterised by ambiguous and irregular threats?” (Maxwell, 2016: para. 3).  This study adopts Patrick Porter’s definition of uncertainty, which he presents “as ignorance over the capabilities and intentions of others” (2016: 240). Other influential interpretations include Vasquez and Rundlett who define uncertainty as being unsure (having limited to no knowledge) of the distribution of outcomes” (2016: 1398). While Huth, Et al. present it “as the size of the implicit or explicit ‘confidence interval’ that decision makers place around their estimates of the expected outcome of initiating an international conflict … As the level of system uncertainty decreases, decision makers become more confident of their beliefs concerning the outcome of a confrontation with other states” (1992: 481).89  Vasquez and Rundlett assert that “alliances are institutions that reduce uncertainty” (2016: 1398). If one subscribes to the notion that “risk is calculated by decision-makers on the basis of their relative capability” (Ibid), do coalitions create the same situation artificially? For example, Vasquez and Rundlett argue that “wars diffuse into multiparty wars only in the presence of alliances. In other words, in the absence of any alliance ties, war would not include more than two parties” (Ibid: 1401). Moreover, in a complex environment in which “carefully laid plans rigorously and undeviating carried out are regarded as the one way to overcome the inevitable confusion of the battlefield” (Creveld, 1985: 166); do decision-makers spawn uncertainty by expecting to have all the answers to complex combat questions? 
                                                     
89 See related diagram on p. 481 of The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, no. 3, (Sept, 1992). 
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Nicholas Drake recently wrote that although “there have been substantial advancements in the American military’s ability to collect and analyse information in the past several years, the growing complexity and constant friction of armed conflict ensures that uncertainty will remain an enduring element of the nature of war” (October 7, 2017). Complexity reflects the dynamism of irregular/unconventional warfare. Where a security strategy was once a response to specific and current adversaries, the Long War demonstrates a proliferation “of the notorious ‘unknown unknowns’” (Porter, 2017, 240).90 Given this reality, Porter questions how “policymakers rightly affirmed the uncertainty of the world, but implicitly regarded their own state as a bringer of order into chaos, somehow transcending the nonlinearity of international life” (2017: 239). Does the formation of coalitions/alliances improve the ability of states to impart this foresight? Furthermore, is the acquisition of externally generated foresight enough for the receiving partner state to reach the same risk assessment conclusion? Tushman and OReilly emphasise that the ability of an entity to assess and respond to complexity requires the “alignment, or congruence, between the organization’s strategy and four key building blocks—critical tasks, formal organization, people, and culture” (1997: 58). The ultimate goal of those tasked with developing and implementing security strategy is to be able to “handle uncertainty more reflexively” (Porter, 2017: 239). Acting reflexively manifests in flexibility and/or adaptability. Although the two terms are similar, flexibility is the ability to rapidly modify the tools, methods and even goals in response to a non-planned-for event; whereas adaptability occurs across a longer timeframe. Consequently, Yakov Ben-Haim claims that “flexibility occurs on a momentary level, whereas adaptability is related to the operational or strategic level” (September 2017).91 The ability to react in a timely, constructive, and progressive manner dominates the capability hierarchy in the 21st-century (although it’s not a uniquely new millennium capability). SECDEF Rumsfeld argued, “that adaptability was critical in a world defined by surprise and uncertainty” (2002: 22); a statement which “typifies a wider trend” among policymakers according to Porter (2017: 240). Is it better to have multiple states addressing uncertainty in unison, or do this result in multiple states coming up short when their unified predictions are wrong? McChrystal (2015) prioritises resilience over predictability in complex environments. Moreover, Porter questions whether “policymakers and official documents that invoke uncertainty also attempt to foist uncertainty onto the world through a self-assured vision of anticipatory” (2016:241). Does coalition formation in ‘quieter’ periods mitigate the “inherent unpredictability” of conflict (Beyerchen, 1992)? The UK MoD’s Strategic Defence & Security Review emphasises that the unexpected is “increasingly likely” (SDSR, 2015: 15) which Porter argues 
                                                     
90 Documents such as the Strategic Defence & Security Review, are an attempt to “institutionalise ‘horizon 
scanning’” according to Porter (2016: 241).  
91 See companion Presentation Slides, Ben-Haim, Y. ‘High-Consequence Decision Making, 2017). 
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provides the UK with an anticipatory role as security provider and force of benevolent prevention that spreads ‘good governance’ (2016: 241). If a state is able to convince its coalition partners that a threat is imminent, but that ‘they’ have a developed a means of addressing the predicted threat, is it more likely be adopted in a multilateral setting? It’s worth noting that “in a truly non-linear world, one’s own actions are also implicated in the reproduction of uncertainty,” therefore “the West can unwittingly be an agent of chaos” (Porter, 2016: 241). For Porter, a worldview that is founded on uncertainty “underpins anticipatory security practice, from greater use of development as an instrument of security to preventative ‘upstream’ engagement, to anticipatory war, and increased surveillance” (Ibid: 241). As previously illustrated, in addition to strategy, a state needs to concentrate resources and mitigate risks. However, a “failure to articulate limitations can lead a state to spread its resources thinly to hold down risks everywhere, exhausting itself and undermining the ability to react to the unexpected” (Ibid: 242). Porter notes, that “it’s still difficult to predict the time, place, and circumstances of future crises” (Ibid: 243); conversely, the thesis argues it’s equally difficult to measure the effectiveness of preventative measures.  Whereas uncertainty is founded on “unmeasurable ‘unknowables’ … Where contemporary social science seeks to reduce uncertainty with new methods and tools, classical realists see it as a dilemma inherent to the limits on knowledge” (Porter, 2016: 242). Porter claims both the 
National Security Strategy and the SDSR “foretell nonlinearity, but project from the present into the future with assurance” (2016: 247). Where does this ‘confidence’ come from? Again Realism helps to explain the seemingly incongruent actions of state’s (and non-state actors). Sovereign nations cooperate when the perceived or actual costs of waging war are too high (a scale from low to high-i.e. risk, is determined by a number of factors highlighted in this document); or to offset the costs of conflict when war seems inevitable. This thesis argues that confidence and prescience are essential in the formation and/or maintenance any alliance/coalition, especially from ‘senior partners’ in such formations. Confidence in one’s ability to accurately forecast the future threat environment includes two terms which are often conflated yet are distinct in their own right. Risk, which is knowable component of policy development, is a product of measuring the costs and benefits resulting from a certain combination of events and decisions (Parker & Stern, 2002; Edelstein, 2002; Rathburn, 2007; Williams, 2008; Coker, 2009; Mitzen & Schweller, 2011)  
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Appendix 2 
Policy, Strategy & Tactics This study hypothesizes that defence diplomacy has contributed to improvements in policy, strategy and tactics (ends, ways & means). Therefore, it is necessary to define, albeit briefly, the three in theory and practice.92 The manipulation of the three concepts, with the addition of ‘risk’, is termed operational art; a term which encapsulates the enduring practice of securing political objectives through the use of force whilst acknowledging the subjective, and often ephemeral nature of conflict. The thesis argues that across the decision-making spectrum, it’s within the realm of strategy that defence diplomacy’s contribution is most significant, if not most evident; therefore, the section begins with strategy.  There are many ways to define strategy, with Clausewitz and his contemporary Baron de Jomini again providing salient commentary. The former asserted that while practically, strategy is “the employment of the battle as the means toward the attainment of the objective of war,” a general theory of strategy “does not specify what to do, but it does advise on how to think about what to do” (1997: 141). While de Jomini describes it as “the art of making war upon a map” (1862: 69). B. H. Liddell Hart continued the theme, articulating strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy" (1967: 335).93 Col. Arthur Lykke’s echoed Hart’s description in a formula which has been broadly adopted, stating “Strategy equals ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus ways (courses of action) plus means (instruments by which an end can be achieved)” (1989: 3).94 In relation to a national security strategy (national strategy), the DoD defines it as “The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military and informational) 95 to achieve objectives that contribute to national security” (JP 1-02). 
                                                     
92 JP 3-05 (2011: III-1-III-2) succinctly articulates the concepts as questions which a Commander needs to ask to 
achieve a desired objective or outcome:  
 Ends - What is the military end state that must be achieved, how is it related to the strategic or policy 
end state, and what objectives must be achieved to enable that end state? 
 Ways - What sequence of actions, branches and sequels are most likely to achieve those objectives 
and the end state? 
 Means - What resources are required to accomplish the sequence of actions? What are the 
culminating points for key resources such as communications, kinetic and non-kinetic fires, logistics 
and medical support? 
 Risk - What is the chance of success, failure or unacceptable consequences in performing the proposed 
sequence of actions? 
93 The ‘art’ of strategy is a common theme in most military oriented scholarship, for example “Creating unity of 
command within large coalitions will remain a high point of military art” (Hooker & Collins: 2015: 10). 
94 Not everyone supports Lykke’s formulaic approach to strategy, with Cavanaugh referring to it as a “tyrannical 
straight jacket” (2017), while Meiser laments that the formula “has become a crutch undermining creative and 
effective strategic thinking” (2016).  
95 Interestingly Sir Michael Howard spoke of strategic adaptation which he determined was “an aspect of 
military science that must be studied above all others” (italics added). Howard, M. Military Science in an Age of 
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 Glueck, Et al. drawing definitions from the corporate sector, present strategy as “a unified, comprehensive, and integrated plan relating the strategic advantages of the firm to the challenges of the environment … designed to ensure that the basic objectives of the enterprise are achieved” (1980).96 The principal purpose of developing a strategy is to effect change and progress a policy objective, yet there are barriers, some insurmountable to transferring strategy from the whiteboard to reality. Some argue that the success of strategic planning rests on the premise that “the world is supposed to hold still while a plan is being developed and then stay on that predicted course while that plan is being implemented” (Mintzberg, 1994: 110). Consequently, it must be noted that a plan is only as good as the environment into which it is implemented, with the ‘only’ true test of its efficacy revealed once the ‘battle’ begins. Albert Palazzo, one of the foremost thinkers on military strategy, concludes that “winning battles—even winning every battle—cannot compensate for a poor or non-existent strategy and inadequate national will and direction” (2017). Therefore, a strategy need to be “integrated in the sense that all parts of the plan are compatible with each other and fit together well” (Kumar and Bansal, 2014: 412). Incorporating these various elements, Gray makes a commendable effort to crystallize a universally applicable definition, explaining that “[S]trategy is very difficult for many reasons, one of which is that it is neither a question of politics nor fighting power, but rather the conversion of military effort into political reward” (2010: 9).97 Moreover, Gray identifies the importance of developing a definition which explains what strategy ‘does’ as well as what it ‘is’, writing that “strategies are theories, which is to say they are purported explanations of how desired effects can be achieved by selected causes of threat and action applied in a particular sequence” (2014: 30). Similarly, Professor Douglas Lovelace Jr., lamented that “[W]e tends to use strategy as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a ‘vision’… Such casual use of the term to describe nothing more than ‘what we would like to do next’ is inappropriate and belies the complexity of true strategy and strategic thinking” (2006: v). 98 Framing strategy as a theory as well as a plan of action “forces the strategist to describe how and why success is to happen against a competitive foe” (Cavanaugh, November 2016).99 Using 
                                                     
Peace, Chesney Gold Medal Lecture, (October 3, 1973); see also: Howard, M. ‘Military Science in an Age of 
Peace’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, RUSI, (March 1974). 
96 Kumar and Bansal also identify the concept of unity, however, their definition is useful as it encapsulates the 
dilemma facing policymakers and military planners by emphasising that “strategy is not just any plan; it is a plan 
that is unified: It ties all the parts of the enterprises together” (2014: 413). 
97 Gray notes that “it is important to remember the key single-plural distinction between the one general theory 
of strategy and the unlimited number of particular strategies” availed in any one particular event (2010: 9). 
98 Prof Lovelace Jr., also stated that “[no] subject is more essential in the preparation of national security 
professionals and military leaders than the teaching of strategy,” (2010: v).  
99 Cavanaugh examines the orientation of definitions of strategy such as: “scientific design, planning,” whether 
it’s a “product or process based approach, is it an artful adaptation and dynamic adjustment … is directly or 
exclusively related to combat and war (or) power.” 
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this more comprehensive mindset “has the distinct advantage of placing primary focus on engagement with the enemy, while lessening the importance of getting to some ‘end’” (Cavanaugh, July 24, 2017). Hooker and Collins are adamant that, at the strategic level there is no cookie-cutter lessons that can be pushed onto every batch of future strategic dough” (2014: 4). Cavanaugh views strategy as both “a product (i.e. pre-planned documents)” and “a process (i.e. shifts and counters) to conclude that “strategy is the purposeful orientation toward success in a complex, competitive conflict” (November 2016). These definitions represent some of the oft-cited definitions of strategy and illustrate the individual characteristics which delineate a seemingly facile yet intricate concept. Gartner asserts that “strategy links military actions to political objectives” (1999: 16). As an example which illustrates theory in practice, critics of the U.S. and its Coalition partners often identify a lack of strategy beyond the immediate combat phase as the most prominent misstep, of the many missteps, in the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Carter Malkasian, who served and advised in both of the major theaters of conflict since September 2001, argues, although the Coalition attempted to rebuild Iraqi security forces in the second half of 2003, “it did not become the focal point of U.S. military strategy until General George Casey, commander of Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I), ordered a review of his military strategy at the end of 2004” (2007: para. 5).100 By the end of the review process, Gen. Casey “directed Coalition forces to shift their focus from fighting insurgents to training Iraqis” (2007: para. 5). General Casey’s recommendations, while strategy oriented, were tactically focused and illustrate the ‘what’ taking priority over the ‘why.’ Unfortunately, this example is not an outlier and demonstrates the U.S. ‘unwavering commitment’ to its immediate post-9/11 strategy. Current U.S. NSA, General H. R. McMaster, declared that while “clear thinking about war costs nothing. What we can afford least is to define the problem of future war as we would like it to be … based on self-delusion” (2013: para. 14). Strategic reviews are increasingly relevant in unconventional warfare, where the enemy constantly morphs and adapts, yet the impact of such reviews are limited when tactical changes are adopted in pursuit of flawed strategic objectives.101  If strategy is a relative combination of individual actions developed to attain a desirable objective (the ways); then a tactic represents the individual actions to reach that objective (the 
                                                     
100 Malkasian was advising the Marine Expeditionary Force in al Anbar province (a region beset by Sunni 
insurgents) while the comprehensive review was being undertaken. 
101 The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart lamented the demise 
of conventional warfare during testimony to the Senate Armed Forces Committee: 
“Adversaries have studied the American way of conflict and have developed, and will continue to develop, 
capabilities to mitigate or directly challenge longstanding U.S. military dominance in all war fighting 
domains…Competitor states will employ all diplomatic, economic, political, and covert mechanisms of influence and 
coercion available to them in advancing regional agendas, with the implied or actual use of military force acting as 
the amplifier that allows these whole-of-state efforts to resonate”(2017)  
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means). Therefore, an elementary differentiation between strategy and tactics can be expressed as: strategy determines the plans and resources required to achieve a favourable outcome(s), while tactics are the means by which previously determined plans are executed. An oft-cited idiom maintains ‘strategy furnishes tactics with the opportunity to strike with the prospect of success.’ Similarly, Cassidy and Tame reinforce the linkage between the tactical element of strategic planning with the overall policy goal, writing that “[D]ivorced from political objectives, successful tactics are without meaning” (June 20, 2017).102 Simply stated, even the best toys are underutilised if one discards the instruction manual.  This aspect of the strategic-tactical relationship will be explored further in Section 3’s discussion of metrics, yet it’s must be noted that tactical success is meaningless if: it does not support the strategic objective; and/or, negatively impacts other tactics deployed in parallel. Strategy works toward mid/long-term objectives; while tactics focus on immediate, ephemeral goals. Strategy requires a comprehensive assessment of all the relevant variables, both known and unknown; whereas tactics prioritise information pertinent to the specific action. Therefore, another distinction emerges; the level of uncertainty is greater in the formulation and implementation of strategy compared to tactics. Strategy remains fairly static over a predetermined period of time, changing only to the most dramatic shifts in the AOR; whereas tactics are the most dynamic elements of the decision-making spectrum, and commanders can adapt ‘on the fly.’103 Policy (the ends) is a relatively simple concept. A policy is the ultimate goal, the preferred outcome of a process, and serves as both an anchor and guide for the strategy.104 Australia’s Foreign Minister Julie Bishop acknowledged recently that “[P]ractical wisdom derived from observation and analysis is the basis for all good policy” (November 2017). Rather than offering more definitions, the Bush admiration’s post-9/11 ‘4D’ national security policy is presented to illustrate a policy which is central to this thesis. Quoting the 2002 National Security Strategy and the 2003 National Strategy for Countering Terrorism, the ‘4D’ policy tenets were: “Defeat Terrorists and Their Organizations; Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorists; Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit; Defend U.S. Citizens and Interests at Home and Abroad”  (2003: 15-24).105 The ‘4D’ policy example illustrates the vague 
                                                     
102 Moreover, the authors insist that the U.S. has a propensity to conflate policy and 
tactics, to substitute action for strategy” (June 20, 2017). 
103 Friedman emphasizes that “No tactical situation is entirely new, but none are ever entirely the same either. 
Applying theory to an original situation in an original way is the art, in both tactics and strategy” (May 30, 2017). 
104 Quite simply, “The conduct of a war cannot be disconnected from the goals of the conflict, reflected in 
policy” (Agnew, 2015: 4) 
105 “disrupt (sometimes substituted with destroy) terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state 
sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors”; 
“defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and 
destroying the threat before it reaches our borders”; “denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to 
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nature of policy’s in general; defeating terrorism is a noble and worthwhile endeavour however just as a tactic needs a strategy to direct state’s actions, policy without the ways to reach the end state is similarly redundant.  The broad, even ambiguous, nature of policy allows a state to develop multiple strategies to achieve its goal, to play ‘the long-game’, develop contingencies and ultimately change strategies as conditions compel. At a policy level, relationships cultivated through defence diplomacy can mitigate conflicts of interest and generate the unity of effort which flow-on across the strategic and tactical realm. Unity of effort does not, and should not require unity of interests. For example, the U.S. 4D policy objectives of Defeat, Deny, Diminish, Defend were not shared by all the partners who signed up for OEF (strategic and tactical) and joined the Coalition (NSCT: 2003). Ongoing and expanding conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa demonstrate that challenges of operationalizing verbal commitments and guarantee of support in OEF were not an isolated occurrence.106 Divergent policy objectives aside, this thesis calculates that defence diplomacy generates transparency and influence which both have a critical role in policy formulation.  A related term is introduced to conclude this section, a term which is often conflated with policy and strategy: ‘grand strategy’. Tami Biddle’s comprehensive analysis of the concept locates it at the end of a hierarchy of terms which “begin with ‘tactics’ at the lowest level and move upward and outward to ‘grand strategy’” (2015: 4). It’s difficult to define what grand strategy ‘is’ and describing what it ‘does’ is no less complicated. Consequently, grand strategy is something of an enigma in IR. It’s most often spoken of in relation to national/international security. While the discussion above is appropriate for the purposes of this thesis, explaining in detail the three elements of the decision-making process, a definition for grand strategy is offered to provide the reader with further clarity. Nina Silove states “[S]cholars broadly agree that grand strategy refers to ‘something’ that has the characteristics of being long-term in scope, related to the state’s highest priorities, and concerned with all spheres of statecraft (DIME) … “grand plans,” “grand principles,” and “grand behaviour” (2017: 2). Perhaps one of the scholars Silove is referring to is Paul Kennedy who construes grand strategy as “the capacity of [a] nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests” (1991: 5). 
                                                     
terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities”; and “diminishing the 
underlying conditions that spawn terrorism” (2002: 5-6). 
106 A recent RAND report concluded that the strategic priorities of US partners in the region “are so 
contradictory that even shared threats like ISIL, which challenge the states and non-state groups of the Levant, 
Israel, and the Gulf alike, are not sufficient to galvanize unified responses. While many of these countries 
participate in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the coalition campaign against ISIL, the extent of their 
contributions has declined, and some continue to pursue parochial agendas that undermine coalition action” 
(Mueller, Et al., 2017: 5) 
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Examining Silove’s definition it’s evident that grand strategy is a ‘meta-concept’, beyond policy and strategy; incorporating a state’s fundamental values, its reputation as well as how it perceives itself (its past, present and future role in the international system). Ashley Tellis concurs, stating simply that grand strategy is “fundamentally reflected in policy” (2017: 3). For example, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States declares that “[I]ncluding all of the world’s poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities of U.S. international policy” (2002: 21). While the overarching grand strategy to the CT policy highlighted above was: “[T]he advance of freedom, opportunity, and human dignity through democracy” (2003: 11). Grand strategy has emerged as IR’s concept ‘de jure’ since the end of the Cold War, with one scholar commenting acrimoniously that “Whenever a foreign policy commentator articulates a new grand strategy, an angel gets its wings” (Drezner, 2011: 60).107 Despite the recent popularity of the concept of grand strategy, self-awareness (the congruence of your self-rating and others’ rating of you) and national values have historically influenced foreign policy. Even when a clearly defined strategy is generated, a state needs to align and direct capabilities and conduct ongoing risk assessments (See Figure 1).108 The 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established the requirement for the Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA), an annual risk assessment provided to the president, the SECDEF and relevant Congressional authorities, to outline the strategic risks to national interests as well as military risks which impact the execution of the National Military Strategy. Another key document, the national security strategy (NSS), is the president’s own risk assessment and is drafted with the input of the National Security Council. The NSS identifies the challenges and opportunities, as well as serving as a policy blueprint for the current administration, outlining the means by which the president intends to achieve his administration’s foreign policy vision. Josh Geltzer, a former Director of CT for the NSC, emphasises that the NSS should be viewed “less as articulating substantive policies and more as offering, for domestic and foreign audiences alike, a language of foreign policy that’s most meaningful to the president, so that others can engage with him on his own terms and understand how particular policies of his fit into a broader worldview” (December 2017). Moreover, the NSS provides guidance to civ/mil personnel tasked with protecting and 
                                                     
107 The theme of Drezner’s article is common, with the Grand Strategy of Obama’s predecessor and 
replacement put under the microscope. For example: Ellis, D. C. ‘U.S. Grand Strategy Following the George W. 
Bush Presidency’, International Studies Perspective, Vol. 10, (2009), pp. 361-377;  Leffler, M. P. 9/11 in 
Retrospect: George W. Bush's Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, no. 5 
(September/October 2011), pp. 33-44; Dombrowski, P. & Reich, S. ‘Does Donald Trump have a Grand 
Strategy?’, International Affairs, Vol. 93, no. 5, (2017), pp. 1013-1037;   
108 The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPC) select military personnel “appraises, manages and communicates 
risk … in relation to problem sets and strategic objectives” (2016: 3). 
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advancing U.S. interests. While some question the NSS’s relevance,109 this thesis deems the NSS as a complementary addition to the U.S. decision-making progress, ensuring all military actions undertaken in pursuit of this strategy, both kinetic and non-kinetic, support the political and economic-oriented diplomatic effort of State.   
 Figure 3: Illustrating policy, strategy & tactic connections and the risk assessment process. (CJCSM 3105.01, 2016: B-9)  
                                                     
109 Some who question the relevance of the NSS include: Walt, S. ‘Why we don’t need another National Strategy 
document’, Foreign Policy, (September 28, 2009); Feaver, P. ‘Holding out for a National Security Strategy’, 
Foreign Policy, (January 20, 2010); Bick, A., Brands, H., Feaver, P., Inboden, W., Kahl, C., Schake, K. & Evans, R. 
‘So, Does the National Security Strategy Matter?’, War on the Rocks, (August 7, 2017). 
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Appendix 3 
Tools of Defence Diplomacy: FMA, SFA, FID and TRAIN-and-ASSIST 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS or FMA) Maj. Gen. Stephen Farmen, commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), recently confirmed that foreign military equipment sales help the U.S. to build on its core themes of readiness and global engagement. The Commander explained that FMS program encourages partner nations “to invest in training and sustainment, in addition to purchasing former U.S. military equipment and hardware” (Quoted in Vergun, July 17, 2017), thus establishing a proxy forward projection capacity. Leading military equipment supplier-nations such as the US, the UK, and France use a sales technique which is based on Threat-Based Security Cooperation, whereby common threats are identified and the supplier delivers the capabilities to offset said threat.110 Besides the financial windfall for the supplier, FMS processed through Threat-Based Security Cooperation results in procuring and delivering “the right capabilities and capacities that are available to deal with those mutual threats in case they arise” (Ibid). There are two acquisition streams in U.S. FMS; either new equipment sales which support domestic manufacturing and boosts employment or equipment purchases known as excess defense articles (EDA), which are surplus or updated equipment. Despite the fact that USASAC currently generates over US$ 170 billion per year from over 5,000 transactions with 151 partner nations, the “overall aims are the strategic effects of these equipment sales on regional and global readiness, both for the U.S. Army and its partner nations” according to Maj. Gen. Farmen (Ibid). It must be noted that, although the strategic objective of the Coalitions capacity building programs “is to produce a more stable and secure Afghanistan by establishing a legitimate and capable government through capacity building initiatives (overseeing the creation of services, training personnel, and the building of institutions, while securing the population” (Porter, 2016: 247), HN’s can often “operate as patronage networks or sectarian regimes extracting resources from their population to benefit their clients” (Biddle, 2014: 80). 
Security Force Assistance (SFA) & Foreign Internal Defence (FID) 
“how can Americans defend real, but limited security interests without sending another 100,000 
soldiers to wage another decade-long war in some far away land?” (Biddle, Et al. 2017: 1) 
                                                     
110 For a practical example how NATO utilizes Threat Based Security Cooperation, see: Ülgen, S. & Kasapoglu, C. 
‘A Threat-Based Strategy for NATO’s Southern Flank’, Carnegie Europe, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2016), pp. 1-49.  
Appendix 3-2 
 
This is the type of question that SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld sought to answer with ‘light (small) footprint’ strategy for OEF and OIF. Rumsfeld’s strategy and its progeny emphasize the U.S. engages with and supports regional actors by building capabilities which in turn limits the need for the U.S. to commit military resources abroad.111 The theory behind the strategy is sound, and for this reason, Hooker and Collins conclude that improving the ability of the U.S “to teach others to defeat an insurgency or terrorists is likely the key to future U.S participation in irregular conflicts” (2015: 16). Aside from the Long War conflict in Afghanistan (and Iraq), evidence of Hooker and Collins’ appraisal is revealed in unconventional (gray-zone) conflicts around the world in Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, western Africa (Niger, Nigeria, Mali), Mauritania, Pakistan and the Philippines. While not an exhaustive list, it does highlight the importance of SFA to build HN partner capacity as neither the U.S., nor its allies, possess the necessary capabilities to be present and active militarily on all these fronts. The U.S. is not alone in its focus on building HN security capacity, but its global presence and SFA budget justify the U.S. focus of this document. Nor is SFA a 21st-century phenomenon; a comprehensive assessment at the turn of the century revealed over 900 individual cases of SFA missions around the world from the end of WW II until the end of the 90’s (Regan, 2003). Often portrayed collectively, and incorrectly as ‘using proxies’,112 SFA seeks to establish a sustainable and capable HN security force and is an acknowledged ‘pillar’ of U.S. foreign policy,113 a dedicated line of effort in a military strategy as well as “a critical tool in the U.S. diplomatic toolbox” (Ross, 2017: 2). The DoD’s Priorities for 21st Century Defense states that “[A]s U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, our global counter terrorism efforts will become more widely distributed and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance” (2012: 4). Perhaps envisioning a successful drawdown of troops and transition of security to the ANSDF, President Obama and the NSC developed a global strategy with SFA at its core. The president’s strategy aimed to create “a network of partnerships from South Asia to the Sahel … allow us to train, build capacity, and facilitate partner countries on the front lines. And these resources will give us flexibility to fulfil different missions” (May 28, 2014).114 As the Operation 
                                                     
111 Steven Walt elucidated the importance of ‘offshore balancing’ as a successful US ‘Brand Strategy’ for the 21st 
Century. Walt states this approach would “minimise America’s overseas footprint and avoiding social engineering 
in countries we don’t understand” (2016). 
112 See: Schmitt, E. ‘U.S. Strategy to Fight Terrorism Increasingly Uses Proxies’, New York Times, (May 29, 2014); 
“How to better Train our Proxies in Modern Warfare,” Panel Discussion at the Sandhurst Conference, presented 
by Modern War Institute, (Thayer Hall, April 3, 2017); Deterrence with Proxies Research Project, Institute on 
Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)-UC San Diego, (2017), (ongoing research project). 
113 For example: US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington D.C.: GPO 2014), 
p. vii; The White House, National Security Strategy, (Washington DC: GPO February 2015). 
114 Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony, U.S. Military 
Academy-West Point, New York, (28 May, 2014); Five and half years later the Special Inspector General for 
Afghan Reconstruction echoed Obama’s sentiments, yet was still waiting for a competent ANSDF to materialize. 
The SIGAR declared that “[W]ithout an effective ANDSF, insurgents and terrorists will increase their control of 
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Anaconda example on pages 3-13 to 3-15 illustrates, SFA is a strategic line of effort with a tactical component, and determining which forces to support requires a holistic understanding of the history, culture and politics of the region. Similar to other activities under the umbrella of defence diplomacy, SFA exemplifies the importance of cultural, historical and political knowledge in the decision-making and planning phase. McFate recalls a persistent consideration when establishing or reconstructing a credible and capable (not necessarily compatible) security force within weak or failing states is that “a security force is often the strongest institution, and, in many cases, is or was a major contributing factor to the states demise” (2007: 81). Understanding HN dynamics mitigate the risk of increasing instability by strengthening a state’s security apparatus, delivering “a form of apolitical capacity building in which military aid ought to increase partner effectiveness in a simple, straightforward way (Biddle, Et al., 2017: 6). SFA is also attractive because its cost-effectiveness makes “a cheap way to bolster allies with limited U.S. commitment” including its physical footprint (Ibid: 13). Reducing U.S. presence in the HN equates to fewer troops, fewer support staff and more contractors. However, post-2011 Iraq demonstrate the political as well as national security risks of premature withdrawal. Establishing sustainable structures to support foreign troop withdrawal is the purview of Foreign internal defence (FID).  The U.S. military defines FID as “the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security … The focus of U.S. [foreign internal defense] efforts is to support the HN’s internal defense and development (IDAD) … It focuses on building viable institutions that respond to the needs of society” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).115 Simply stated, FID involves working by, with and through local governments to help them secure themselves by building up their indigenous forces.116 At its core, FID is a contemporary technique of indirect 
                                                     
provinces and populations. The Kabul government will struggle to build popular support and provide basic 
services. And reconstruction advisors and oversight personnel will be constrained in getting around the country 
to do their jobs” (2017: 2). Sopko, J. F. ‘The Way Forward in Afghanistan’, Prepared Remarks of Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International 
Studies, September 21, 2017), pp. 1-12. 
115 See also: Tompkins, Paul J., Jr., & Chuck Crosset, (eds.), Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies: 
Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, (United States Army Special 
Operations Command & Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory National Security Analysis 
Department, April 27, 2012). 
116 Although indigenous forces are mentioned, one should not confuse FID, which supports state and 
paramilitary forces, with supporting contra-government militia’s. This type of activity would be defined as 
‘unconventional warfare’ which consists of “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area,” see: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, 
Joint Publication 3-05, (July 16, 2014).  
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support to ‘at-risk governments’, prioritizing assistance to governments using the ‘failed state narrative.’ Advising, across the civ/mil spectrum, is another important element of FID, primarily as “a preventative measure intended to stop the growth of insurgencies before they grow into severe national security threats for HN governments” (Stringer, 2016, 87).  FID ops can run parallel to, and complement SFA, whereby FID concentrates on establishing the HN structures which support its nascent security capabilities created through SFA. Again, a thorough understanding of those who U.S. personnel engage with is vital. Steve Balestrieri notes that “the key to FID is to build rapport with the HN forces … having the language and cultural background to understand, adapt and thrive with the HN is vital” (August 2017). Similar to SOFs LRC program, the Marine Raider Training Centre’s Basic Language Course (BLC) is a key preparatory measure to achieve U.S. FID objectives.117 The BLC is a 125-day language course incorporates coursework, simulations and immersion exercises through which “students are given different opportunities to advance their language skills, as well as practice rapport building with simulated partner nation forces in controlled environments using role players and instructors” (Whitely, September 2017). FID missions are conducted during peacetime to buttress a state against the triggers of violence, stabilising the government by filling gaps in state capabilities thus helping the HN to “protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security” (ATP 3-05.2, 2015: 1-1; JP 3-22, 2010: xi).  Special warfare operations are one such stabilization mechanism. Special Warfare consists of “activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2012).118 Often viewed as an additional policy option outside of conventional or COIN strategy considerations, this thesis posits that the stabilization characteristics of special warfare are integral to contemporary conflict such as the Long War. The central tenets of diplomacy are evident within special warfare activities which cover an “all-encompassing spectrum from influence operations and political action to economic sanctions and coercive diplomacy; activities across the spectrum have the ability to influence/compel actors inside and outside of political coalitions. Viewing 
                                                     
117 The concept of the ‘warrior diplomat’ is embedded in the US Marine Corps with the 1940 US Marine Corps 
Small Wars Manual “The political authorities do not relinquish active participation in the negotiations and they 
ordinarily continue to exert considerable influence on the military campaign. The military leader in such 
operations thus finds himself limited to certain lines of action as to the strategy and even as to the tactics of 
the campaign. This feature has been so marked in past operations, that marines have been referred to as State 
Department Troops in small wars” (1940: 11-12). 
118 See also: Madden, Et al., further defines special warfare as a capability that “fills the missing middle for 
exerting influence between precision-strike options provided by armed unmanned aerial systems, SOF raids, 
aircraft and missiles, and the costly commitment of conventional forces” (2016: 2).  
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special warfare through the lens of defence diplomacy, it must be acknowledged that “direct approach only buys time and space for the indirect approach … that will prove decisive in the global security arena” (McRaven, 2012). Even in operations as proactive and dynamic as Special Warfare, it is: 
 the long-term relationships fostered by the indirect approach (which) are conduits for 
understanding and influence … the basis for partnerships through which the United States can 
help other countries solve their own problems and contribute to increased security in their 
regions … partnerships grow into alliances, as other countries become willing to assist the U.S. 
in security missions elsewhere (Robinson, 2012). In an active conflict zone, “the HN will request U.S. assistance through diplomatic channels which is then passed thru DOD down to USSOCOM” (Balestrieri, August 2017). Once the situation has been assessed, SOF are deployed to lead operation while building HN capacity until HN forces can perform unilaterally with SOF advisors if requested. COIN is a subset of FID and in a perfect world, a successful COIN campaign would end with a FID mission. This is because an insurgency can lose tactically and still achieve its political goals, the oft-mentioned ‘winning by not losing.’119 To simplify; a foreign military victory, i.e. defeat of the insurgent, means little if the HN is unable or unwilling to serve and protect the ‘entire’ population through legitimate state institutions. A salient feature of irregular conflict, and must be perceived by strategic planners as an additional impediment to FID missions is the issue of sanctuaries.  In Afghanistan for example, the insurgent opponents of the Coalition “exploited base areas in adjacent countries” to continually undermine operational successes (Hooker & Collins, 2015: 14). Recognising that operational success and strategic progression are not the same leads one to recall the opening lines of On Strategy by Harry Summers: “’You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,’ said the American Colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark for a moment. ‘That may be so, he replied but it is irrelevant’” (Summers, 1995: 9). Winning conventional conflicts (defeating a peer enemy) is often faster and cheaper than stabilization and COIN, however one must remember that warfare is a means to political ends—if the military means don’t actually secure any of the political ends, then the fighting is just a waste of lives and dollars, whether the intervening state declares a victory or not. FID and COIN are an effort to address homeland security (terrorism), humanitarian concerns (refugee issues), and regional stability (economic & political) and building HN capacity and/or defeating insurgents are means to these ends, not an end in itself. The role of the previously discussed policy advisor, in its various guises, is key to achieving objectives in FID and/or COIN missions. Stringer highlights that advisory missions are strategically significant “due to the frequency of their occurrence and 
                                                     
119 See page 17 for relevant sources on this concept. 
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inordinate effect on emerging or existing security threats in relevant partner nations” (Stringer, 2016, 87).  Speaking on the possibilities afforded to the U.S. as a result of its FID, SFA, FMS, ect., initiatives, then SECDEF Leon Panetta declared that "[W]e must use our best skills and our assistance to build new alliances, new partnerships throughout the world by engaging in exercises, in training, in assistance and in innovative rotational deployments" (Panetta, 2012). Yet while FMA/FMS deliver the material capabilities and FID and/or SFA generate the conditions necessary for the HN to take responsibility for its national security, an effective, and sustainable COIN/CT strategy ‘lives and dies’ with the train-and-assist mission.   
Train-and-Assist: Building Confidence as Well as Capacity.  
 “The United States has made great strides in building up the operational capacity of its partners by 
training and equipping troops and mentoring them in the field. But there has not been enough attention 
paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human capital (including 
leadership skills and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long term … In these situations, the 
effectiveness and credibility of the United States will only be as good as the effectiveness, credibility, 
and sustainability of its local partners” (Gates, June 2010) At the end of 2014, OEF came to end with the formal transition of primary security to the GIRoA. This “transition marked the formal end to 13 years of combat operations and a renewal of the U.S. commitment to work with Afghanistan for an enduring security capacity” (IG for OCO, 2015: 4). Thus the U.S. embarked on a new stability mission in South Asia. On January 1, 2015, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS), provides the framework for continued U.S. support. OFS has two complementary missions: U.S. forces continue its CT efforts to prevent the resurgence of al Qa’ida and its remnants and will also conduct a train, advise, and assist program to improve the capabilities of the ANDSF under ORS. Train-and-Assist missions are an extremely important component of COIN and have been a stand-alone line of effort in OEF, ISAF and ORS. Generating a sustainable domestic force with the capacity to guarantee HN security has been described by U.S. military leadership as “our ticket home” (Hammes, 2015: 277). Through personal experience, Griffiths emphasises that “[N]either the small war fundamentals nor considerations explain how to be a good advisor” (2017: 3). It’s a skillset which is part intrinsic, part experience and wholly individual. Private interviews with a former ADF Military Advisor (Civil Military Advisory Training-CMAT) in Eastern Iraq prior to the 
Hashid Watani (national mobilisation) or Sahwa ‘Surge’, revealed that individual personality was/is a major determinant in the success of Train-and-Assist missions. The former Chief Instructor recalled that Australian trainers and advisors are highly sought after because of their attitude and the military culture of the ADF. Additionally, the source noted, that when selecting individual Iraqi’s to ‘stand-up’ in leadership positions after the first training rotation (6 weeks), 
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he and his fellow trainers would prioritise personal qualities and the ability to lead over military skills. The former head of CMAT emphasised that Iraqi’s who chose to join the Iraqi army for US$ 30 a week, when a cleaner at the Imperial Palace in the secure Green Zone earned US$ 60, had already demonstrated certain commendable individual qualities.  A decade later, the enemy has morphed into a more disruptive beast, but the challenges of building and sustain an effective Iraqi security force and multifaceted and ongoing. For example, the current deputy commanding general for Special Operations Joint Task Force OEF, U.S. Marine Corps Brig. Gen. James F. Glynn, insisted that “[Special operations forces] operators are not made overnight; they aren’t mass produced” (Snow, 2017). The deputy commander it takes nearly six months to create a basically trained CTS operator, and for officers, it takes almost a year … that training doesn’t include the initial screening, selection and assessment that comes prior” (August 11, 2017). As the training goes on, so does the draw of Coalition partners physical and financial resources. For instance, budget documents reveal that the U.S. allocated US$ 1.176 billion in FY 2017 for the Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and the FY 2018 President’s Budget request includes “US$1.269 billion for Iraq T&E activities” (excluding $289.5 million requested in the 2017/2018 ITEF for support to the Kurdish Peshmerga).120  Captain Zach Griffiths, SF officer and former commander of Task Unit Nangarhar, (a C-JTF-U.S. & Hungarian forces), was tasked with building “enduring tactical, operational, and institutional capacity” of the Provincial Response Company, a special operations element of the Afghan police (2017: 1). Griffith identified cultural awareness; a comprehensive understanding of their Afghan partners was an essential component of developing mutual trust. The allied special operations detachment Griffith commanded “reconstituted the PRC with internally- and externally-focused efforts, and finally restored their confidence with progressively tougher combat operations” (2017: 1). A genuine effort was made to acknowledge progress and ‘reward’ tactical victories, no matter how small.121 Griffith believes this simple effort made a significant contribution to restoring morale and building trust, instilling “confidence in themselves and us, their advisors” (2017: 6). At the end of his deployment, Griffith concluded that “Good advisors rebuilt the PRC with trust earned through shared sweat and combat” (2017: 1). 
You cannot send military personnel “into a theatre and expect them to have a positive impact unless 
they are historically, culturally, linguistically & religiously” aware of the OE (Mattis, 2009). 
                                                     
120 ‘FY 2018 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Request Counter-Isis Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)’, 
Department of Defence Budget FY 2018, (Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defence, May 2017), p. 3. 
121 Griffith detailed how “[W]e cemented victory on confidence operations by awarding “high risk arrest” 
badges … These badges celebrated the mettle of the patrolmen brave enough to face a midnight raid. The 
detachment wore them too; together we fought and earned the patches,” p. 5. 
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Despite operating in a different theatre, working with a different ethnicity and culture, against a different opponent, Major James King, former Intelligence Advisor for a Military Transition Team in Iraq, echoes Griffiths account on the importance of confidence and how to achieve and sustain it. Like Griffith, Captain Nicholas Wilson, who served as a liaison officer (LNO) with the ADF, and Major King identified the need to understand the culture of the trainees, as well as the impact of personalities (both good and bad) on mission success. Wilson noted that a trainer must “[L]earn your advisees’ personalities and backgrounds. All efforts must go towards maintaining positive relationships … Knowledge of their personal lives, and finding common points between you can go a long way to building rapport” (August 2017). While King asserts ‘[R]egardless of the host nation force’s nationality, advisers must treat their counterparts with respect” (2017: 2). The Major gave the example of how U.S. trainers would subject the trainees to the same intense, in-your-face, drill-sergeant style training which they had been exposed to state-side, however, rather than motivate the troops, Iraqi recruits would be embarrassed and ashamed” (Ibid).122 The learnt experience is key to progress in warfare and lessons have been learned; it’s widely acknowledged that in most non-American cultures, this training style is not only ineffective but also extremely counterproductive.  Additionally, Captain Nicholas Wilson emphasised the foreign trainer must “[F]ocus your advisory efforts on the existing host nation structures, culture and methods, not Australian ones. You will never change the host nation force into the ADF, nor should you try to” (August 2017). However, there fundamental are elements of Coalition partners WoG approach to national security which should be replicated; the most important being the appropriate civ/mil balance. For example, Ford and Dalton recently explored the difficulty of developing a NATO-style security architecture in the Middle East or South Asia. Although NATO is the most successful military alliance in recent history, opportunities to replicate it appear limited “as both regions share several fundamental challenges that make building a regional security architecture particularly challenging” (Ibid). Wilson recognised and attempted to reinforce “the advantages of a cooperative and friendly civil-military relationship … a proper military-civilian relationship is a powerful force multiplier in remote or contested regions” (Ibid).  A central element in achieving the desired endstate is the issue of vetting. McFate evaluates capacity building programs since WW II and concludes that two equally important lessons can be gleaned from previous efforts to create a credible and capable security force. Firstly, that “the effects of vetting or lustration may be short-lived if the process is fast-tracked or abandoned halfway through (i.e., recruit first, vet later)” and secondly, that “process matters’ in relation to a 
                                                     
122 King recognises the dangers in this type of attack on a recruit’s individual identity highlighting that “incidents 
like these can often lead to soldiers deserting or in extreme cases a reprisal attack” [so called Green on Blue’ 
incidents] (2017: 2). 
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consolidated and comprehensive structure which produces the required results while being transparent and accountable to both the training nation and the HN (2007: 80). McFate adds that a failure to apply these and other lessons learned will inevitably benefit the insurgency by establishing a force which lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the local population which can lead to a variety of outcomes including broadening the active/passive support for the insurgency as well as increased incidents of insurgent infiltration into the ranks of security forces (e.g. Green on Blue attacks). Muhammad Al-Waeli agrees that the key to building a successful organization is the selection process. However, he emphasises that the Iraqi government “did not have the luxury” when it established Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in 2015 as the “imminent challenge was to stop ISIS from advancing at any cost” (December 2017). Hence, quantity and speed had higher priority over quality and thoroughness. Green recalled inadequate vetting undermined initial attempts to stand up the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) as insurgents, petty criminals and drug addicts permeated the nascent local security apparatus (2017: 15). Again, based on personal experience, Green notes that local powerbrokers monopolized and co-opted the ANAP to serve as their personal militia’s; engaging in “bribe-taking shakedown behaviour” (Ibid).  Diversity can mitigate corruption and, potential misuse of force against in situ populations. McFate proposes that a diversity quota is a pre-requisite because a “single group should not disproportionately dominate the new security sector lest it seize control of the government” or at the very least marginalise and/or target other groups not incorporated (McFate, 2007: 87). Yet a diverse force brings its own set of challenges. Al-Waeli recalls that “the exponential growth of the PMF into a staggering 130,000 organization whose members hail from different denominations and backgrounds within a few months posed serious organizational and administrative concerns” which undermined its legitimacy despite achieving success on the battlefield (December 2017). The three practitioners, with direct exposure to the opportunities and challenges of standing-up HN forces in a variety of circumstances, all agree that designing and implementing a successful vetting plan, requires comprehensive consultations with stakeholders “to develop an end-state vision for the new force” (2007: 82).123  Clausewitz warned that “activity in war is movement in a resistant medium” (Clausewitz, 1997: 67), therefore, even if all learnt lessons are imparted, and all the boxes are ticked while training or mentoring nascent platoons, company’s or battalions, if advisors are not able to install a new generation of leaders, then all their blood, sweat and toil will be ineffective. Wilson 
                                                     
123 For a comprehensive assessment of U.S. Foreign Military assistance programs in SE Asia 2001-2004, see: 
GOA-05-793, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights Reviews and 
Strategic Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces, Report to Congressional Committees, 
GOA-05-793, (July 2005), pp. 1-90. 
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prioritised the “[T]ime spent building the foundation of the relationship will result in long-term gains” (August 2017). Captain Wilson concluded that: 
Advising is a difficult business; every advisor is placed in a position of trying to influence people 
they have no authority over, perhaps to do things that may not be in their nature, all whilst 
trying to implement Australian policy and answer for Australian government decisions over 
which they have no control. This is all conducted in a culturally diverse, developing and 
potentially troubled nation (August 2017). While King believes that refining and executing the basic, core doctrine very well produces a force that will continue to fight effectively “after your gone.” Mirroring Griffiths experience in Afghanistan, King ended his deployment with a genuine sense of professional and personal achievement; concluding it was “a very rewarding experience” (2017: 3). 
Our team arrived in Iraq to a mob of people that knew very little about combat operations. 
Through our efforts and the lessons, we learned along the way, that mob slowly morphed itself 
into a cohesive fighting unit. One that the Iraqi army felt confident enough to deploy over 300 
KMs from its home station to support operations in a critical area of the country (King, 2017: 8).  King’s sentiment was echoed by Green who declared that his first deployment to Uruzgan as a POLAD in 2005/06 had been incredibly rewarding and a privilege …” (2017: 3). The Coalition Train-and-Assist strategy extends from the combat forces on the ground through to the institutions which guide them. Initiatives such as the MoDA program (previous section) helps build nascent institutional capacity for HN governments. In the Afghan Defense Ministry for example, civilian advisors support effective and accountable governance by building core competencies in: “defense policy and strategy, including force planning and resource acquisitions, procurement and allocation; personnel management, civ/mil and interagency operations, including doctrine, training and education; and the management of defence infrastructure.124 The QDR emphasized the MoDA “strengthens capacities for ministerial-level training” (2010: 30). Deployed under the auspices of the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, advisors aim to build long-term relationships with Afghan government partners, as well as developing a cadre of skilled professionals. Successive SIGAR’s highlight that corruption across all levels of the GIRoA continues to disrupt progress at a ministerial level, however, if the effects, if not the culture, of corruption can be effectively mitigated; then in theory, these relationships will form the core of a network of trust and transparency which will facilitate long-term communication security cooperation. 
                                                     
124 Governance is defined as “the state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behaviour 
by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society” (JP 3-07, 2016: 
xiv).  
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“Figuring out who may have the means and the desire to step in is part of our diplomatic mission” 
Crocker, 2013: 104). Over 16 years Coalition civ/mil personnel have delivered hard-won tactical gains which will only be sustained by effective and accountable GIRoA governance and institutions. There has been progress in some areas such as identifying and training NCO’s.  Conversations with a member of the U.S. armed forces directly involved in ORS revealed "... When a country focuses on developing its NCO corps, the professionalism of their military increases dramatically." Creating a viable Afghan security force is the only way foreign forces will be able to pull our forces out without causing a collapse once the Coalition withdraws. Toward this objective, Coalition nations are restructuring the manner in which they contribute expertise to the Coalition train-and-assist strategy (Cox, 2017). The creation of regionally aligned security force assistance brigades (SFAB’s) to provide such capabilities to the GIRoA demonstrate that lessons have been learned from the examples presented throughout this document.  The SAFB concept is an important structural evolution of the US’s capacity building process; a process which “might be America’s biggest growth industry” (Cooper 2017).125 The previous system, Security Force Assistance Teams (SFAT), deployed a reconfigured brigade combat team for an advise and assist mission, whereas the SAFB provides a purpose-built training force. Not only does this offer a more effective training mechanism but also frees up the brigade combat team thereby enhancing U.S. force readiness according to Master Stg. Brian Hamilton (2017). Despite SAFB’s generating AOR/OE specific forces, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley argues the new system, which had been informally applied and tested for several years, will be “a less ad-hoc approach” to the crucial security-assistance missions. A critical element of the new system given the complex security environment facing the U.S. and its partners, the structure of the SFAB’s is such that they are equally effective in conflicts with irregular or conventional combatants. Moreover, in an effort to ensure the sustainability and efficacy of the SFAB’s, the U.S. Army is establishing a Military Advisor Training Academy (MATA) at Fort Benning, an institution to disseminate the most up to date PME.  Sydney Freedberg Jr. suggests that “creating an academy for advisors shows a commitment to further institutionalizing the lessons of the long post-9/11 wars. After Vietnam, the Army wilfully forgot about guerrilla warfare in its eagerness to refocus on the Russians. Maybe this time will be different” (February 2017).126 Speaking recently to the issue of reevaluating train-and-
                                                     
14 SFAB was to be officially stood up in October 2017 but the date was pushed back to January 2018. The 2nd 
SFAB is currently in training. It is a volunteer based recruitment process, although the Army is offering $5000 
incentive payments for recruits to the debut group (1st SFAB). 
126 John Friberg (2017) disputes this claim, noting that the Fort Benning MATA is not the first MATA that the 
Army has established. During the early years of the Vietnam War, U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets) at 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina conducted a six-week long advisor training course. The Military Assistance Training 
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assist missions, General Dunford acknowledged that the U.S. and its Coalition partners have “16 years of lessons learned and lot of lessons from Vietnam as well” (July 23, 2017). As part of this revaluation of train-and-assist programs, and ahead of the release of The Army Techniques 
Publication – ATP 3-96.1 Security Force Assistance Brigade in early 2018, the U.S. has recently reviewed the practices and restrictions for its SFAB’s and made adjustments which allow advisors to accompany HN forces to the frontlines especially in complex urban environments in Iraq and Afghanistan to deliver tactical (fire-support, targeting advice) and strategic objectives.127 The revised mission has adopted the TA3E mission directive, and this thesis suggests that the ‘beyond the wire’ mission directive is in part due to successful civil affairs operations performed by SOF since 2011. While the SFAB represent A U.S. Army initiative, Dalton suggests that the five service branches “must be prepared to shape, deter, defend, fight, and stabilize alongside allies and partners. It is time for the services to fully recognize and resource security cooperation not as an enabling, specialized function, but as an integral tool to achieve core military objectives” (2017: 3). SFA, FID and train-and-equip mission are often criticised for not delivering the security assurances that were designed for, (most recently the multi-year effort to train-and-equip the Iraqi Army, or Operation Sycamore, the effort to support anti-Assad militias in Syria, or the various assistance missions in the Philippines).128 For example, Biddle, Et al. note that “over US47 billion in U.S. aid to the Pakistani military has not enabled it to defeat insurgents there and U.S. efforts to build the South Vietnamese military were famously unsuccessful from 1956 to 1975” (2017: 4).129 
                                                     
Advisor (MATA) course was established in 1962 as part of the U.S. Army Special Warfare School. It prepared 
conventional U.S. Army officers and NCOs for assignments as advisors to Vietnamese Army units. Instructors 
were Special Forces NCOs highly trained in conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions. See: U.S. 
Army, MATA Handbook for Vietnam, US Army Special Warfare School, (Fort Bragg, North Carolina, January 
1966), pp. 1-253; While it’s too early to comment on the program’s effectiveness, current SOF personnel have 
raised concerns over the limited, 6-week timeline for SFAB training. For example: Balestrieri, S. ‘SOF Truths- 
SOF Can Not Be Mass Produced… Right? Apparently Not’, SpecialOperations.com, (October 2, 2017). 
127 The US Army pre-release statement addressing the final draft of ATP 3-96.1 states that the document 
“provides doctrinal guidance and direction for how the SFAB plans, prepares, and executes operations globally. 
It focuses on the SFAB conducting SFA and advising foreign security forces. It is based on lessons learned from 
previous advising efforts and recent combat operations with a view to the future. ATP 3-96.1 provides the 
framework for conventional forces to conduct SFA within the construct of unified land operations. It addresses 
SFA at operational and tactical levels.” 
128 Despite its problems, ome have suggested that the multi-year train-and-equip mission in the Philippines 
known as Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines (OEF-P) should serve as a model” for bilateral US COIN/CT 
engagement (Swain, 2010: 4); Johnston concludes the WoG approach by SOF in the Philippines ensured the 
synchronization of US efforts across the country” (2017: 84); Army Techniques Publication 3-05.2 recognizes 
the OEF-P as “a model construct for planning and executing FID” (2015: 2-19).See also: Maxwell, D. ‘Operation 
Enduring Philippines: What Would Sun Tzu Say?’, Military Review, Vol. 82, no. 3, (May-June 2004), pp. 20-24; 
Palinonis, D. C. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines: A Demonstration of Economy of Force, (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, 2009), pp. 1-27; Robinson, L., Johnston, P. B. & Oak., G. S. U.S. Special Operations Forces in 
the Philippines, 2001–2014, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), pp. 1-185. 
129 Kronstad reports that Congress began appropriating billions of dollars to reimburse Pakistan and other nations 
for their operational and logistical support of U.S.-led CT operations in FY 2002. “These “coalition support funds” 
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While Amira Jardoon’s recent analysis revealed the correlation between SFA/FMA and the recipient states targeting of its own population by investigating whether “enhancing a government’s coercive capacity (i.e., its ability to threaten to use force or the actual use of limited force), exacerbate or mitigate its use of collective violence?” (2017: 2). Also, consider the ‘failing’ and retreat of Iraqi security forces when confronted with an advancing ISIS in June 2014. However, identifying ‘success’ in foreign assistance to the HN is not black or white.  For instance, the capitulation of Iraqi security forces in Mosul when confronted by a ‘few hundred’ Sunni insurgents is clearly a failure of the Iraqi Army and a ‘terrible’ return on investment for the billions of dollars spent through SFA, does that equate to failed system or strategy? Similarly, the ability of the Taliban to capture and control more territory at any time since October is an indication of the tenacity of a determined and well-supported insurgency, is it a failure of Coalition train-and-equip missions? This is a critical question because if ‘we’ (the U.S./Coalition) expect HN and partner states to quickly construct/reconstruct to civil/military institutions necessary to realize our objectives, then it is it entirely reasonable of them to expect that ‘we’ offer a model to be replicated. John Deni argued that because of the high profile nature of the Coalitions missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, less than optimal outcomes have “led many to conclude that military engagement for the purposes of building partner capacity and foreign internal defense simply does not work. In reality, the evidence is far more nuanced, and other successful cases are dismissed or ignored in a rush to judgement” (2016: 2).  Programs such as SFA does not occur in a vacuum and the situation in Iraq, replicated in Afghanistan post-2014, was exacerbated by a confluence of problems including regional insecurity, weak and centralised governance as well as underlying identity (ethnic, religious, cultural) issues. As illustrated elsewhere in this document, those involved in SFA, FID and Train-and-Assist missions declared their missions a qualified success; achieving the objectives of standing up a capable security force. This thesis argues that these programs contribute to U.S. and Coalition security on multiple levels; not always in terms of tangible outcomes. The problem of ‘proxy’s in complex COIN operations - Operation Anaconda and its Legacy   Operation Anaconda began before dawn on March, 2nd 2002 involving about 2,000 coalition troops, including more than 900 Americans, 200 U.S. Special Forces and other troops, and 200 special operations troops from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, Norway, New Zealand, and Afghan allies. The Afghan allies consisted of militias under the command of local 
                                                     
(CSF) have accounted for roughly half of overt U.S. financial transfers to Pakistan since 2001, or about $13 billion 
to date,” (2015: 14); See also: Nagl, J. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). Nagl’s quintessential account of US efforts in Vietnam 
illustrates the difficulty of train-and-equip missions in an active combat zone.  
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Warlords such as Zia Lodin, Kamal Khan Zadran, Muhammad Nasim and Zakim Khan. Each of the commanders were supported a U.S. SF teams and operations were guided by Coalition reconnaissance units inside the AO. Commander Lodin’s forces suffered early casualties and swiftly withdrew and the resulting hole had to be plugged by U.S. troops which disrupted their task to block known routes of escape from the south and southwest, conduct reconnaissance, and call in air strikes. Geibel writes that promised Afghan reinforcements never arrived and the precision operation designed to mop up the remaining AQ and Taliban fighters in the mountain hold-out began to unravel. Coalition commanders were quick to condemn the Afghan militias, claiming that “allied Afghan generals retreated under withering fire from foes who might have been tipped off about the attack” (Schmitt & Shanker, March 2002). While some Afghan commanders argued the U.S. “may have made the mistake of relying on a select few local commanders who gave wrong estimates of enemy troop numbers, then backed out on pledges to assist in the battle” (Geibel, 2002: 76). One militia leader involved in the Battle for Shar-I-Khot blamed the U.S., insisting it “does not understand our local politics; it does not know whom to trust, and [it] trusts the wrong people.”130   Whether the U.S. understood the dynamics on the ground, ethnic and tribal rivalries certainly played a part in the actions of the various militia’s. Schmitt & Shanker wrote that U.S. personnel involved understood that the region’s warlords were playing a long-game in Afghanistan, asserting “This is the way everybody fights over there. Fight and fall back. You don’t want to take too many combat losses yourself. You save your resources from attrition to make sure you stay in power when it’s all over” (March 10, 2002). However, an unnamed SF Lt. Colonel summed up the difficulty faced by Coalition forces throughout the Long War, declaring “The forces [Afghans] put together are different from our American military force. They’re not an American military force. We can’t expect them to be. It makes them no less noble, no less brave, no less willing to get out and engage our common enemy” (Quoted in Mohan, G. & Schrader, March 11, 2002). While the use of ‘proxy forces’, at least in the short-term can yield results, these forces are often a law unto themselves with limited accountability or local representation. They are cognizant of their role in a COIN campaign, and they are also fully aware and exploit the fact that there is a reluctance for Coalition partners to reprimand them for fear of derailing cooperation at an operational level. Green recalls that the initial U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan from late 2001-2003 prioritised local warlords and their militias under the broad 11,000-man strong Afghan 
                                                     
130 The thesis emphasises that the make-up of the force involved in the Battle for Shar-I-Khot was a factor in 
the overall failure of Operation Anaconda, not the factor. Ballard, Et al., conclude that poor coordination 
between Combined Joint Task Force Mountain and U.S. CENTCOM, a lack of clarity regarding C2, as well as 
restrictive command structure within CENTCOM, equally contributed to mission failure (2012: 69-73). 
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Militia Force (AMF). At this point, it’s worth noting that Jones and Munoz label this first phase of the Long War as a “successful US-led insurgency against the Taliban government” (2010: 1).131 The authors assess that the U.S. corralled and directed a multi-ethnic force which included Tajiks, Uzbek’s Hazara’s and Pashtun’s in a nation-wide, multi-front effort. Tactically, this combination produced results by protecting FOB’s, providing Intel and logistical support and boosting/supplanting SOFs routing of remaining Taliban, bringing a level of stability to their AOR.132 However, these groups abused the local community to such a degree which “prompted Afghan villagers to join the Taliban in 2006 out of a sense of justice to confront the abuses of warlord forces and because they were unable to defend themselves from the Taliban intimidation” (2017: 14). As a result, earlier tactical gains were overshadowed by a reversal of progress at the tactical level; however, the response to counter the situation created its own challenges. Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, then commander of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, ordered the demobilization of the AMF, reportedly instructing militia members “to go into the army,” with the aim of absorbing them into a nascent Afghan army.133 The thinking was similar to the de-Baathification of the Iraqi army in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and the process generated similar results. There was a “significant deterioration of security throughout southern Afghanistan” as Warlords no longer had a formal role in the security operation, and this period saw a resurrection of the Taliban which continues to battle Coalition forces in 2017 (Green, 2017: 14). This was not the first, and definitely not the last demonstration of the importance of tactical and strategic symmetry.  
  
                                                     
131 Jones, S. G. & Munoz, A. Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defence Forces, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2010), pp. 1-115.  
132 Robinson, L. One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare, (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2013), p. 9. 
133 Eikenberry statement cited in Robinson, L. One Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American 
Warfare, (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), p. 12. 
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Appendix 4 
The ideal warrior diplomat: The POLAD and the SOF Operator 
Selecting the political advisor (POLAD) as the referent not only helps one illustrate the warrior diplomat concept, it’s also useful in addressing two questions which emerge from the previously accepted ‘militarization of foreign policy’ narrative. First, is the POLAD a token position aimed at placating an under-resourced and increasingly marginalised State, ultimately perpetuating the dominance of the military within diplomacy? And second, whether the POLAD, by design, represents command intent to State more than providing political guidance to the commander? In this scenario the regional command system becomes “a parallel foreign affairs system to State by interacting with foreign governments” (Special Report, 2017: 13). Put simply, channels of communication are often likened to a conduit, does the POLAD equate to a one-way valve? The following comprehensive assessment answers these questions illuminates the discussion and elucidates the position of this thesis. As a result of the U.S. governmental structure, conceived by the Founding Fathers to prioritize “checks and balances over efficiency”, the concept, and more so the practice, of interagency cohesion is often a point of contention and obstruction across the U.S. security apparatus (NDU, 2002: 1). Defence Diplomacy in the Long War demonstrates that relationship building and communication are essential to achieving cohesion.134 One example of cohesion is the cooperation and coordination between DoD and State manifests in the civilian political advisor or POLAD. POLADs and their military counterparts, the military attaché, have been connecting the two primary foreign policy agencies for over seven decades since U.S. diplomat Robert D. Murphy, under the direction of President Roosevelt, first served as an advisor to General Dwight D. Eisenhower during WW II.135 FDR established the role of the POLAD to bridge 
                                                     
134 Just as trust has multiple roles within the concept of defence diplomacy, similarly, cohesion incorporates 
two equal and necessary components: task and social; social cohesion is necessary to achieve task cohesion, 
yet task cohesion can also foster social cohesion. See: MacCoun, R. J. & Hix, W. M. ‘Unit Cohesion and Military 
Performance’, in National Defence Research Institute, Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy: An 
Update of RAND’s 1993 Study, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), pp. 137-165. 
135 Murphy wrote that: 
 “I was amazed in those first occupation days to discover how thoroughly the Germans had prepared for every phase 
of military government. It became apparent that they had drafted comprehensive blueprints long in advance to suit 
whatever conditions they might encounter in conquered countries. Years later, after the war, I glanced through those 
plans in captured documents, and noted that they were even more comprehensive than we had realized. I reflected 
ruefully that the United States Government might have practiced to advantage some of that German foresight. In our 
own early ventures in military government, Washington's neglect of this phase of waging war created unnecessary 
difficulties for General Eisenhower, and especially for me as his political adviser” (1964: 46) 
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the divide between the Foreign Service and the military with the understanding that it “gave him another way of executing his policies in the field” (NDU, 2002: 16).  75 years later, in 2017, there are 26 POLADs among the approximately 90 FSO’s advising U.S. military commanders, the leadership team around the SECDEF, the Office of the Service Chief and the Joint Staff as well as civilian agencies under the umbrella of DoD. According to State, these civilian roles make vital contributions in “strengthening U.S. national security by enhancing interagency cooperation and policy coordination” (N/A, 2017). POLAD’s fall under the remit, direction and oversight of State’s Political-Military Affairs Bureau, whose mission “is to build enduring security partnerships to advance U.S. national security objectives." The role of the POLAD endures because “[D]irect personal communication, even in a digital age, turns out to be critical in helping both organizations (State & DoD) cooperate effectively” (NDU, 2002: 16). An increase in State generated POLADs has occurred in conjunction with a significant increase in the DoD seeking advisory positions within State. The resulting interagency cohesion is central to a state’s WoG security strategy. POLADs provide broad political experience and relevant policy advice, as well as intimate knowledge of the AOR (JCS) or area of operations (AO-combat command) to complement the military’s existing cultural, political and historical expertise. For example, reflecting upon his arrival as POLAD to Gen. Eisenhower prior to Operation TORCH (the invasion of North Africa in November 1942, a pivotal juncture of WW II), Robert Murphy recalled that while he “was pleased to learn that the General's political advisers in London included experienced diplomats who knew France well. But even these capable men had no first-hand knowledge of Africa” (1964: 103). POLADs form a communication conduit to expedite, simplify and more importantly clarify the transfer of information of issues critical to the national security of the U.S. (most states have a similar advisor structure).136 POLADs draft briefings and other correspondence in a manner which is digestible to both State and the DoD, and often serve an external liaison role with international stakeholders. Although the communications component of the role is most often emphasized, the ability of the POLAD, and the military attaché, to absorb or reflect institutional culture is a desirable outcome of their engagement. Working daily with military personnel, especially high ranking personnel, expose POLADs to unique characteristics of military culture; a “culture that sometimes seems foreign enough to warrant opening an Embassy in the Pentagon’s lobby” (NDU, 2002. 1). However, Emma Sky, who deployed to Iraq in 2003 as a British civilian representative for the much-maligned Coalition Provincial Authority and later sever as 
                                                     
136 For a detailed assessment of the role a POLAD in the EU see: Terms of Reference: EUSR Political Advisor, 
European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, (2012) 
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a POLAD to General Ray Odierno, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, from 2007 to 2010, describes how she soon recognized the flexibility and adaptability of U.S. Forces, and to appreciate the Army’s “organizations, its bureaucracy, its leadership and its resources” and to identify “shared values and objectives” (2005: 41).137 This insight, including a greater comprehension of organizational culture on both sides, is fundamental to the optimization of these communication channels. For example, the Joint Risk 
Analysis Manual from the CJCS explicitly avows that it’s crucial for leaders to “use language that military professionals and civilian policymakers can understand in order to critically evaluate a situation” (2016: A-1). The Manual reinforces the idea that assessing and more importantly communicating of risk is an “essential” and “continual” process (Ibid). The Manual also provides a relevant example of the importance of civilian input to the upper-echelons of Defence. A good example on the concept in practice was the 2009 Afghan Surge. The ‘surge’ was a result of the CJCS assessing the relative strategic risks to U.S. interests and the relative military of the missions in both Afghanistan and Iraq.138 The Chairman (Admiral Mike Mullen) evaluated the military and strategic risk in Iraq had decreased and stabilized while it had elevated and continued to rise in Afghanistan. Based upon his collective risk assessment, President Obama shifted priority to Afghanistan and surged “40,000 more Soldiers and Marines-which increased military risk-to-force but was necessary to decrease military risk-to-mission in theatre and associated strategic risk” (2016: C-15).  In this example, civilian input in the Chairman’s decision-making process bolstered Admiral Mullen’s ability to balance often competing operational and strategic priorities. Relatedly, the POLAD would be able to communicate to the Head of Mission (the ambassador) the precise suite of likely outcomes: thereby allowing the ambassador to prepare the ground once the decision had been made and the policy had been officially articulated. However, some scholars (Randall, 1985; Satori, 2005; Trager, 2011; Weeds & Serafino, 2014; McManus, 2014) question the relationship between that of a good diplomat and a good advisor, focusing on the divergence between an autonomous and credible representative of the state, with the trusted advisor the Chief of Mission, Combat Commander or Head of state. Such a critique has merit, given the critical role of diplomacy in preventing, reducing and most importantly, succeeding in 
                                                     
137 Sky also identified and subsequently overcame a difference in culture between the US and British militaries, 
as well as between the British military and British FSO’s. Interestingly, she also noticed that the Arab, Kurds and 
Turkmen leaders she was in dialogue with in Kirkuk, had a comprehensive understanding of British culture and 
politics, a legacy of British regional post-WW 1 endeavors.  
138 Other Joint Staff members were tasked with assessing risks in other AOR to provide a comprehensive global 
risk assessment. This was a key development as a successful surge may have delivered results in Afghanistan 
whilst exposing US interests in other parts of the world. 
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warfare, and may subsequently provide justification “for leaders to separate diplomatic and advisory functions” (Lindsey, 2017: 545).139 The author uses this framework to explain why “leaders will tend side with their advisors more often than they side with their diplomats” (Ibid: 555). Yet the thesis argues that, a ‘foot in both camps’, civ/mil approach of the POLAD and SOF personnel not only overcomes inherent bias towards strategic/political objectives but also leverages his/her intimate knowledge of both strategy and operation to maximise their diplomatic output, as well as their advisory input. To summarize, the POLAD reports directly to the Head of Mission, which, under U.S. legislation, is an ambassador (civilian). His or her role is to improve civ/mil communication to ensure that military strategy corresponds with the political priorities of the government; ultimately delivering its policy objectives. An MOU between State and DoD recognises the valuable role POLADs provide their respective departments in assessing and articulating “the political implications of military planning and strategy and in serving as the principal source of counsel on international issues to their respective Commanders-in-Chief and Service Chiefs” (Marcella, 2008: 49-50). A report generated following the ‘2013 Conference on Interagency Cooperation’ explained that the POLAD enhances both State and the DoD. For State, the POLAD “provides a straight channel to top-level military command echelons,” and doe the DoD, “the officer provides insight into policy and the workings of the State Department, personal advice, and a conduit for expanding a commander’s influence” (Special Report, 2013: 3). Additionally, conference participants, comprising of former POLAD’s, ambassadors, current and former military personnel and FSO’s, agreed that  “[W]hile the formal job description for POLADs has not changed, the dramatic increase in their number and distribution throughout the military command structure—a significant thickening of the personnel connective tissue—has interesting implications for cooperation between the State Department and DoD” (2013: 4).140 This trend had continued, and the thesis views the POLAD as a vital node in the decision-making network,  one which “collectively aligns and coordinates information across and within echelons to ensure the coherence of the entire network” (King, 2017: 8). 
POLADs: Individual Relationships and Trust Networks 
                                                     
139 Lindsey writes that “Diplomats, unlike advisors, primarily serve to transmit messages to foreign 
governments. In an advisory relationship, leaders delegate the acquisition or analysis of information. In a 
diplomatic relationship, leaders delegate the transmission of information” (2017: 546).  
140 The report recommends that “the number of POLADs assigned to lower level commands should remain 
limited because of the overall limitations on the size of the POLAD corps” (2013: 4). 
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Existing personal relations generated through PME, military exchanges or prior coalition experience prove invaluable in both the form and function of inter-state (as well as interagency) security oriented cooperation based initiatives; be it formal alliances or ad-hoc coalitions. A 2013 conference report on civ/mil engagement concluded that “personal chemistry between the military commander and the POLAD” is essential because “if the right relationship or chemistry does not exist, the commander will at a minimum ignore the political advisor or work around the assigned officer” (2013: 11). Alexander and Thibodeau usefully illustrate this point with their analysis of Syria Transition Assistance Response Team (START), “an innovative model for diplomacy in dangerous environments” under the auspices of State (OIG, 2016: 8). START forms part of a multifaceted U.S. response to the Syrian civil war and its associated counter-ISIS strategy and integrates FSO’s, USAID, DoD and military personnel, as well as personal services contractors, “into a cohesive unit to provide humanitarian and transition assistance inside Syria and relief to Syrian refugees in Turkey” (Ibid). Alexander, who served in START, stressed that personal relationships within the team helped to consolidate the initiative from its inception. Trust networks were built on the foundations of previous interactions in similar situations, therefore START personnel “knew what to expect from each other,” and the “information-sharing, collaboration, and synchronization among people and organizations was immeasurable” (Ibid: 88).  Conversely when new personnel (either military or civilian) were assigned to START with no personal history with embedded staff, “personal trusting relationships had to be built before there was complete integration and collaboration” which undermined “the ultimate goal of whole-of-government collaboration and interagency synchronization and information-sharing” (2016: 88). Similarly, Green noted that although he was on his third tour in the Long War, and whilst he was eminently qualified for his role as an advisor in Village Stability Operations, he still had to “wear the rank of Lt. Commander” even though he was a Lieutenant, in order to carry some weight not just with his men but with other U.S. units ‘inside the wire’” (2017: 7). Despite indenting the importance, and perhaps a correlation between existing relationships and trust, the thesis recognises that the mere existence of a credible existing linkage is not enough to generate strategic or even operational outcomes. While Goddard (2009) and Grynaviski (2015) assert that one’s place in the network raises one’s value as diplomatic “broker” (2009: 250), the thesis emphasises that without the requisite skill-set, a well-placed ‘broker’ actually undermines the efficacy of the network. Therefore, a trusted diplomatic broker is credible, well placed, has a reputation of delivering results, and the ability to continue to deliver.  Establishing trust takes time, yet time in combat is a precious commodity and personnel, both military and civilian rotate through theatre quickly, staying several months to a year. Long 
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deployments strain the force physically and mentally as well as negatively impacting retention. Moreover, short deployments in high tempo theatres make it difficult to build trust with HN populations, for example, Mark Cancian identified the difficulty bridging the linguistic divide with “few troops speaking the language outside of a few foreign area officers” (August 2017). There are exceptions, with individuals such as Carter Malkasian demonstrating the positive impact of local knowledge, durable presence and domestic trust networks are to COIN strategy. Malkasian, a special assistant to the current CJCS, General Joseph Dunford, previously spent two years generating personal relationships and networks; engaging directly with the Karzai government and Coalition stakeholders on policy and strategy issues as a POLAD in Helmand province (Garmser district).141 In this role, Malkasian directly influenced policy and strategy within State and DoD, as well as commuting his vast field experience into director role’s with the Stability and Development Program at the Center for Naval Analyses (the think tank for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps October 2006 & 2009) and State’s Office of Overseas Operations (Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, 2012-2013). The diplomatic expertise of individuals such as Malkasian is invaluable to any security alliance as they engaged in the core elements of defence diplomacy from the platoon level through to the defence ministry, advising, influencing, building relationships, as well as communicating and representing the foreign policy of the state whenever they act in an official capacity.  Ultimately, evaluating the effectiveness of the POLAD program should be left to those involved on both sides of the exchange. 
“While only some military officers need exposure to State, most diplomats need exposure to the 
military” (Special Report, 2013: 5) Lieutenant General William Troy, Director of the Army Staff, declared the “Army-POLAD relationship is especially beneficial for the Army Headquarters functions as it focuses on “today’s fight,” building the Army of the future and crisis management” (2013: 8). For example, because the Army needs to communicate to a diverse audience of both internal and external stakeholders, the POLAD’s experience in matters and language of State enables the Army to “easily and naturally” disseminate its messages “without undue bureaucracy” (Ibid).  LTG Troy concluded that the POLAD augments the U.S. Army’s ability to deploy globally in MOOTW through the Office of the Service Chief by facilitating the core defence diplomacy initiatives such as counterpart visits, PME, training and assist (FID), and personnel exchanges. LTG Troy also praised the POLAD program for helping the Army to develop (prepare, train and even deploy) regionally aligned, mission specific personnel. “By linking back to the relevant combatant 
                                                     
141 Malkasian deployed as a POLAD to the Marine Commander in Iraq (2004-06 & 2007-08) as well as Kabul 
(2013–2014) where he first advised General Dunford, then Commander of ISAF. 
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command during active conflict,” the POLAD network ensures that everyone involved has a comprehensive understanding of the situation, in addition to clear mission objectives (2013: 9).  Another person eminently qualified to evaluate the impact of POLADs is General David Petraeus. Gen. Petraeus, who’s synonymous with COIN (with a legacy extending across the POLAD program), identified personality as an important component of a productive civ/mil relationship; equivalent to the requisite skill-set. Petraeus described the ‘ideal’ POLAD as “someone who can complement the military commander, complement his staff, and bring relevant experience and expertise to the table” (2013: 15). The former CENTCOM and ISAF commander emphasised the POLAD opened doors for the commander in State and relevant embassies, expanded the range and speed of available information, and helped the commander to generate understanding, and therefore support, for pursuing policies and programs which ran counter to State’s or the executive branch’s determinations. Petraeus noted that this ‘ideal’ POLAD required skill, initiative and a combination of “sympathy and understanding of the commander’s perspectives and intentions” (2013: 16). Drawing from his experience in the Long War, General Petraeus stressed that of all the qualities and capabilities of the ‘ideal’ POLAD, beyond his/her “general usefulness” in a combat situation, “possessing traditional diplomatic skills” are paramount (2013: 16).142 These traditional diplomatic skills revealed themselves to Petraeus who witnessed the “great value” of POLADs as liaisons between the Pentagon and State, between the regional command and the embassy, and by providing “personal advice to commanders”; as well as an often underappreciated “representational function” (2013: 15).  As discussed in section 1 (along with communication), representation is one of diplomacy’s key tenets and evidencing it reinforces the central argument of this thesis. Consider for instance, in a strategy meeting among Coalition stakeholders or with HN leadership, the demonstration of unity embodied by the presence of a civilian alongside senior military personnel is a powerful representation of the state’s WoG approach to security, as well as the equality of State and DoD. Military personnel also serve as representatives of the state, often in more overt manner; therefore, their ability to act, and to be seen as acting, in a manner acceptable to the HN is extremely important. For example, Wilson highlights that foreign military embeds (trainers, advisors, ect.) with HN institutions, insisting that personnel: 
 [D]isplay honesty and a high moral standard. Don’t give any reason for people to question 
your integrity as it will undermine your standing in the community, both in Australia and in 
your host nation … At all times you represent Australia ... Your behaviour is a direct 
                                                     
142 Petraeus also noted that “nothing replaces local language capability and local political and historical 
knowledge” (2013: 16). 
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representation of Australia to the people of the host nation … be conscious of the impressions 
you give to the local population (August 2017). Although no longer serving as a POLAD, Ambassador Butler prepared U.S. military personnel to work with U.S. embassies in Afghanistan. The ambassador recalled how personnel would question whether “there would be a State Department officer” and would highlight “all the (civilian) areas where such a person was needed to advise and guide the task force” (2017: 39). The ambassador highlighted a particular discussion with “a two-star Army general, a battalion commander in Afghanistan in the early years of that conflict noted the absence of the State Department in his province at that time, and explained how valuable POLADs and State-led provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) had been to him later on in Iraq” (2017: 39).143 More often than not, the ability of the POLAD to absorb and project culture, be bilingual (speaking the language of DoD/State), and bridge the organizational gap between the two foreign policy structures relies on individual experience either as an ambassador or deputy chief of mission and/or serving in the armed forces.144 Additionally, despite a perception that the ‘militarization of foreign policy’ universally diminishes State, participants in the previously mention 2013 Civ/Mil Conference acknowledged that if “there’s an asymmetry in the State-Defense exchange relationship, it’s probably too State’s advantage in terms of sending senior officers to DoD” because the majority of defence/military personnel serving in State are lower ranked and/or junior officers (Special Report, 2013: 11). Additionally, State’s Office of Inspector General Inspection of Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan report recognised the expertise POLADs brought to theater, declaring that in the absence of senior FSOs (ambassador, SRAP), POLADs would be “an adequate substitute” for senior civilian representatives (SCR) … could potentially replace the larger regional platform (2014: 9, 13).   Another key disclosure to emerge from the Civ/Mil Conference, in support of a common thread throughout this research project, was that individual personalities impact the 
                                                     
143 Select literature on Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Cowper-Coles, S. Cables from Kabul: the inside story of 
the West’s Afghanistan campaign, (London: Harper Press, 2014); Henrikson, A. ‘United States Contemporary 
Diplomacy: Implementing a Foreign Policy of "Engagement," in Kerr, P., & Wiseman, G. Diplomacy in a 
globalizing world: Theories and practices, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Kilcullen, D. The Accidental 
Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Moelker, 
R. ‘The Genesis of the “Dutch Approach” to Asymmetric Conflicts’, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 40, no. 1, 
(2014), pp. 96-117; Rietjens, S. J. H. ‘Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: Experiences from the Dutch 
Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan’, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 34, no. 2, (2014), pp. 173-207; 
Vogelaar, A. L. W. & Kramer, E. H. ‘’, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 30, no. 3, (2004), pp. 409-431. 
144 ‘Chief of Mission Authority’ dictates that all U.S government personnel and activities in a given country be 
approved by that country’s Ambassador. 
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effectiveness of the civ/mil relationship.145 The Special Report noted an intimate relationship between POLADs and the relevant military commander requires consideration of compatible personalities as well as professional experience” (2013: 10).146 A comprehensive RAND study demonstrates, through an analysis of 89 insurgencies since WW II, the importance of local expertise and how local populations are reluctant to trust foreigners who transition in an out of the area at regular intervals. Building relationships takes time and hard-won trust can be quickly eroded and difficult to re-establish when personnel are redeployed or end their tour. 147 Tom Ricks (2010) recommended the POLAD as uniquely placed to anchor these local trust networks as the POLAD’s combination of political nous and thorough understanding of military culture.  
 “The POLAD’s responsibility is to adapt to the specific environment. The good POLADs—as good 
diplomats—do that” (Special Report, 2013: 11) While the POLAD has become an accepted member of the national security apparatus, this thesis disagrees with the current system which prioritizes assigning advisors to senior military personnel at the strategic level. Recognizing the key role of the POLAD, the thesis stresses the need to expand the availability of POLADs to lower echelons of military command. Moreover, there is no shortage of State personnel seeking to serve in this unique, challenging and rewarding role. While an assessment of the literature available reveals the increased interest in advisory roles was primarily driven by financial incentives and pathways to career advancement, it’s important to highlight that an ability to develop a cross-agency skillset was the primary tenet of the 2010 QDDR. Nevertheless, it is the recommendation of this thesis, that a determined effort to deepen distribution through too personnel involved in operationalizing C2 will only enhance interagency cooperation, and would present a model to be replicated to the U.S.’ global security partners.  The thesis emphasises that POLADs should be understood as a particular entity within the civ/mil relationship at the core of defence diplomacy; and not an all-encompassing label for all civilian advisory positions. Sisley Huddleston (1954) defined diplomacy as the art of 
                                                     
145 See also: King A. ‘Why did 51st Highland Division Fail? A case-study in command and combat effectiveness’, 
British Journal of Military History, Vol. 4, no. 1, (2017), pp. 44-70. 
146 Conversely, conference participants identified instances where seniority (former ambassador) was considered 
as a pseudonym for experience, which was often not the case. This illustrates that previous engagement between 
senior military and FSO personnel is not a substitute for the skill and acumen of a dedicated political advisor. One 
recommendation from the 2013 conference was the need to develop a selection criterion for future POLAD 
deployment however, personality and compatibility, which has been identified and a key to success, may be 
neglected in a rigid, quantitative selection process.  
147 See: Gompert, D. C., Gordon, J., Grissom, A., Frelinger, D. R., Jones, S. G., Libicki, M.C., O'Connell, E., Stearns 
Lawson, B. &. Hunter, R. E. War by Other Means- Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for 
Counterinsurgency: RAND Counterinsurgency Study-Final Report, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 
pp. 1-519.  
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lubricating the wheels of international relations” (Quoted in Freeman, 1997: 100). In a statement of perfect (if somewhat fortunate) symmetry, coordinator of the previously mentioned PM, John Finney, declared that “POLAD’s help people from different universes to pull together. They’re the lubricant that makes the cogs of two different institutions work together” (NDU, 2002: 10).   
 Figure 4: Illustrating the strategic and tactical ‘reach’ of the POLAD.  Source: Special Report: POLAD Conference, Washington D.C, (May 10, 2013), p. 8. Other related and noteworthy mechanisms of the U.S. WoG COIN strategy, and more evidence of civ/mil synchronicity are the Ministry of Defence Advisors (MoDA) program and the Joint Interagency Coordination Group(s) (JIACG). Both of these interagency mechanisms facilitates cooperation, information sharing and coordination from strategic planning through to operationalizing the strategy. The U.S. MoDA program operates globally across the five U.S. Combat Commands AOR’s (European, African, Pacific, Central, & Southern Command). Commencing in 2011, the Afghan MoDA program partners DoD civilian staff with their counterparts in the Afghan Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) to 
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generate long-term personal relationships and institutional concordance.148 Like the POLAD, MoDA’s bring unique capabilities and knowledge of the U.S. system to the nascent Afghan departments to facilitate progress across a spectrum of activities including defence policy and strategy, resource procurement and logistics through to Intelligence and interagency operations. The MoDA’s objective is not to recreate the structure and culture of the DoD as this would be unrealistic, but to mirror the core competencies of the DoD, building the capacity of institutions which is key to improving operational coordination between Coalition defence ministries and the HN in the short-term. In the long-term, creating legitimate (transparent and accountable) institutions are a key component of progressing towards the political objective of the US: complete transfer of responsibility for Afghan security to the GIRoA.  Erik Leklem, who deployed as a MoDA to the Afghan MoD in 2011 as part of ISAF’s Training Mission stressed that enhancing “the professionalism of the Afghan military and civilian leaders of the MoD and MoI are critical” to achieving ‘Inteqal’ (the Dari term for the transition of security responsibilities from coalition forces to the ANSF). As an advisor, Leklem’s mission consisted of: “one, to assist very capable Afghan leaders like General Akramyar in developing a “partnered” approach to transition planning with NATO, and two, to advise him on how to develop his organization and staff to conduct such planning in the future” (June 25, 2011). While achieving these outcomes is significant, this thesis identifies a parallel, and vital, outcome of the program. MoDA’s demonstrate to Afghan stakeholders the importance of civilian control of defence which is an unequivocal requirement in developing the legitimacy and accountability necessary to achieve success in the Long War. Relatedly, and mirroring discussions elsewhere in this document, the former MoDA also witnessed first-hand the reciprocal nature of the various mentoring, advising, training missions incorporated in defence diplomacy oriented engagement. Leklem revealed that he frequently learnt from his Afghan counterpart (General Akramyar):    
Whether it is better understanding Afghan culture and history, or learning about the 
constraints on planning in a society suffering from over 30 years of ongoing conflict, our 
partnership enables me to advise my NATO and U.S. colleagues on how we could work more 
successfully with our Afghan partners.  It is humbling and inspiring to watch the general and 
                                                     
148 DoD personnel selected for the MoDA program already possess a valuable skill-set however nominated 
MoDA participate in “an 8-week training course designed to enhance mentoring, advising and capacity building 
and provide orientation on ministry and command structures and processes” as well as a ‘probationary’ period 
under the guidance of a senior defence official or US Operational Commander” (Confidential CENTCOM internal 
document, 2015). The Afghan MoDA program grew for 25 personnel in 2011 to over 70 personnel in 2016. For 
more detail see: US Department of Defence, Ministry of Defence Advisory Program, Defence Security 
Cooperation Agency. 
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his colleagues surmount the numerous challenges they face in this counterinsurgency (June 
25, 2011). Leklem’s recollection is supported by Dan Green, who recalls that his primary goal as advisor to Special Operations Task Force-South East was to articulate the “Byzantine world of Afghan politics and the complexity of the insurgency” which included “ethnic differences” and “tribal histories,” the “survivor’s mentality” of the Afghan people, and finally the “zero-sum” nature of Afghan governance (2017: 23). Despite progress being made in terms of building relationships and trust, founded on an understanding of the cultural nuances (on both sides), improvements ‘can’ be made. For instance, the burning of the Quran in an incinerator at Bagram AFB in 2012, demonstrated the ability of ‘small’ culturally oriented mistake was able to undermine hard-won gains in the Coalitions population-centric COIN effort. A more recent example of the value of understanding HN culture occurred in September 2017 as the U.S. military distributed leaflets, a common method for communicating with local populations in their native language, explaining how the Taliban had hijacked Islam for their nefarious objectives. However, the leaflets contained an image of a white dog (an animal viewed by many Muslims as unclean) emblazoned with the Shahada, the most common recitation of faith for Muslims. Maj. Gen. James Linder, a U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, apologised for the mistake, noted the U.S. respected the Afghan people and promised to “hold the responsible party accountable” (Faizy & Bengali, 2017). However, analysts lamented that “[T]he foreign forces don’t have any idea of what are the values of the Afghan people;” while a Taliban suicide bomber attacked Bagram as a direct response to the defamatory leaflet according to a Taliban statement (Roggio, 2017). Moreover, the leaflet drop broke an agreement between NATO commanders and the Afghan Defence Ministry who were to consult each other on all propaganda operations before implementation. An Afghan Defence Ministry spokesman declared this to be “a very serious issue … it is natural when such mistakes take place that the people will change their mind and oppose foreign soldiers” (Wellman, 2017). Mistakes such as this, while disconcerting, are occurring less often, in part because of improvements in U.S. civ/mil interagency cooperation. The second coordination mechanism, the JIACG, provides a means to integrate civ/mil campaign planning efforts at the strategic and operational levels for the combatant commander (PACCOM, CENTCOM ect.). Interagency platform such as the JIACG were prioritised post-9/11 after investigations revealed a culture of interagency competitiveness and information siloing/stove-piping. Similar to all the mechanisms under the umbrella of defence diplomacy, JIACG generates transparency through open, structured channels of communication. DoD, State 
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and national security-related agencies share information campaign planning, sensitivities, operational and support requirements, capabilities, as well as limitations. In theory, a JIACG ensures unity of effort by matching commander’s intent to the foreign policy objective. A JIAGC 
Fact Sheet released by the U.S. Joint Operation Command details how JIACG’s “serve as a coordinating body among the civilian agencies in Washington, D.C., the country ambassadors, the combatant command’s staff, and other multinational and multilateral bodies within the region” (2005: 1). Moreover, because JIACG’s provide a communication conduit to international stakeholders, the messages communicated are consistent and non-contradictory. JIACG staff also regularly ‘wargame’ crisis scenarios to develop timely and effective interagency responses to non-conventional national security threats. Opportunities to red-team or similar real-time scenario exercises are invaluable, with Brigadier McDaniel recognizing that the “relationships built through joint exchanges proved extremely important in the initial combat phase” (2017). Norman Wade’s Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine: Guide to Joint, Multinational and 
Interorganisational Operations articulates the theory behind these cooperation-oriented mechanisms such as JIACG. Wade’s focus on collaboration demonstrates that it’s more than the latest ‘buzz’ word in 21st-century national security parlance. Wade presents the narrowing, and eventual elimination, of the civ/mil divide is priority number one. Wade explains: 
The most productive way to look at this relationship is seeing the comparative advantages of 
each of the two communities—military and civilian. While the military normally focuses on 
reaching clearly defined and measurable objectives within given timelines under a C2 
structure, civilian organizations are concerned with fulfilling changeable political, economic, 
social, and humanitarian interests using dialogue, bargaining, risk taking, and consensus 
building. Civilian organizations may have a better appreciation of the political-social-cultural 
situation, and have better relief, development, and public administration. They may be more 
adept at negotiation, bargaining, and consensus decision making, thus potentially acting as 
agents of change within that society (2015: 6-7 & 8-9). Despite accumulating evidence of the preponderance of civilian advisory roles, some claim that “[M]ainstream military culture resists the strategic significance of military advisors and often relegates this mission to a second-tier status” (Stringer, 2016: 86). For example, “the training, processes and culture within the military are attuned to supporting formal interaction between politicians and commanders at the top” while FSO’s rely on information and interactions from personnel in situ (Agnew, 2015: 9). The thesis concludes that effectively managing the civil-military relationship requires a more horizontal interface, creating what King describes as a deep and enduring interdependence between commanders across levels” (2017: 8). Additionally, the thesis asserts that establishing platforms for collaborative effort will, 
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overtime allow stakeholders circumvent cultural and structural barriers. The mechanisms discussed above as well as the Joint Task Force (JTF), Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-International), Combined Joint Operation Command’s (CJOC), Interagency Communication/Intelligence Hub’s, Stabilization Advisors (STABADs), Ambassador’s Country Command and numerous NATO/UN Interorganisational bodies, generate unified action in planning and execution with interagency and multinational partners by building and sharing a common understanding of the strategic purpose and end state; developing and articulating relevant objectives. Moreover, collaboration during strategic planning stages ensures a common understanding of the operational environment which ‘should’ facilitate broad spectrum capability harmonization to achieve national security objectives. 
Special Operations Forces: The Tip of the Diplomatic Spear Special Forces (SF), or more broadly Special Operation Forces (SOF) are the ‘tip of spear’ in U.S. global CT/COIN operations and thus play a vitally important, if at times misrepresented, role.149 In 2015 SOCOM was designated the DoD coordinating authority for trans-regional terrorism, which tasks it with synchronising all the efforts of the various US combat commands around the world (CENTCOM, AFRICOM, PACOM, ect., as well as Joint Special Operations Command-JSOC). Despite its reputation as a clandestine, independent entity, with President George H. W. Bush declaring “JSOC is awesome … they’re really good” (May 2008),150 JSOC does not operate autonomously and remains under the authority of the regional commander, such as Gen Votel in CENTCOM. Moreover, no operation will be conducted without the express permission of the U.S. ambassador to the country of concern. Speaking at The Aspen Institute Security Forum in July 2017, Raymond “Tony” Thomas, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) sought to dispel any notion that SOCOM (and SOF) were global policemen. Lt. Gen. Thomas stressed:  
we are not a panacea, we don't do anything by ourselves and we aren't doing things that aren't 
highly supervised … we are very, very relevant to most if not all the national security challenges 
(faced by the US), and … I think we're a great return on investment when you consider for all 
                                                     
149 The two terms are often used interchangeably yet there are key distinctions between them. In terms of the US, 
Special Operations, or more accurately SOF include any unit from the 4 branches of the US Armed Forces (Army, 
Navy, Air Force and Marines-the Coast Guard is the 5 branch but does not have a SOF unit) that fall under SOCOM. 
Special Forces refers to a specific unit within the various service branches such as the much heralded Green Berets, 
Delta Force & Ranger Regiment (Army), 1st Marine Raider Battalion or the 1st and 2nd Recon Battalion and Navy Seal 
Team units. Each of the US coalition partners have SOF capabilities. 
150 Excerpts from Bob Woodward's Oval Office interviews with President George W. Bush, The War Within, The 
Washington Post, (May 20-21, 2008). 
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our varied activities right now 8,000 people in 80 different countries around the world we're 
doing that on 2% of the DoD budget and 2% of the DoD manpower (July 21, 2017). SOF operate and conduct forward planning guided by 5 principles, with each having an important relationship with the core premise of this thesis. The first of these principles, or truths, is that ‘humans are more important than hardware,’ emphasising that “the right people, highly trained and working as a team, will accomplish the mission” (Hutto, 1987: v).151 Commander Thomas emphasised that SOCOM is focused on reducing its operations tempo by leveraging others, whether it's “our other partners in DoD, our allies, or our interagency partners we're actively trying to do that to reduce the tempo while we prepare for other things” (July 21, 2017). The ubiquitous SOF have a prominent role to play in defence diplomacy. The U.S. Army describes the role of SOF as maintaining alliances, building partner nation capacity, developing surrogate capabilities at the operational and tactical level (ADP-3-05, 2012). SOF pursues these objectives through a suite of activities such as: direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CP of WMD), CT, COIN, unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), security force assistance (SFA), information operations (IO), military information support operations (MISO), civil affairs operations (CAO) (JP 3-05, 2011:  II-5, II-19).152 
The Role of SOF in Contemporary Political Warfare: Phase Zero Operations 
“Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In broadest 
definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short 
of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range 
from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as an example, the Marshall 
Plan), and ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ 
foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground 
resistance in hostile states” (Keenan, 1948).  In a State Department Planning memorandum in 1948, George Kennan defined political warfare as “all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives” (1948). Six decades later, the U.S. Army’s Unconventional Warfare doctrine identifies political warfare as the “aggressive use of political means … to persuade other actors to act in concert 
                                                     
151 Truth 1: Humans are more important than hardware; Truth 2: Quality is better than quantity; Truth 3: Special 
Operations Forces cannot be mass produced; Truth 4: Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created 
after emergencies occur; Truth 5: Most special operations require non-SOF assistance. 
152 In October 2017 MISO returned to its former (and widely accepted) appellation of PSYOP (psychological 
operations). See also: Myers, M. ‘The Army's psychological operations community is getting its name back’, 
Army Times, (November 6, 2017).  
Appendix 4-16 
 
 
with U.S. national objectives (FM 3-05.130: 233).  Using the elements of national power (i.e., diplomacy, information, military, and economics-DIME), states have adapted (some more quickly and to a greater effect than others) to 21st-century conditions (unconventional/irregular warfare), by developing and implementing strategies and achieving objectives which could have previously only been achieved through traditional warfare. While non-state entities are also acquiring the capacity to engage in political warfare, more often than not it is the sovereign state which is executing political warfare strategies to combat a peer’s strengths in order to gain geopolitical concessions, advantages, and advancements. Moreover, as a result of unconventional conflicts, political warfare is played out in that space between diplomacy and open warfare, where traditional statecraft (DIME) has proven to be inadequate, overly-cumbersome, difficult to fund and action, and where conventional military options either cannot, or should not be used to achieve a state’s objectives. Therefore, political warfare aligns with defence diplomacy as both the activity (political warfare) and the mechanism (defence diplomacy) link DIME to generate unity of effort.  More importantly for the purposes of this study, Madden, Et al. define political warfare “as the art of making and breaking coalitions” (2014: 2). Effectively deploying political warfare in this space allows the U.S. (or other states) to mitigate/offset partner states whose core objectives conflict with its own, even if the outcome is the reduction in a decision not to engage, a reduction in engagement or a termination of the partnership should priorities diverge too much. For example, ineffective partner capabilities can be addressed through a range of activities. However, behaviour by coalition partners which falls outside the bounds of normative standards can undermine intra-group confidence and external legitimacy. Madden, Et al. note that while “monitoring, screening, and institutional reform” can effectively address bad behaviour “they should also be weighed against the policy goals” of senior coalition partners (2014: 3). Additionally, as it pertains to COIN, “political warfare is a population-centric engagement, that seeks to influence, to persuade, even to co-opt” (Votel, Et al., 2016: 102). Like other peer nations, the U.S. generates and deploys proactive political warfare activities, as well as developing reactive methods to counter increasingly adaptive adversaries. Whether labelled Information Operations, Psychological Warfare, disinformation campaigns or propaganda, the ability of states to deploy these essential non-violent persuasive/coercive actions has been impacted by 21st century ICT which has ‘levelled the playing field’. While the objectives remain unchanged over time, the target audience has grown & the means to reach them have improved exponentially; the challenge for states such as the U.S. is how to effectively counter nefarious intent in an already saturated medium to reach a hyper-informed public. Political warfare epitomises the contemporary WoG approach to national security and DoD remains firmly in 
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control of the concept at the strategic and tactical level; although some have challenged the DoD’s leadership role (Livermore, 2017).   The thesis sought to identify how SOF operationalised Keenan’s political warfare within a WoG framework to mitigate threats before they spiral beyond their ability to respond? In the SOF community, the integration of diplomacy and warfighting before the point of crisis is called phase zero (Johnston, 2017: 77).153 Phase zero is all activities that happen before the first phases of traditional military operations that serve to shape the environment and prevent or deter future conflicts from emerging or escalating (Wald, 2006). Phase zero actions are the primary mechanism for the buttressing of the global SOF network. These bi-and/or multilateral operations aim to enhance partner force interoperability (capabilities and strategy), shape the operational environment, prevent the escalation of armed conflict, to progress U.S. interests. Phase zero operations are therefore part deterrent, part preparatory, generating the unity of effort required to react in a timely manner if armed conflict does erupt and increased military intervention is required. SOF executes the majority of these phase zero activities in sovereign nations under the auspices of the U.S. ambassador or chief of mission and are in direct support of the objectives of his or her diplomatic mission. In this synchronized WoG environment, SOF and the diplomacy-oriented inter-agency work hand and hand to achieve U.S. national, and Coalition/regional security interests. Johnston asserts that “the integration of SOF and American diplomats is a new reality in the post 9/11 national security environment” (2017: 78). The thesis identifies several other questions which need to be answered to establish best practice. For example, how can the U.S. engage more effectively in political warfare? What structural changes will need to be made for the U.S. to conduct agile political warfare, and what will be the role of SOF? And how does SOF minimize unintended consequences of UW, such as empowering possible future adversaries? How do SOF reframe what constitutes strategic power and strategic risk in a complex and unpredictable world? How can these risks, opportunities, and threats be communicated across USSOCOM and other government organizations in a common language to ensure mutual support? What is the role of SOF as part of a WoG approach to mitigate 
                                                     
153 JP5-0 Joint Operation Planning defines “Shaping or Phase Zero (0) operations as “Joint and multinational 
operations—inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and various interagency activities are 
performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and 
allies”; however, it concludes that shaping occurs throughout ‘all’ the phases of operation planning, (2011: 
xxiii); The remaining phase are: Phase 1:Deter the Enemy, Phase 2: Seize the Initiative, Phase 3: Dominate the 
Enemy, Phase 4: Stabilize the Environment, Phase 5: Enable Civil Authority; See: a Notional Joint Combat 
Operation Model (Figure V-4 in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, (2017: V-8). 
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threats before they spiral beyond their ability to respond? The following discussion addresses these questions while illustrating the diplomatic credential of SOF.  
SOF: Equal, parallel and/or complementary diplomacy 
Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations articulates the role of SOF in a WoG approach to U.S. national security. 3-05 states that SOF “work in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments” (2014: ix) therefore it’s important that SOF are “[M]ore than just hunter-killers, the U.S.’s best-trained commandos are increasingly military trainers, nation builders and diplomats” (Hennigan 2017). Most Western governments since 9/11 have accepted that a WoG/whole of nation approach marks the most effective path to effectiveness governance/national security. Although the form may differ, at its core, a WoG approach relies on a well-led mosaic of agencies, skill sets, resources, and effort to achieve consistent and effective governance in all areas of responsibility” (Ricks, 2017:15). The 2010 Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review outlines how WoG efforts are necessary to address global uncertainty and instability, as well as the ability to shape the environment(s) to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives (QDDR, 2010). ‘Comprehensive Deterrence’ is WoG activity which aims to maintain “the positional advantage of the U.S. by preventing an adversary’s action through the existence of credible physical, cognitive and moral threats by raising the perceived benefit of action to an unacceptable risk level” (ASORF: 2017). Policymakers formulate strategy, design capable military forces and operational concepts which generate the type of comprehensive deterrence needed “to prevent conflict and defend U.S. national interests” (Haddick, 2017: 1). In practice, WoG comprehensive deterrence allows the U.S. “to simultaneously defend the homeland; conduct sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and, in multiple regions, deter aggression and assure allies through forward presence and engagement” (National Military Strategy, 2015: 6).154 Transregional aspects of competition and conflict require new planning models for comprehensive deterrence, new operational constructs, new ways of thinking, and a fully integrated partner network to rescale security challenges before they escalate (the so-called gray-zone) and at a much lower level of national effort. This is not a new approach, former Secretary of State George Shultz compelled U.S. diplomats to spend much of their time “gardening,” in reference to a strategy of consistent engagement with its allies, especially in the 
                                                     
154 For a recent assessment of comprehensive deterrence at a strategic and tactical level see: Haddick, R.’ How 
Do SOF Contribute to Comprehensive Deterrence?’, JSOU Report 17-11, (MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special 
Operations University Press, 2017), pp. 1-92.  
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early stages of a crisis.155 Nor is it new for a broad range of U.S. representatives to engage in diplomacy. What is new however is that military actors, such as SOF, are being recognised as central to U.S. diplomatic efforts. Take, for example, comments from former Secretary of State Clinton who announced that SOF needed to be as comfortable drinking tea with tribal leaders as they are raiding a terrorist compound. We also need diplomats and development experts who understand modern warfare and are up to the job of being your partners” While it is true that SOF is engaged in highly kinetic, ‘tip of spear’ direct actions, former U.S. SOC Commander, Admiral William McRaven, emphasises that the direct action piece of what we do is a very small part of the portfolio” (June 2013). However, it must be acknowledged that direct action such as surgical strikes are “designed to shape the operational environment or influence selected target audiences in support of broader strategic objectives” (ARSOF, 2014: 11). Building and maintaining relationships has always been part of SOF “operational art” (Cleveland, Et al., 2016: 11), however, the SOF network has amplified and expanded its focus on cultivating relationships by using training and “soft” power initiatives to build partnerships between SOF forces and key local constituencies” in the 100 or so countries in which SOF are present (Kashkett, 2017: 23).156 Given their expanded role which integrates economic development, public health and humanitarian assistance, SOF efforts inevitably stray into the space traditionally occupied U.S. FSO’s. Rather than being a source of competition or tension however, the thesis stresses that it’s vital for U.S. diplomats to see SOF “as a highly adaptable singularly capable natural ally, and as a primary partner in the civil-military diplomacy of the future” (Ibid: 27). A recently released report from McQuaid, Et al. which assessed the U.S. WoG strategy to counter al Qa’ida, recognised the SOF network efforts “to forge relationships, build trust, create a common perception of the enemy, and generate access” through its “military diplomacy and civil affairs operations” (2017: 21). As an enabler for the resident embassy and FSO personnel, some describe SOF as operating in “a dimension that shadows traditional diplomacy” (Votel, Et al., 2016; Kashkett: 26). Moreover, “[A]t a time when the most pressing danger to U.S. national security comes from … asymmetric threats … and when so much of our diplomacy revolves around building coalitions … special operations will inevitably have an increasingly central role in U.S. foreign policy” (Ibid: 26). SOF provide national decision makers “strategic options for protecting and advancing U.S. 
                                                     
155 ‘A Conversation with George P. Shultz’ w/Richard Haass, Council on Foreign Relations, (January 29, 2013). 
The Secretary articulated that ‘gardening’ is “one of the most underrated aspects of diplomacy” and an 
essential “way to keep weeds from overwhelming you is to deal with them constantly and in their early stages.” 
156 See also: Turse, N ‘American Special Forces are Deployed to 70 Percent of the Worlds Countries’, The Nation, 
(January 5, 2017). “SOCOM is willing to name only 129 of the 138 countries its forces deployed to in 2016.”  
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national interests without committing major combat forces to costly, long-term contingency operations (Votel, Et al., 2016: 102).157 This option is especially important in unconventional conflicts in which “political, economic, informational, and military competition are more fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war” (Ibid: 102). Operating in this space allows rivals to achieve their strategic objectives in conditions that do not constitute armed conflict, from war to peace and the ‘gray-zone’ in between, and therefore “do not evoke a military response” (Burkhart and Woody, 2017: 21). Given the dynamic, multifaceted and multi-domain nature of unconventional conflicts, the role and potential of SOF as a purveyor of defence diplomacy is clearly evident. SOF liaison officers (LNOs) directed by SOCOM, are embedded in more than two dozen U.S. embassies (Loveall, 2015). Moreover, under the guidance of former SOCOM Commander Admiral McRaven, the U.S. has embarked on an ambitious mission to develop a “global SOF network to link together the capabilities, expertise and collaborative efforts ... to build their capacity and fostering long-term relationships” through a cross-Coalition training strategy (Kashkett, 2017: 23).158 Griffith (2017) details how he personally achieved this through weekly meetings, “the Brigade Commander’s ‘SOF Shura’” which served as a vehicle to disseminate operational messages across eastern Afghanistan as well as outreach to the broader SOF community. The thesis identifies that the higher average age of SOF personnel compared the ‘regular’ armed forces enhances their diplomatic persona. Kashkett likens the multiple complementary qualities of SOF operators with those of the ‘traditional’ diplomat, identifying that “[L]ike the ethos of career diplomats, the SOF philosophy recognizes the value of nurturing ties to foreign cultures, and acknowledges the stability value of addressing the critical needs of civilians” (2017: 23). For example, COIN/CT demands close diplomatic-military coordination in pre, active and post kinetic operation environments; in so doing, diplomacy is used to ‘sell’ the operation to a variety of military and civilian stakeholders. SOF are often perceived as somewhat cavalier operating with a certain swagger, and that swagger extends to how SOF achieve their objectives. However, research reveals that this ‘Hollywood’ image of SOF is far from the truth as SOF are bound, and operate by the same Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) as conventional forces. If SOF’s evolving role, from unilateral ‘raiding 
                                                     
157 See also: USSOCOM, United States Special Operations Command Special Operations Forces Operation 
Concept, (May 2013), pp. 1-28. 
158 The SOF network is a synchronization mechanism tasked with “training SOF partners (Kashkett, 2017: 23); The 
Operating Concept defines the Global SOF Network as “a globally linked force of SOF and their strategic partners 
– joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, non-governmental, commercial, and academic” (2013: 2). 
While the “SOF Operator is a vital element of the Global SOF Network but cannot succeed without the enabling 
forces, capabilities, and infrastructure that also comprise the network” (Ibid: 4). 
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operations’ to capacity building missions, is to progress, the perception of an ‘unrestrained’ actor needs to be overcome. That’s because the relationship-building rests primarily on establishing trust and the best mechanism to generate trust is to be predictable-operating within predetermined, identifiable parameters, i.e. rules. Admiral William McRaven bluntly declared that “the first time you violate that trust with one of your counterparts whether it's an ally, whether it's a partner, whether it's a general purpose force, will be the last time they'll work with you” (June 2013).  
SOF: Consummate tactical diplomats (biē & mētis)159 Civ/mil practitioners in Afghanistan who engage, and build capacity with a HN understand the importance of trust, and it’s a priority for both sides. The Coalition must trust that their HN partners have both the will and the capacity to achieve ‘the’ objective.  Conversely, HN partners must trust that the information, that is training and assistance offered at a political and/or military level, disseminated is the ‘right’ information for the HN context. The ‘right’ information includes not only the ‘how’s’- structure, order and discipline (shoot, move and communicate), but also the ‘why’s’ linking universal values (not Western values or U.S. values) - transparency, inclusiveness, human rights ect. The country team in the embassy is a key component in this process as identifying who work with requires specific knowledge that the in situ operator can deliver. As highlighted throughout Defence Diplomacy in the Long War and this document, there are challenges to State and the FSO community in retaining primacy over the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and one could present SOF diplomatic ‘credentials’ as a ready-made replacement; however, that is not what is argued by this thesis. Despite the fact that SOF operate across the world with a 7-1 personnel ratio in comparison with their colleagues at State, SOF does not possess, nor can it possess, the capabilities available through the resident embassy, such as: maintaining a high-level dialogue with HN’s, assisting in-country U.S. citizens or engaging in the various components of public diplomacy (Kashkett, 2017). The thesis presents SOF as equal, parallel and complementary diplomatic entity. The thesis determines that SOF’ diplomatic capacity reinforces its place at the ‘tip of the spear’ in COIN. Freidman dictates that insurgencies slowly drown in a rising tide of defeat across multiple dimensions, amongst the population, on the battlefield, and in their policy goals” (2014: 84). SOF is one of the few DoD populations with a history of recognizing the importance of understanding local cultures and languages to the success of their mission sets. Lessons learned 
                                                     
159 There are two approaches to warfare. One is to be strong and powerful. The other is to be smart and 
cunning. The Greek terms for these concepts are biē and mētis respectively. 
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from the past 16 years of conflict demonstrate the need for relevant and theoretically informed linguistic, cultural knowledge and skill-based competence. However, DoD training and education policy, strategy, and program development have not produced, on a consistent basis, the requisite levels. The DoD has created a program referred to as LRC (language, region, and culture), a comprehensive approach that aims to generate the critical knowledge and skills necessary for success. However, promoting an acronym and attempting to bring together disparate linguistic, regional expertise, and cultural knowledge and skills without a formal, systematic learning approach supported by relevant performance assessments, credible faculty, and learning technology is no easy task. As a result, military and civilian personnel are often left deficient in those qualities demanded by the contemporary operational environment. Never-the-less, the LRC is a genuine effort “to promote a synergistic and meaningful language, region, and cultural learning experience” (Greene Sands, 2016: xi).  Kenneth Poole identified a metric for success for the LRC (and similar programs) involved not only developing “foundational and transferable capabilities,” producing SOF that are better prepared to function tactically, operationally, and strategically, but also “the ability to apply them to missions involving culturally complex situations and interactions” such as Afghanistan (2016: vii). During the Long War, twenty-four Coalition members deployed SOF to the Afghan theatre and the challenge for US/Coalition SOF continues to be able to “simultaneously confront the Taliban’s military arm and its political strategy in a way that was supported by Afghan communities” (Green, 2016: 12). With so many Coalition SOF units in theatre, this thesis recommends that developing a ‘universal’ LRC, which could be disseminated through PME, personnel exchanges or combined training exercises, would achieve the fore mentioned objective. Additionally, would it be possible to replicate an Anbar Awakening strategy in Afghanistan by leveraging enhanced cultural awareness and effectively mapping the ‘human terrain’?160  The Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Afghanistan demonstrate the under-reported non-kinetic cultural, linguistic and political capabilities of SOF. VSO combines the strategic tools described previously, such as UW, SFA and FID to generate “a comprehensive COIN methodology, which focuses on leveraging traditional village-level constructs against anti-government forces” (Deep, April 2014). VSO also illustrate how SOF, perceived (at least publicly) 
                                                     
160 For example of the Anbar Awakening see: Eisenstadt, M. ‘Iraq Tribal Engagement: Lessons Learned’, Military 
Review, (September/October 2007), pp. 16-31; Searle, T. R. ‘Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: The Critical 
Role of Special Operations’, Joint Force Quarterly, Iss. 50 (3rd Quarter 2008), pp. 62-66; Green, D. R. ‘The Fallujah 
awakening: a case study in counterinsurgency’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 21, no. 4, (2010), pp. 591-609; 
Defence Diplomacy in the Long War discusses the concept and role of Human Terrain Teams on pp. 103, 126. 
the concept of human terrain. 
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as a kinetic, direct-action force, demonstrates its relationship and trust building capabilities, as well as its ability to represent, communicate, reduce tensions (locally & regionally), gather and disseminate information; which are timeless characteristics of ‘a diplomat.’ Daniel Green, who served in a PRT, and a Tribal Advisor with Special Forces (SEALs & Green Berets) in Uruzgan Province described the VSO, a program which was adopted in 2010, as a focused effort “to combat the Taliban insurgency holistically with a bottom-up approach that enlisted local communities both in their own defense as well as in their own governance” (August 2017).161 In contrast to direct-action and clearing operations by SOF, the VSO initiative saw SOF embedded in villages, partnering with locals to improve the security situation on a village by village basis. Each village team, made up of a small number of operators, worked closely with village elders to facilitate conflict resolution between tribes and villages, empower local leaders through regular Shura’s (meetings) to resolve community problems and then train military-age males to serve as Afghan Local Police (ALP) (Green, 2017: ix).162 These locally-derived security units were primarily defensive in orientation, and great effort was made to present these units as village defenders rather than a ‘militia’ which evoke a legacy of abuse and exploitation (Robinson, 2013). The ALP undermines the insurgency and terrorist groups at an operational and strategic level by targeting them militarily while simultaneously addressing political, economic and tribal issues. In parallel to their security force training programs, Green recalls that SOF “created a network of political advisers from the village to the national level in Afghanistan called augmentation teams that mentored Afghan officials while encouraging positive governing behaviour” (August 2017). The personal relationship generated through VSO established conditions on the ground whereby communities are empowered to defend themselves politically and economically as well as militarily. Having commanded both ISAF and CENTCOM, Gen. Petraeus overtly championed the role of SOF in halting Taliban momentum, through target assassinations and village clearance operations. However, Petraeus also prioritised efforts for SOF to train, equip and assist local Afghan police units (armed village security forces) too stand-up and eventually substitute U.S. presence with effective Afghan Special Operations capabilities.163 Apart from the tactical 
                                                     
161 Since 2001, Daniel Green has held several senior advisory positions dealing with the Middle East, Central 
Asia, and NATO/Europe in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the State Department. 
162 These forces were logistically supported by the Afghan government and organized to protect their home 
villages through a series of checkpoints, active patrolling and other security operations. 
163 In late August 2017, Afghan President Ghani, finally activated the Afghan National Army Special 
Operations Corps. Last Sunday, President Ghani activated the Afghan National Army Special Operations Corps. 
Gen. John W. Nicholson, commander of ORS called this milestone “an essential step in growing the Afghan 
National Army.” ‘Commander Statement’, Press Conference on New US Policy, NATO Resolute Support 
Mission, (August 24, 2017; Zahid, N. ‘Afghanistan’s Special Operations Forces Transition from Division to Corps’, 
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benefits of improving local force capacity, Green believes these initiatives are intended to both “empower locals to protect their own territory and to give them an economic alternative to working for the Taliban” (August 2017). The VSO was a mechanism designed to deliver outcomes on multi-levels. For example, the initiative improved military and security capabilities, but also by building resilient governing structures including local policing by local police personnel, VSO improved the local political environment. Having served in both kinetic and non-kinetic roles in the same province (Uruzgan), Green’s recollections illustrate the progress that can be made when built on solid foundation of personal relationships and comprehensive understanding of local and regional dynamics. Lt. Col. Michael Waltz, who served with Green in Afghanistan, recognises the capacity of one officer “to make a tremendous difference” strategically and tactically “when empowered to apply lessons learned” (2017: viii).164 After a decade of civ/mil deployment in Afghanistan, Green is a vehement supporter of the positive role of SOF and VSO and argues the program “could be applied to other theatres of war” (2017). This thesis agrees that fundamental theoretical principles which underpin VSO success could be at best universally applied, or at a minimum provide the basis for preliminary expeditionary actions. Not surprisingly, an increased role for SOF has led to calls for additional oversight mechanism for this indispensable U.S. military asset. In 2012, Congress passed a defense bill that mandated confidential quarterly briefings from the Pentagon outlining counterterrorism operations and activities involving SOF. In 2017, Congress directed the Pentagon provide monthly briefings to the Senate and House armed services committees (SASC & HASC). Micha Zenko provides evidence of the key role of civilians inside this most kinetic element of the U.S. armed forces, noting that “JSOC is generally represented by a group of civilian military officials from the office of the assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low-intensity conflict, specifically sections J-37 (special operations) and J-39 (global operations)” (August 3, 2017). More evidence of the civ/mil integration can be seen through the creation of the Pre-Strike Pause Cell, which consists of a handful of civilian and military analysts who can ‘pause’ the targeting of particular individuals due to the viability of Intel or the impact on strategic objectives. The Pre-Strike Pause Cell increases the civilian role in pre-strike tactical oversight.  The thesis predicts that increased oversight, ongoing accountability under the LOAC, and an improved understanding of the scope on SOF activities will further entrench SOF in defence 
                                                     
VOA, (August 20, 2017): Byman notes that despite the welcome addition of Afghan SOF Corps, “these special 
operations forces represent only 17,000 troops of the country’s 300,000-strong military” (August 22, 2017) 
164 Lt. Col. Waltz wrote the ‘Foreword’ for Green’s in the Warlords Shadow. 
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diplomacy oriented engagement.165 Yet it recognises that championing SOF must not create what Johnston labelled and “authorities trap,” whereby mission success undermines comprehensive WoG Phase Zero operations, and which could obscure other strategic threats (2017: 91-94).166 The thesis presents State and SOF as the two equal blades of the diplomatic spear, with each focused of the apex of mission success, with each providing an indispensable support role for the other. 
 
Figure 5: The qualities of the ideal ‘warrior diplomat’ (compare with Nicolson’s ‘ideal diplomatist’). (Berg-
Knutsen & Roberts, 2015: 43) 
                                                     
165 There is growing disquiet regarding the pressure on SOF personnel in the stability operations and TA3E 
missions. For example, Dalton stresses that “stretching SOF blunts the sharpness of the tool … aligning security 
cooperation missions, and particularly the Train-and-Assist components of these missions, to SOF may be too 
convenient. However, such siloing would be short-sighted” (2017: 2). The thesis acknowledges that such 
concerns are justified, which is why the nascent SFABs are a welcome addition to US/Coalition capabilities. 
However, much like the debate over the status of State versus DoD, SOF are the best option to engage with 
HNs across the spectrum of capacity building and stability activities. 
166 Johnston argues that the CT-centric OEF-P led the chiefs of mission and geographic combatant commanders 
to focus on countering Islamic terrorism, and not necessarily addressing the widespread symptoms of instability 
in the Philippines that fostered the rise of Islamic extremism in the first place. The former was a CT campaign; 
the latter would have been a phase zero campaign: this is the “authorities trap” (2017: 94); The 6-month siege 
of ISIS aligned militants in Marawi during 2017 demonstrates the detrimental after-effects of the ‘authorities 
trap’ to US national security.  
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Appendix 5 
The Privatization of Defence Diplomacy: Risks and Rewards Non-state actors (NSAs) are the unit of analysis for this appendix, and are included to present further evidence of the mutually supportive nature of diplomacy and defence. Likewise, it illustrates that defence mirrors or parallels the evolution in contemporary diplomacy. This appendix serves as an introduction to concepts which will form areas of future research. There are parallels between the expansion and privatization of diplomacy at a systemic, macro level and the micro defence diplomacy level. Diplomatic scholars have been debating the privatization of diplomacy at a systemic, macro and micro level for over two decades and it is perhaps unsurprising to find evidence of a parallel expansion and privatization within defence diplomacy. Two brief examples of privatization are presented to demonstrate the opportunities privatization offers, providing further evidence of the intrinsic complementary nature of diplomacy and defence. A broader network has positively influenced outcomes for diplomatic practice in the twenty-first century and similar benefits can be identified in defence diplomacy. The following two examples demonstrate that privatization presents opportunities and positively influence outcomes for diplomacy in general and defence diplomacy in particular. However, it also illustrates a point argued throughout this document; that tangible results are often just the tip of the defence diplomacy spear, and that success on the battlefield can run counter to strategic objectives. The formal inclusion of NSAs in the policy/strategy decision-making process is relatively recent, post-Cold War phenomenon, but it’s indicative of the embrace of multi-lateral security oriented institutions and the WoG approach too national security. The first example is purposely brief because much has been written on the influence, role and ceremony of these events, however, it illustrates the scope of defence diplomacy oriented engagement. The Shangri-La Dialogue is presented to illustrate what the thesis labels the privatization of defence diplomacy. Formed off the back of the 2000 Munich Conference of Security Policy, which is the oldest (1963) and most prominent of these privatized events, the Dialogue debuted in mid-2002.167 The Shangri-La Dialogue Asia’s premier exercise in defence diplomacy is funded, organised and marketed by the private sector, primarily the International Institute of Strategic Studies, defence 
                                                     
167 The Munich Security Conference (MSC) is the world's leading platform for debates on international security 
policy. With over 500 official participants and 300 observers at the annual conference provides a unique 
atmosphere for frank, private and mostly off-the-record exchange on present and future security challenges 
and solutions. In addition to the annual conference, the MSC Foundation regularly organizes high-profile events 
around the world. These events include summits and roundtables dedicated to a particular thematic focus like 
European Defence, Energy Security, Cyber Security, and Health Security. For an example of the output of these 
multilateral multitrack dialogues see: Munich Security Conference Report. More European, More Connected 
and More Capable, Munich Security Conference & Hertie School of Governance, (2017), pp. 1-43. 
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force equipment contractors and MNC’s (Capie & Taylor, 2010: 361). The annual conference brings together hundreds of participants including, defence ministers, civilian and military officials, journalists, academics and associated stakeholders to create an effective Track-two security mechanism which is unique to the South East Asian region. Increasingly, government officials are representing their states, therefore, Rolfe describes the Shangri-La Dialogue as a Track-1 or 1.5 event. The Friends of Europe Security Jam is another annual Track-1.5 defence diplomacy event which brings together national Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs (in official capacity), Nobel Peace Prize laureate’s, NGO leaders, and thousands of experts in a massive online brainstorm covering topics from counter-terrorism to global governance, cyber-security and the future of security forces. The second example is the increase of private security contractors (PSCs or Private Military Companies-PMC) in the realm of defence diplomacy. PMCs such as Blackwater, Sandline, Executive Outcomes, AirsCan Inc. are synonymous with contemporary irregular conflict. Private paramilitaries are not exclusive to the Long War, nor is their participation in defence diplomacy oriented engagement. However, if state-centric defence diplomacy is relatively inconspicuous in analyses of unconventional conflicts, the current role and/or potential of private contractors in this space is at best scant. The thesis proposes that in general, the highly developed skillset of security contractors could enhance the ability of deployed civ/mil personnel to ‘map the human terrain,’ engage with HN forces and local populations and provide the enduring presence necessary to progress Coalition Long War objectives.   Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) has been deployed by the U.S in a military/diplomacy role since 1995 during the conflict in the Balkans (Dunigan, 2011: 91-96). The rise of PMCs is fuelled in part by domestic pressure for states (especially the U.S.) to reduce the cost in physical treasure of engaging in expeditionary military interventions. While Hills argues that the appearance of U.S. defence contractors who negotiate agreements directly with foreign governments (especially emerging democracies) advertising expertise in areas such as force management and modernization allows the USG to “project its influence more cheaply and efficiently that defence diplomacy permits, especially when strategic issues do not align with existing policy” (2000: 62).  Another explanation for the emergence of PMCs is a theory called “The Transformation Paradox’ which posits that “if RMA continues along its current trajectory and military forces become smaller, more technology reliant, and less dependent on individuals with high levels of physical fitness and the ability to face physical danger, private militaries will become even more competitive with state ones” (Housen, 2002: 5). Regardless of the driving factor(s), early ‘qualified’ successes have led to the replication of the PSC model in states where the U.S. has 
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intervened.168 For example, the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is a quasi-commercial operation acting under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior and provides security to contractors on a fee-for-service basis. Documentation form Danger Zones Jobs, a leading private sector recruiter, list contractor numbers from 1st quarter FY16 at approximately 30,400 DoD contractors in Afghanistan under OFS/ORS (Zenko, 2017). While the DoD reports there were 23,525 operational contractors working in Afghanistan as of July 2017 (DAS-State 2017). Private contractors have provided support for Coalition forces since the early days of the Long War. At peak utilization, PSCs “constituted a larger occupying force in Iraq and Afghanistan than did U.S. troops” (Dunigan, 2011: 1). It’s not only private armed combat personnel who play a significant role. For example, Leidos Innovation Corp, a U.S. company, secured a $728 million, three-year deal in August 2017 to work on helicopters and planes for the Afghan Air Force and Afghan Special Mission Wing (DoD-CR-164-17, 2017). And yet despite the number of contractors in Afghanistan declining over the past year, from 26,435 in the third quarter of fiscal 2016 to 23,525 in the third quarter of fiscal 2017 (9,436 are American citizens, 8,873 are third-country nationals, and 5,216 are Afghans); since the inauguration of Donald Trump, calls to privatize the Long War have increased (DAS-State 2017). Prominent figures in the military contractor industry, former Blackwater CEO Eric Prince and Stephen Feinberg, owner of DynCorp International (Cerberus Capital Management), a company which holds a number of major U.S. government security contracts, have leveraged previous personal contact with the president to engage in direct consultations with President Trump and his national security team. Prince has speculated whether victory in Afghanistan could best be pursued by “consolidating authority into one person to lead all coalition efforts” (May 2017). The ‘Viceroy’ would be “a federal official who reports to the president and is empowered to make decisions about State Department, DoD, and intelligence community functions in-country (Gray August, 2017). Gray notes that Prince had been ‘shopping’ a proposal labelled “A Strategic Economy of Force” across D.C. which includes “sending 5,500 contractors to Afghanistan” to embed with ANSDF under the direction of the ‘Viceroy’” (August 2017).169 Similarly, Feinberg was reported to have spoken with SECDEF Mattis and National Security Advisor Gen H.R. McMaster where he pitched an expansion of DynCorp current training role in Afghanistan into a paramilitary force under the direction of the CIA (Landler, Et al., 2017).170  
                                                     
168 Although MPRI improved security and stability in the Balkans since its first contract was granted in January 
1995, the company was accused of inevitably contributing to “humanitarian atrocities” by the Croatian Armed 
Forces (Dunigan, 2011: 93-95). 
169 Despite the evidence which suggests otherwise, Prince defended his position in an interview with Defense 
One, declaring “I’m not talking about an expansion of contractors, I’m talking about a rationalization.” See: 
Weisgerber, M. ‘The Global Business Brief’, Defense One, (August 24, 2017). 
170 Gray writes that former senior adviser Steve Bannon and the presents son-in-law Jared Kushner have 
advocated the privatization agenda of Feinberg and Prince. 
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Feinberg, and Prince, as well as those who support the privatization of warfare such as Republican congressman Dana Rohrabacher, identify lower costs as a motivating factor: lower costs politically, and lower costs in terms of blood and treasure (August 2017). Others have not waited for the decision to be made, developing an operational and legal framework to guide and provide oversight for a ‘private army.’ Phil Walter proposed a comprehensive selection process, unlike the Prince model, “for any function that is not inherently governmental … allow only former members of the U.S. armed forces or U.S. government civil servants with appropriate training and experience to be hired into the majority of positions, and all of the contractors should be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice…” (September 2017).171 Having already highlighted the significant role of reputation and emotion as well as domestic pressure in the foreign policy decision-making process, the appeal of outsourcing the Long War is evident.  In a world of for-profit soldiering, shareholder interests, and corporate culture, PSC’s facilitate ‘experimentation’ without condemnation. Although private armies/militias are an integral element of the history of the US, contemporary PMC’s are the progeny of the massive U.S. military-industrial-complex. PMC’s will remain in theatre for the foreseeable future with Prince asserting that “markets have a way of providing things when the government can’t” (Quoted in Stossel, October 2017). Prince makes an important point, and the U.S. government can exploit the contract tendering process and open markets to drive down prices and cap expenses, while competition drives innovation.  There are certainly questions to be answered pertaining to the moral or ethical justification of outsourcing a state’s national security to private contractors, however, this document is not a vehicle for this discussion. It acknowledges the primacy of the debate and accepts that while “contractors can be effective, it may not always be pretty” (Dunigan, August 2017). Similarly, while it’s clearly demonstrated that contractors could fulfil the kinetic objectives of U.S. COIN and CT; their ability to communicate and represent the USG is dubious. This thesis argues and has demonstrated the diplomatic credentials of armed forces personnel as legitimate representatives of the state. Who would a ‘private army’ be representing? Especially when this army contains ‘soldiers’ from third-party nations; that is-states not involved in the Coalition. Moreover, as a revenue-generating entity obliged to fulfil its contractual requirements, what is the incentive for contractors to engage in the relationship and trust building activities presented in this document beyond the those needed to deliver operational success? Moreover, research reveals the difficulty regarding C2 in coordinating military and contractor operations (Cotton, Et al., 2010). How would the difficulties be 
                                                     
171 See also: Department of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Commanders of the Combatant Commands, (Washington 
D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008), pp. 1-8. 
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exacerbated when substituting the Combatant Command with the embassy? Furthermore, Afghanistan is not the ‘Wild West’, as PSCs operate under U.S. and international guidance and standards, as well as licencing restrictions and structural mechanisms tasked with providing C2 and oversight (DAS-State, 2017). However, two challenges stand out among many in terms of privatization of defence diplomacy. Firstly, how to overcome a history and culture of plausible deniability for both the PSC and the state. Secondly, and more importantly for this thesis, would PSCs be willing, or indeed able, to fill the void created when the current civ/mil apparatus is exchanged by private companies in complex COIN operations. What will be the national security outcomes for invested state’s when stakeholder interests are supplanted by shareholder interests? This thesis concludes that PMCs will endure by proving “comparatively cheap and rapid solutions in warzones, while side-stepping messy political and international ties,” PMCs will endure, therefore, countries such as the U.S. will continue to outsource aspects of its national security (Narwold, 2017). However, the thesis posits that the potential of PMCs to complement a state’s defence diplomacy oriented engagement requires further investigation. Moreover, the thesis speculates that if the recently established (yet to be deployed) SFABs do not deliver as expected (hoped), then decision-makers may be more amenable to a more mature, unbiased discussion on the privatization of defence diplomacy.  
 Figure 5: Contractor Demographics in Afghanistan 2008-2017 (DAS-State, 2017: 1) 
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 Figure 6: Comparing U.S. Troops & Contractors numbers (Byman, 2017). 
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Appendix 6 
Alternate tools of State: Public Diplomacy During the Long War  The purpose of this appendix is to highlighted the many, diverse and innovative methods of diplomacy employed by State post-9/11 which both parallel and complement State’s defence diplomacy oriented engagement. It demonstrates that, despite operating with limited resources, State has made an invaluable contributed to U.S. national security by progressing its broader War on Terror (WoT) and Long War objectives. Additionally, it demonstrates that State, similar to the DoD, can develop and pursue a multi-track strategy, through both inter-agency and independent State initiatives, as part of the U.S. WoG approach. Summit diplomacy has often taken centre stage during the WoT and diplomacy’s moment in the spotlight leads to heightened expectations and often criticism. Despite the continuous work undertaken by FSO’s on a daily basis, the headline grabber is generally the summit where the world’s leaders and senior policymakers gather to solve global problems. A survey of the summits convened over the past 16 years is instructive as it highlights the pervasive nature of contemporary diplomacy, not only for the summit itself as the embodiment of diplomatic practice but also for the prominent role of diplomacy in pursuing the summit’s recommendations. Perhaps not surprisingly, the majority of the recommendations emanating from the various summits are pursed through the good offices of State (Foreign Ministries), however they also illustrate a focus on cross-cultural engagement which: a) began well before the WoT but has gathered pace since 2001, and b) was discussed repeatedly in both the research monograph and this paper. The following brief examples of WoT-oriented summits demonstrate the significance, utility and scope of this mainstay of traditional diplomacy. Firstly, the Australian government hosted the ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ CT summit in June 2015. The two-day diplomatic gathering brought together ministers, ambassadors, academics and CSO’s as well as key experts in the technology sector with representatives from Google, Twitter and Facebook also in attendance. (Clark, 2015).172 At the conclusion of the summit the Attorney-General, the Hon George Brandis QC declared governments work collectively with businesses and CSOs’ to “promote our own narrative, highlighting the values of our societies –peace, respect and social inclusion” (June 2015). Secondly, the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee 
                                                     
172 Attending the summit were ministers from Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Laos, Vietnam and New Zealand as well 
as the ambassadors from the U.S., Britain, Iraq and Canada; One of the most prominent annual summits on the 
topic of CT is The World Summit on Counter-Terrorism, convened by the International Institute for Counter-
Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel. The forum celebrated its 17th year in 2017 and brings together global 
policymakers, leaders in defence, intelligence and policing, academics and security professionals. Although this is 
‘must attend’ event, and is supported by the government of Israel, it is similar to the Shangri-La Dialogue in that is 
privately organised and funded.  
Appendix 6-2 
 
convened a ministerial level summit in July 2015 aimed at ‘Stemming the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters’ where they reached an agreement on a “proposal to better promote universal values and to work closer with Internet service providers” to counter extremist propaganda (UN CTC, July 2015). Thirdly, President Obama assembled sixty world leaders, during February 2015 in Washington D.C., for the ‘Summit on Countering Violent Extremism’ attended by members of the coalition against ISIL. At the conclusion of the summit, President Obama announced a three-phase strategy to combat violent extremism (CVE), all of which are under the auspices of State and are diplomacy orientated (Office of the Press Secretary, February 2015). The first priority is a continuation of the program to train allies to fight terrorists, secondly to create a counter-narrative using technology and people-to-people dialogue to cross cultures and thirdly, initiate development programs that focus on individual economic empowerment and improving education.  The final example is the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), which is a joint initiative of State and the Turkish Foreign Ministry launched in 2011.  The GCTF is a ministerial level, summit orientated institution whose mission is to support the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UNCTS 2015). Through regular meeting and its various working groups, the GCTF brings together policy-makers, CT practitioners and subject matter experts from around the world. The GCTF works closely with the United Nations and other organisations at an international, regional and sub-regional level to pursue its long-term mission of “preventing, combatting and prosecuting terrorist acts, and countering incitement and recruitment” (GCTF Website). As mentioned previously, the dominant theme of the majority of these summits, more so since 2009, has been countering or preventing the spread of violent extremism, a mission which prioritises cross-cultural engagement. A primary engagement tool of State ids public diplomacy. In February 2002, a Gallup poll found that only 33% of the populations of predominately Muslim countries had a favourable opinion of the U.S. (Beers, 2002)173 and a PEW Research poll found “only 2 percent of British Muslims agreed with the statement that the U.S. supports democracy around the world” (Djerejian, 2003: 15). More alarming were the results of a 2005 Lowy Institute poll which revealed that more Australians felt threatened by U.S. foreign policy than were worried about Islamic fundamentalism (Cook, 2005: 1). Polling such as this highlight “the way in which foreign publics interpret the values, motivations and qualities” of others “can create an enabling or disabling environment” (Leonard, 2002: 49). It is therefore not surprising when Hocking claims that communication with the public on foreign policy issues been prioritized since 9/11 (2004: 149), or when van Ham and Berridge acknowledges that public diplomacy “has become a major instrument in ... the so-called War on Terror” (2010: 164; 2003: 441). As the first 
                                                     
173 The poll revealed some alarming results with Kuwait, Morocco and Saudi Arabia, long-term U.S. allies polling at 
28%, 22% and 18% respectively. 
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U.S. bombs fell like unseasonal rain onto the Tora Bora Mountains in October 2001,174 former UN Ambassador and Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP), Richard Holbrooke declared: 
Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or -- if you really want to be 
blunt -- propaganda. But whatever it is called, defining what this war is really about in the minds 
of the 1 billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historic importance (2001)  In spite of the priority placed on selling the war, the “compassionate hegemon” stumbled in its initial forays, effectively drowned out by the bombing campaign (van Ham, 2003: 428).175 The U.S. government established the Office of Strategic Information (OSI) to sell the war, however it was shut down in early 2002 when it was criticised for being an “Orwellian” propaganda tool of the Pentagon.176 Kenton Keith, the Director of U.S. Information Centre in Islamabad, acknowledged that the Bush administration “dropped the ball” in regards to their public diplomacy efforts in the early stages of OEF (Quoted in Sharp, 2003: 446).177 In response, President Bush “would send media officials to Britain and Pakistan to explain the anti-terrorism fighting to foreign audiences” (Ibid).178 The U.S. government realised it had a communications problem and commissioned a number of investigations to identify how it could better transmit its policies and values around the world, particularly to Muslim majority nations.179  As part of its non-kinetic efforts early on in the WoT, the Bush administration embarked on a recruitment drive to enhance its ability to talk to foreign publics.180 The West, and in particular 
                                                     
174 By the 14th of October, one week into its air campaign, coalition aircraft had dropped over 1,500 bombs and 
munitions of various types. Initial targets prioritised anti-air equipment (surface to air missiles, early warning 
radars, C3, aircraft and airfields), before transitioning to tanks and training sites once the airspace was secured 
(Ballard, Et al. 2012, 54; Wright, Et al., 2010, 64). 
175 The U.S government set about rebranding itself “as a compassionate hegemon rather than a global bully.”  
176 Muravchik states that the OSI was destined to fail because of its operational remit; “by combining the tasks of 
public relations with those of covert operations, (the latter) would thereby taint the former.” (2002: 25). 
177 See also: ‘Coalition Tries to Inform the International Community’. The Daily Herald, Chicago Illinios. 
Newspapers.Com. (November 23rd, 2001).  
178 The Coalition Information Centres (CIC) were established by the Department of State to counter misinformation; 
Pesto, H. (2010). op. cit. The CIC also initiated a program called the ‘Initiative of Afghan Women’ which was designed 
to facilitate the entry of women into the post-Taliban government. (2002: 76); van Ham, P. op.cit. The ‘instant 
response forces’ would “neutralize negative information and news” 24 hours a day. (2003: 436); Muravchik, J. op. 
cit.  For Muravchik, the CIC was established “to publicize our side’s war aims and to provide instantaneous rebuttal 
of enemy claims about civilian casualties or battlefield.” (2002: 26). 
179 The studies included: “The Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information 
Dissemination” (2001). Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition; Technology and Logistics; “Building 
America’s Public Diplomacy through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources” (2002), a report of the U.S. 
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy; “Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public 
Diplomacy” (2003), the report of an independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations; “U.S. 
Public Diplomacy” (2003), by the U.S. General Accounting Office; “Strengthening U.S.-Muslim Communications” 
(2003), from the Center for the Study of the Presidency; “How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy” (2003), by 
Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, published by the Heritage Foundation; “The Youth Factor: The New Demographics 
of the Middle East and the Implications for U.S. Policy” (2003), a Brookings Institution study by Graham E. Fuller. 
180 The US formulated it policy to neutralize and change the negative perceptions of the ‘Arab street’ “by a focused 
effort of public diplomacy” (2003: 428). 
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the US, implemented a region-wide campaign to sell brand America to the Muslim community in the hope that, even if no-one is buying, then they might at least have a better understanding of the product.181 President Bush recruited Charlotte Beers, a former advertising executive as the Under-Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Summoning her advertising past, Under Secretary Beers commissioned public service announcements such as ‘I am an American’ which would highlight the multicultural aspects of life in the U.S and capture “the essence and value of U.S freedom and democracy” (van Ham: 2003: 434).182 Beers also championed innovative publications such as Muslim Life in America and other forms of “mass communication including advertising spots, international radio broadcasting networks” and a partnership with the Smithsonian Institute to create virtual reality tours of American suburbs (Snow, 2002; Beers, 2002). Under Secretary Beers oversaw the creation of the Council of American Muslims for Understanding, designed to educate a domestic and international audience “about the many important achievements of Muslims in America and throughout history” (2002). State increased its public diplomacy budget by 5.4% in FY 2003 and the department augmented its educational and cultural exchanges such as the Fulbright Scholarship program.183  The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World released another important public diplomacy document during the initial stages of the WoT titled Changing Minds, 
Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World. The Advisory Group was established on the advice of Secretary of State Colin Powell and its mandate was to advise the Department of State on methods to improve the administration use of public diplomacy. Changing Minds, Winning Peace was highly critical of the entire structure of public diplomacy in the US.184 Radio Sawa (together), formerly Voice of America (VOA), and the al Hurrah (the free) television station were developed by the State to initiate the younger generation 
                                                     
181 Muravchik argues ‘it’s not our brand, it’s their buying habits.” (2002: 29); See also: President George W. Bush. 
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 
11. 20th September, 2001. The American Presidency Project; This assumption of “Islamic fundamentalists with a 
passionate hatred of everything Western” oversimplifies the motivations for al Qaida according to Barkawi and 
Laffey because it ignores the long history of interconnection and mutual constitution out of which bin Laden’s 
ideas and organisation was produced.” (2003: 347); Richards suggest that neoconservatives answer the ‘Why do 
they hate us’ question by claiming that “Muslims hate the United States because we have been successful and they 
have failed (2003: 2). 
182 van Ham claims that although the ads were destined for the domestic market as a way to boost patriotism, 
there were also part of a broader exercise to reposition and recharge the ‘American’ brand.  
183 While this year on year increase sounds encouraging, Melissen points out that the U.S. Department of State 
allocates 1% of its total budget towards public diplomacy, and the US “compares favourably with other countries.” 
(2011: 13). 
184 Some of the Advisory Groups criticisms included: The entire “apparatus of public diplomacy has proven 
inadequate…a system that has become outmoded…requires an immediate end to the absurd and dangerous 
underfunding of public diplomacy in a time of peril lacking both strategic direction and resources.” (Djerejian, 2003: 
8). 
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of the ‘Arab street’ “into American culture and winning them over to American values” (Dalacoura, 2005: 964).185 Some have criticised the Under Secretary and her office for having little impact in America’s battle to defeat international terrorism, for example, Haris Pesto claims that the main product of her office was a twenty-five-page pamphlet titled ‘Terrorism Network’” (2010: 74). While Melissen claims that this period in U.S. public diplomacy was “infused with corporate advertising and marketing approaches” which weren’t configured to the complexities “of transnational relations” (2011: 3).186 In 2014/15 the budget for the Broadcasting Board of Governors which oversees all broadcasting of U.S. programs across multi-formats, totalled US$ 733.4 million, with US$ 152 million directed to states at the forefront in the WoT (2013: 2, 10).187 However, Radio Sawa had been criticised for concentrating too much on the music and not enough on the message.188 In Diplomacy by Other Means Mark Leonard claims, that initiatives such as Radio Sawa and the BBC World Service are about as useful and dropping anti-Osama bin Laden leaflet-bombs from the sky over Afghanistan (2003: 51).  Differences in culture can be a corrosive factor in the WoT and cultural diplomacy can assist in both the mediation of differences and as a mechanism for imparting a message about ‘us to the other’.189 Pigman states that governments, global corporations, IGO’s, NGOs and CSO’s all use cultural diplomacy “as part of a broader public diplomacy campaign” to overcome differences which can lead to alienation and aggression.190 Students travelling to the U.S. have risen 72% in 15 years to a total of 886 052 in 2013/14, while the number of American students studying abroad has “more than doubled” to 289 408 in 2013/14 according to the Institute of International Education which is supported by State’s Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs.191 This 
                                                     
185 Leonard claims that the government monitored talkback was replaced by “Brittney Spears and the Backstreet 
Boys” (2002: 56). 
186 Melissen does however state that “nation branding efforts based on corporate sector techniques and highly 
centralized public diplomacy practices, do not exclude governments from learning from the more enlightened 
principles of ‘new public diplomacy’” (2011: 12). 
187 Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq are the top three locations for broadcast funding; See also: University of Maryland 
with Zogby International. ‘2010 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey’,  Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development. 
2010), pp. 1-93. The Arab Public Opinion Survey contains over 30 pages of questions related to viewing and listening 
habits of people throughout the Middle East a would provide invaluable insight for policy-makers when designing 
initiatives and allocating funds.  
188 “The view of the Advisory Group is that Sawa needs a clearer objective than building a large audience…that it 
can change attitudes of Arab listeners toward the United States.” (Djerejian, 2003: 30). 
189 According to Cohen the “role for contemporary diplomacy: to work on the boundary between cultures as an 
interpretive and conjunctive mechanism” (1999: 16). 
190 Cultural diplomacy is not necessarily issue specific or government orientated and therefore Pigman claims that 
“cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy should be considered very distinct, even if overlapping spheres” (2012: 
181) 
191 See: Institute for International Education. (2014). ‘Open Doors 2014: A 15-Year Snapshot’; Institute of 
International Education. (2014). Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange; Institute of 
International Education. (2014). ‘Open Doors Data: International Scholars: All Places of Origin, 2003. Institute of 
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represents a massive turnaround from the low period during the 1990’s where public and cultural diplomacy programs and funding were cut dramatically. Cull reveals that budgets for exchange programs were reduced by a third during the 90’s (2012: 182).192 Globally, governments and CSO’s recognise the importance of educational exchanges as a vehicle for cross-cultural pollination. These exchanges take the form of initiatives such as the Erasmus program in the European Union, the Rhodes Scholarship at the University of Oxford and the Fulbright program in the U.S. The Fulbright scholarship programs which have operated since 1946 are fostered “through direct relationships between U.S. embassies and counterpart foreign ministries,” facilitating the participation of approximately 310 000 students, scholars, teachers and professionals who have become ‘Fulbrighters.’193 Some have argued, “the fight against terrorism has strengthened state authority” as a population turns to its government in times of crisis (Kleiner, 2008: 337). Melissen recognises that “the state is more resilient than is sometimes suggested and one should not underestimate the innovative capacity of state-based diplomacy” (2011: 3). While the WoT has both challenged, re-evaluated and some may say reinvented the role of foreign ministries (MFA’s), the events on 9/11 and The New Embassy Security Act of 1998 have transformed many U.S. embassies into “command posts in the War on Terror.”194 Some embassies now resemble fortresses and the security of infrastructure and staffers are prioritised over “operational effectiveness.”195 The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy has recognised the negative impact these monoliths have on home nation populations and have recommended that embassies become more accessible in their outer perimeters to encourage interactions and allow “visitors to unescorted access within” that area.196  There are examples of less extravagant embassies such as the British embassy in Kabul which was unavailable to occupy in late 2001 and therefore the diplomatic staff were forced to live in shipping containers (Berridge, 2011: 6). The British experience was duplicated in Iraq in 2003 however; the shipping containers and a ‘flat-pack’ prefabricated building was soon abandoned for the relative safety of the ‘green zone’ (Berridge, 2012: 154-155). The number of 
                                                     
International Education. (2014). ‘Open Doors Data: International Scholars: All Places of Origin, 2014.; Institute of 
International Education. (2014). ‘Open Doors 2014 Regional Fact Sheet: Middle East and North Africa.’  
192 The situation was so dire according to Cull that he titles this chapter in his book, The Tragedy of American Public 
Diplomacy. 
193See: Institute of International Education. ‘Fulbright.’ also http://eca.state.gov/fulbright/facts-and-common-
questions; ‘Fulbrighters’ is a term used to describe a graduate diaspora of the Fulbright program; U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Public Diplomacy. ‘Executive Summary’ (Attiah, 2014: 3-5). 
194 ‘Embassies as Command Posts in the Ant-Terror Campaign’ A Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate. (December 15, 2006). The New Embassy Security Act was created following the twin 
attacks on the US embassies in Dar Es Salam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in November 1998. 
195 Berridge, G. R. (2011: 6). 
196 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. ‘Executive Summary’ op.cit. pp. 3, 6. 
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military and intelligence personnel working within embassies and consulates has also increased during the WoT although the U.S. in particular has a history of embedding intelligence officers in its overseas missions. Berridge cites the Church Commission report tabled in 1976 which concluded, “more than a quarter of all U.S. diplomats posted abroad were members of the agency” (CIA) which also controlled most diplomatic communications (Ibid: 21).197 Bull claims that the contemporary U.S. embassy can be overpopulated with diplomatic staff, military and intelligence personnel, Treasury and USAID representatives, and various advisors (2012: 167). Paralleling the expansion of embassies, MFA’s, those bastions of state-centered traditional diplomacy, have incorporated many new front-line services to combat the global terrorism threat.198State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism was established “to forge partnerships with non-state actors, multilateral organizations, and foreign governments in the struggle against the threat of terrorism at home and abroad.”199 The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) under the direction of the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy is a potent public diplomacy mechanism by which State aims to counter anti-American messages across the digital spectrum.200 However, the problem of public diplomacy in the WoT is not necessarily, how it has been practised but what its intensions have been. Former Under-Secretary Beers believed that every time the U.S. government spoke, those “words are heard around the world” (2002). Does the West expect diplomacy to deliver outcomes which are anathema to diplomacy’s core functions?  Sharp explores this notion further by highlighting that diplomacy’s role is to form a bridge between islands of the other in international society not to act as a converting force that transports them over to our side. Again, this highlights that criticism of diplomacy often boils down to the message and not the delivery mechanism. Sharp insists that more effective enforcement the West’s message is not the answer (2009: 285). This thesis suggests a subtler approach is required; one that incorporates all available technologies to deliver a more palatable, bite-size message, as 
                                                     
197 The U.S. government requested the Church Commission investigate the operations of the CIA in what is widely 
regarded as the most comprehensive investigation of the international intelligence service ever conducted; See also: 
Church Committee Final Report. (1976). ‘The Department of State,’ (Chapter 14, pp. 305-317). Book 1: Foreign and 
Military Intelligence. The report noted “that State had access to CIA communication only as determined by the CIA, 
whereas the CIA has access to all State’s communications.” (1976: 315). 
198 The Office for Combating Terrorism, created in 1972 became the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
in 1985, and the Bureau of Counterterrorism in 2012. For more information, visit Bureau of Counterterrorism. U.S. 
Department of State.  
199 The Bureau of Counterterrorism homepage. U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/  
200 The Digital Outreach Team is part of the CSCC and openly engages with the foreign public in Arabic, Urdu, Punjabi, 
and Somali actively and openly engages in Arabic, Urdu, Punjabi, and Somali to counter terrorist propaganda and 
misinformation. The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), U.S. Department of State; U.S. 
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. ‘Executive Summary’ op. cit. The CSCC has been encouraged by the 
Advisory Commission to increase its capacity to combat ISIL’s violent extremism to which the CSCC has responded 
by learning and adapting in this dynamic environment. One way it has achieved this is by reverting to low tech audio 
file streaming in an attempt to connect to “less literate audiences” (2003: 3, 7). 
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opposed to complex communications which are hard to swallow. This approach can be assisted through the mobilisation of Arab and Muslim diaspora to add their voice to the conversation using all available media platforms.201 Leonard maintains that simple, easy to understand messages are the answer in an environment where people (consumers of information) are bombarded with thousands of messages every day (2002: 51). As the thesis has demonstrated time and again, building strong sustainable relationships will only be achieved through dialogue, this is communication that involves the dissemination as well as receiving of a message(s).  Sharp admits that the extremists have endured and even usurped Western outreach through “better public diplomacy and propaganda” (2009: 280).202 However, this trend is reversible as the West can work with the “seismic shifts in the sophistication and volume of information” available and there have been many positive practical developments.203 The Office of eDiplomacy, which is part of the Bureau of Information and Resource Management, was established by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2002 to improve the Department’s use of information “in the pursuit of national interests” (2011: 132). Subsequently, the Office of eDiplomacy has “been responsible for some terrific innovations” which relate directly to the WoT. 204  State’s ‘Engage America’ and ‘Hometown Diplomat’ are proactive programs which encourage communication between professional and ‘civilian’ diplomats.205 In 2015, the Department of State has created a “multi-disciplinary hub” which will facilitate better resource management, improve knowledge sharing, and provide greater accountability for development initiatives.206 The U.S.’ coalition partners of the United States have created their own online presence with varying degrees of success and social media platforms have been incorporated into many MFA’s. The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy has urged the Obama administration to continue to connect public diplomacy with policy-making in Washington.207 This acknowledgement from the Advisory Commission, supports the premise of this thesis that diplomacy, in this case public diplomacy, “adds a more sophisticated approach to the military method of ‘winning’ the war on terrorism” (van Ham, 2003: 442). 
                                                     
201 van Ham states that the Department of State began actively involving Muslim Americans in a media campaign 
“on the necessities of regime change in Iraq” prior to the 2003 invasion (2003: 438). 
202 See also: Klausen, J. ‘Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq’, 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 38, no. 1, (2014), pp. 1-22.  
203 U.S. Department of State and U.S. AID. ‘Executive Summary.’ (2003 8); U.S Department of State, Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review. (US Government 2015).   
204 Radio Sawa, Al Hurra television, and the digital outreach team (DOT) who counter online radicalization through 
foreign language bogging are some the Office of eDiplomacy’s WoT related programs. (Murray, 2015:133). 
205 U.S. Department of State and U.S. AID. ‘Executive Summary.’ op.cit. State will increase funding for diplomatic 
staff recruitment and training to “modernize” and “diversify” the Foreign Service (2003: 13-14). 
206 The hub incorporates “analytics, data science, strategy and knowledge management.” (Ibid: 10). 
207 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. ‘Executive Summary’ op.cit.  (2003:3). 
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The online arena has also become a battlefield where cyber warriors from both sides target material and human assets. Western governments have uploaded videos to YouTube through the Multi-National Force Iraq channel (MNFIRAQ) to show their humanitarian efforts of the military personnel and development achievements of the Foreign Service.208 Likewise, terrorist groups have taken to YouTube to target the military with videos footage taken by third-party observers and in some instances from the military personnel’s own onboard camera footage. Various terrorist groups have an extensive online profile including Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and Twitter pages, message boards and blogs and online magazines. Al Qaida’s Inspire, the Afghan Taliban’s Al-Somood, and ISIL’s Dabiq are just a selection of the English language periodicals produced by contemporary terrorist organisations. The terrorists are not immune to cyber-attacks as evidence by hacking of an estimated 26,000 ISIL linked Twitter accounts by cyber-activist group Anonymous who proceeded to publish the details of 70 pro ISIL websites and their host providers. Contemporary terrorist groups are maximizing their use of ICT and globalisation enablers, ironically the same ICT and interconnected processes which enhance modern diplomatic relations driven by the MFA.209  State’s online presence is on par with the terrorist groups and the Foreign Service has access to the latest technology to compete for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the global disenchanted. An often misunderstood component of the global audience is the domestic constituency. Three decades ago Klare and Kornbluh stressed that one of the priorities of the intervening state in low-intensity warfare (COIN and/or sustained CT operations) is “to wage the war at home - to fight for hearts and minds …” (1988: 14). Once again, it comes down to presenting a compatible message, however, this approach reliant upon the target audience listening.  
Defence Diplomacy in the Long War detailed how development and diplomacy are inextricably linked whether at a macro (IGO’s, States, and Regional bodies, the World Bank, IMF, and WTO) level or the micro (Sub–regional organisations, NGO’s, CSO’s) level. Roberts’s notes that NGO’s working in the development sector often liken themselves to “development diplomats” (2009: 513). Communication and representation are the fundamental diplomatic elements that facilitate development and aid projects from concept to completion. In the 2015 Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review, then Secretary of State Kerry highlighted that governments need to increase their already substantial global partnerships with NGO’s and CSO’s. Endorsing the multistakeholder, WoG approach which permeates this research, Secretary Kerry declared 
                                                     
208 MNFIRAQ was put up online in march 2007 to give viewers a boots on the ground perspective of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.” (2008:163). Christensen presents a comprehensive study of the use of social media by both sides in the 
WoT. As a non-expert of digital platforms and due to the research time-frame, I have relied on selective primary 
documents and peer reviewed journals for my sources. 
209 Kiras states technology is not a one-way phenomenon. The same technologies that enable terrorists to 
permeate global populations can likewise be used to penetrate their organisations in counter-terrorism measures. 
(2010: 384).   
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that diplomacy is no longer limited to traditional actors insisting, “diplomats…must focus on strengthening partnerships with civil society, citizen movements, faith leaders, entrepreneurs, innovators and others how to share our values” (2015: 9). Hamilton and Langhorne maintain that development initiatives are “a major growth area in the use and usefulness of diplomatic activity” (2010: 246). Secretary Kerry re-affirmed, “American diplomacy and development are crucial to ensuring that this century will be defined by the opportunities rather than the threats” (QDDR, 2015: 8). This thesis argues that this is another aspect of the WoT where the West has fully tapped into diplomacy’s potential to provide successful outcomes.   The sharing of ‘our values’ permeates most Western security and development initiatives and the promotion of democracy remains a central pillar of Western outreach (albeit, not a vocally as previous). However, correlating the establishment of democracy with good governance continues to be a point of contention among populations with which the West is trying to connect. According to a Pew Research Center poll conducted in October 2014, only 48% of Tunisian’s, the birthplace of the ‘Arab Spring,’ prefer a democratic government compared to 68% in 2012.210 Findings from the Global Attitudes Survey also highlight that 83% of Tunisian’s either strictly followed the Q’uran of the values of Islam and a majority of those surveyed regard stability and a strong military as more valuable than democracy and political representation.211 The 2010 Annual 
Arab Public Opinion Survey noted that a Gallup poll in 2006 likewise revealed a strong link between religion and politics with participants agreeing that religious leaders should actively participate in the drafting a new constitution.212 During the same 2010 study, when participants were asked to nominate the two factors driving U.S. policy in the Middle East, combating terrorism, and promoting democracy ranked lowest (2010: 10). The Survey also asked respondents which state would they prefer to be the solitary ‘superpower,’ and the U.S. was ranked 6th behind France, China, Germany, Britain and Russia (Ibid: 55). This is an area where active listening must precede dialogue otherwise Western efforts to communicate will be unable to overcome the realities of past democratization efforts in turbulent regions. In the short-term, Berger claims that Western NGO’s should cooperate more with Islamic organisations because the West lacks “credibility” as it has focused on implanting democracy at the expense of human rights (2004: 14). Since 2001, diplomatic scholarship has been dwarfed by the exponential growth in Security Studies funding, degree programs and publications, while foreign policy analysis overshadows 
                                                     
210‘Spring 2014 Global Attitudes Survey’, Pew Research Center.   
211 Ibid. Question 106, 62% would favour stability without democracy and Question 38a/38b, 95 %, believe the 
military has a positive influence on the country while only 52 % believe the national government has a positive 
influence on the country. 
212 The survey found that percentage of people who thought of themselves as primarily as Muslims first-increased, 
citizens of their country second- declined marginally and citizens of world last- declined as well however the numbers 
of respondents who chose that option was almost within the margin of error (2010: 75). 
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diplomatic studies in U.S. International Relations disciplines.213 Despite diplomacy’s utility in the WoT evidenced by this research project, institutionalized research programs and think-tanks, who had intermittently debated terrorism prior to 9/11, now, had unprecedented access to policymakers (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).214 One must question why diplomacy has been given short shrift when as Der Derian explains, diplomacy has historically been a foil against terrorism and defines terrorism(1987: 74, 82) and claims that ironically, although “definitions of terrorism have been multiplying almost as rapidly as the institutions set up to analyse the phenomenon” (1987: 152), it seems “nations cannot agree to a common definition of terrorism, let alone common power to enforce sanctions against it” (1992: 79). Academics often attempt to contain diplomacy and terrorism within a neat conceptual box when the concepts are so broad that they can’t be corralled.  Whilst prosecuting the WoT, the U.S. and its allies have taken political and military action; building up its offensive and defensive military capabilities and establishing strategic alliances. However, from a diplomatic action standpoint the focus is, as always, on relations and on how they are strengthened and maintained regardless of external developments. Diplomacy continues even after war has been chosen as the method to achieve their foreign policy objectives. From this insight, it is reasonable to suggest that if a diplomatic mantra existed, it would be, if there were an opportunity to talk, let’s take it. Although this may not be politically acceptable when keeping a dialogue open is viewed as getting in the way of other courses of action to provide policy outcomes.  Throughout the WoT, the portrayal of terrorism and terrorists “has done as much to divide the West as to unite it” which affects internal and external relations between all stakeholders, especially states (Buzan & Hansen, 2008: 254).215 In the past terrorist groups who stopped bombing and started lobbying acquired legitimacy and were able to have representation at an international level.216 However, Peter Willets claims that al Qa’ida and its violent global agenda 
                                                     
213 “Especially in the last decade or so, security studies have become a vibrant and diverse field of inquiry” (Barkawi 
& Laffey, 2006: 333); An increase in “CT scholarship…has also contributed to this shift in strategic emphasis” (Adams, 
Et al., 2011: 13); Sharp notes that there was a growth in diplomatic scholarship post-Cold War in both “established 
foreign service schools” as well as in newly created centres which reinforce and reinvigorate diplomacy’s utility in 
the 1990’s (2009: 45; Based on Sharp’s assessment in would seem that diplomatic studies were set to enter the 21st 
century from a position of strength however the terrorist attacks on the United States interrupted that progress; 
Garret Mattingly argued, “ideological absolutes…drive diplomacy from the field. In their absence diplomacy is 
returning” (1955:196). 
214 Buzan and Hansen note that although “there were a number of institutionalised research communities devoted 
to terrorism prior to 9/11,” the presence of terrorism related think-tanks, conferences university programs and 
journals have increased significantly (2009: 252-3). 
215 Barkawi & Laffey declare that “Attempting to disaggregate these phenomena and squeeze them into boxes 
marked ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’ will not aid understanding of the dynamics of the War on Terror” (2006: 347). 
216 Examples include: The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) and Hizballah in the Middle East, the IRA in Northern Ireland and the Kosovo Liberation Army in the former 
Yugoslavia 
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have effectively “delegitimized all groups who use violence for political purposes” (2008: 338). The opportunities for political engagement have been deeply affected because “the characterisation of ‘terrorism’ and the identity of ‘terrorists’ is opaque and remain heavily contested” (Ibid: 254). This is an important point of conjecture in a “modern international system (where) the bestowal of diplomatic identity became a means of empowerment-its denial a means of disempowerment” (Constantinou & Der Derian, 2008: 9).  
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